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Britain & the Egyptian Nationalist Movement 1936-1952
This is a comprehensive study of the Egyptian Nationalist Movement between two of the most important dates in the history of modern 1936, the year of the Anglo-Egyptian Alliance Treaty, and 1952, the year of the 23 July Revolution. This 17-year period coincided with the final years of Britain's military occupation and authoritarian influence within Egypt, and also with the end of the reign of Egypt's last king.
Basing her study mainly on official British documents, the author analyses the Egyptian Nationalist Movement from the perspective of those who shaped British policy during that time. She explains the many covert links between the British Embassy and certain Egyptian parties and political groups and the positions of the principal contenders in the Egyptian political arena regarding the vital issues of the day. Analysis of the period of armed struggle in the Suez Canal Zone in 1951-2 shows that the British misjudged the signs and implications of the situation, failing especially to appreciate the crucial role of the Egyptian army and police in the Nationalist Movement.
The study's conclusions are supported by primary sources including Foreign Office reports and reveal divergent views of political developments in Egypt during this eventful period.
Basing her study mainly on official British documents, the author analyses the Egyptian Nationalist Movement from the perspective of those who shaped British policy during that time. She explains the many covert links between the British Embassy and certain Egyptian parties and political groups and the positions of the principal contenders in the Egyptian political arena regarding the vital issues of the day. Analysis of the period of armed struggle in the Suez Canal Zone in 1951-2 shows that the British misjudged the signs and implications of the situation, failing especially to appreciate the crucial role of the Egyptian army and police in the Nationalist Movement.
The study's conclusions are supported by primary sources including Foreign Office reports and reveal divergent views of political developments in Egypt during this eventful period.
350 pages, Hardcover
First published July 1, 1994
About the author
Gamal Abdel Nasser
57 books18 followersGamal Abdel Nasser Hussein (Arabic: جمال عبد الناصر حسين) was the 2nd President (1956–1970) and occasional Prime Minister (1954, 1954–1962, 1967–1970) of Egypt after having led the overthrow of the King of Egypt in 1952.
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December 24, 2015
Hoda Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Britain and the Egyptian National Movement is a high political examination of the relationship between Britain and the Egyptian nationalists between 1936 and 1952, albeit one that attempts engage the latter as an autonomous entity rather than as a function of its relationship to the former. Her work is divided into four lengthy chapters that cover the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, World War II, the conflict’s immediate aftermath, and the final years prior to the Free Officer Revolution. Her overarching theme is that “the greater the escalation of the Movement and the diversification of its currents, branches, and modes of action, and the more it received support from Egyptian public opinion, the more difficult it became for Britain to control or contain it”. Her assessment of the British, therefore, is that they were too rigid in their analysis of Egypt’s dynamic political elements to be able to respond to them effectively.
In looking at the 1930s, Abdel Nasser argues that the National Front first coalesced as the result of a unified drive from the Wafd, the palace, and the public to extract concessions from Britain in regard to the occupation. The Front, however, was not as revolutionary as the movement that supported it, and thus they sought cooperation and more moderate demands. This allowed the British to play the Front’s disparate elements against each other and prevent it from achieving a genuine treaty of independence, securing instead what the British desired: a short-term solution to national problems that did not fundamentally alter its relationship with the country. The arrival of World War II brought two issues to the fore: Egypt’s entry into the conflict and securing the home front. In terms of the former, the nationalists were successful in preventing the worst of the conflict from coming to Egypt, but this was also due in part to the turning tides of the war and the British considerations of the political implications if Egypt could claim to have contributed to victory. As for the second issue, their collaboration with the British engendered the rise of more radical political elements and lowered their popularity, making them more dependent on British support.
