What do you think?
Rate this book
The Last Year of the Luftwaffe: May 1944 to May 1945
An insight into the decline and fall of the German air force.
- GenresMilitary HistoryAviation
191 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1991
106 people are currently reading
48 people want to read
About the author
Alfred Price
122 books19 followersAlfred Price seved for 16 years as an aircrew officer in the Royal air Force where he specialised in electronic warfare and air fighting tactics.
He left the RAF in 1974 and thereafter he worked full time as a writer on aviation subjects.
He holds a PhD in history from Loughborough University and is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
He left the RAF in 1974 and thereafter he worked full time as a writer on aviation subjects.
He holds a PhD in history from Loughborough University and is a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews
April 16, 2021
This book is a handy little history of the death throes of the once world-conquering Luftwaffe. It is a succinct chronicle of the activities, weapons and politics of the final twelve months of this fighting force.
Beginning his narrative in the build up to D-Day, Price describes how what was, in May 1944, a formidable force awaiting invasion and the resumption of the Soviet advance, became, in May 1945 a force with no bombers, no pilots and no fuel, that could barely fly a single plane into Berlin.
Price makes clear a few points that I think are worth noting: despite the Allied bombing the German aircraft factories continued to push out record numbers of 'planes, partly by severely rationalizing the models produced. Thus, there was never a shortage of fighters at any time, to the extent that by 1945 if a 'plane got damaged it wasn't repaired, as it was simpler to take a new one from an aircraft park.
What the Allied bombing did do however, was to cripple the fuel supply to the Luftwaffe. This became one of the major impediments to continued flying by the force. In April 1944 175,000 tons of fuel was produced, but in June that figure had reduced to 55,000 tons. Later in the book Price notes - referring to the deployment of the Heinkel He 177 heavy bomber - "If the heavy bomber force mounted ten sorties per aircraft per month, and the operational training organization turns out new crews at a rate sufficient to replace moderate attrition, about 35,000 tons of aviation fuel would have been required per month [assuming a fleet of 270 bombers, which was about one-twentieth of the numbers of heavy bombers available to the USAAF and RAF]. That was nearly one-fifth of the total German aviation fuel production in May 1944, the month when production reached it's peak." This fuel crisis became the major problem for the Luftwaffe into 1945.
One shibboleth that Price convincingly demolishes is the idea that Hitler's requirement that the Me 262 be developed as a ground attack aircraft delayed the implementation of this weapon to the extent that Germany lost the air war. Price shows that the Me 262 was not delayed by the decision to turn it into a bomb-carrier, but by the unserviceability of its engines - the first squadrons were deployed with an engine life of 10 hours, which meant that they were almost impossible to keep in the field. The training of pilots to fly these difficult aircraft was also an issue, with some units being withdrawn to retrain the pilots after their first initial injection into the fight.
The reason the Me 262 was deployed before it was ready, and why other more-or-less ineffective weapons such as the Me 163, the Bachem Natter and various missiles were the subject of much work, was to try and find an effective counter to the massive Allied air raids that were flying at will over the Reich. Price recounts the telling statistics that despite the best efforts of the Germans, loss rates for the Allied bombers never climbed much above 3% per mission from all sources. The German fighter loss rate was higher, and unlike the Allies, who could easily replace both pilots and 'planes, the Luftwaffe was rapidly running out of experienced pilots.
The thinking of the Nazi hierarchy did not help either - there were several attempts at "decisive blows" such as Operation Bodenplatte. Given the overwhelming material advantage of the Allies, these large-scale operations never had a chance of having a decisive impact on the Allies war effort, and in fact usually resulted in the loss of precious pilots, while using up ever more of the dwindling stocks of fuel.
As the final few months of the War closed in, more desperate tactics began to be thought of. The strange piggy-back Mistel "flying bombs" were used in a vain attempt to slow the Russian advance, and pilots were trained for ramming attacks against the bomber formations. These schemes did nothing to halt the inevitable.
For those with an interest in this subject, this book is well worth picking up: it is well-written and contains useful charts and statistics, as well as a bibliography. The index is next-to-useless, but that is to be expected in a work published by Greenhill. One for aficionados.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
Beginning his narrative in the build up to D-Day, Price describes how what was, in May 1944, a formidable force awaiting invasion and the resumption of the Soviet advance, became, in May 1945 a force with no bombers, no pilots and no fuel, that could barely fly a single plane into Berlin.
Price makes clear a few points that I think are worth noting: despite the Allied bombing the German aircraft factories continued to push out record numbers of 'planes, partly by severely rationalizing the models produced. Thus, there was never a shortage of fighters at any time, to the extent that by 1945 if a 'plane got damaged it wasn't repaired, as it was simpler to take a new one from an aircraft park.
What the Allied bombing did do however, was to cripple the fuel supply to the Luftwaffe. This became one of the major impediments to continued flying by the force. In April 1944 175,000 tons of fuel was produced, but in June that figure had reduced to 55,000 tons. Later in the book Price notes - referring to the deployment of the Heinkel He 177 heavy bomber - "If the heavy bomber force mounted ten sorties per aircraft per month, and the operational training organization turns out new crews at a rate sufficient to replace moderate attrition, about 35,000 tons of aviation fuel would have been required per month [assuming a fleet of 270 bombers, which was about one-twentieth of the numbers of heavy bombers available to the USAAF and RAF]. That was nearly one-fifth of the total German aviation fuel production in May 1944, the month when production reached it's peak." This fuel crisis became the major problem for the Luftwaffe into 1945.
One shibboleth that Price convincingly demolishes is the idea that Hitler's requirement that the Me 262 be developed as a ground attack aircraft delayed the implementation of this weapon to the extent that Germany lost the air war. Price shows that the Me 262 was not delayed by the decision to turn it into a bomb-carrier, but by the unserviceability of its engines - the first squadrons were deployed with an engine life of 10 hours, which meant that they were almost impossible to keep in the field. The training of pilots to fly these difficult aircraft was also an issue, with some units being withdrawn to retrain the pilots after their first initial injection into the fight.
The reason the Me 262 was deployed before it was ready, and why other more-or-less ineffective weapons such as the Me 163, the Bachem Natter and various missiles were the subject of much work, was to try and