After the war the British attempted to coopt the nationalists and use them to further their own interests, but the revolutionary backing of the group proved too powerful. Meanwhile, the hegemony of the Wafd was challenged by religious groups, which became increasingly violent the more they were repressed, and socialists, who had limited impact, yet were of particular concern to the British as the growing Soviet influence became a global concern. The nationalists, meanwhile, wanted to negotiate a new relationship with the British, particularly in terms of the military presence that far exceeded the limits of the 1936 treaty. The British refused at first to negotiate and, once they finally acquiesced, dragged out the discussions for over a year without any meaningful result. Egypt’s international contacts, particularly with the Arab League, grew during this time and eventually it decided to bring its demands to the United Nations. The British feared that Egypt had a strong case that would embarrass them, and thus they did everything they could to prevent the matter from reaching the Security Council. Although they failed in this, the committee’s decision took a middle path that pleased no one, essentially telling both sides to continue with discussions. Continued political and military intrigues led to increased violence and, in the end, Britain discovered that its belief in the loyalty of the Egyptian Army was mistaken, for it had grown nationalist, independent, and capable of undertaking a revolution.
Abdel Nasser’s work is relatively detailed and often relies more on British documents than Egyptian ones, but overall bestows more agency to indigenous actors and popular movements than most previous studies. Works that have been produced in the twenty years since this book’s publication, however, have provided more nuanced, comprehensive, and engaged accounts of indigenous Egyptian contributions to the political movements of this era, and thus while there is nothing particularly problematic with Britain and the Egyptian Nationalist Movement, it is now probably more of an interesting piece for specialists to consider rather than something essential for scholars to read.
In looking at the 1930s, Abdel Nasser argues that the National Front first coalesced as the result of a unified drive from the Wafd, the palace, and the public to extract concessions from Britain in regard to the occupation. The Front, however, was not as revolutionary as the movement that supported it, and thus they sought cooperation and more moderate demands. This allowed the British to play the Front’s disparate elements against each other and prevent it from achieving a genuine treaty of independence, securing instead what the British desired: a short-term solution to national problems that did not fundamentally alter its relationship with the country. The arrival of World War II brought two issues to the fore: Egypt’s entry into the conflict and securing the home front. In terms of the former, the nationalists were successful in preventing the worst of the conflict from coming to Egypt, but this was also due in part to the turning tides of the war and the British considerations of the political implications if Egypt could claim to have contributed to victory. As for the second issue, their collaboration with the British engendered the rise of more radical political elements and lowered their popularity, making them more dependent on British support.
After the war the British attempted to coopt the nationalists and use them to further their own interests, but the revolutionary backing of the group proved too powerful. Meanwhile, the hegemony of the Wafd was challenged by religious groups, which became increasingly violent the more they were repressed, and socialists, who had limited impact, yet were of particular concern to the British as the growing Soviet influence became a global concern. The nationalists, meanwhile, wanted to negotiate a new relationship with the British, particularly in terms of the military presence that far exceeded the limits of the 1936 treaty. The British refused at first to negotiate and, once they finally acquiesced, dragged out the discussions for over a year without any meaningful result. Egypt’s international contacts, particularly with the Arab League, grew during this time and eventually it decided to bring its demands to the United Nations. The British feared that Egypt had a strong case that would embarrass them, and thus they did everything they could to prevent the matter from reaching the Security Council. Although they failed in this, the committee’s decision took a middle path that pleased no one, essentially telling both sides to continue with discussions. Continued political and military intrigues led to increased violence and, in the end, Britain discovered that its belief in the loyalty of the Egyptian Army was mistaken, for it had grown nationalist, independent, and capable of undertaking a revolution.
Abdel Nasser’s work is relatively detailed and often relies more on British documents than Egyptian ones, but overall bestows more agency to indigenous actors and popular movements than most previous studies. Works that have been produced in the twenty years since this book’s publication, however, have provided more nuanced, comprehensive, and engaged accounts of indigenous Egyptian contributions to the political movements of this era, and thus while there is nothing particularly problematic with Britain and the Egyptian Nationalist Movement, it is now probably more of an interesting piece for specialists to consider rather than something essential for scholars to read.
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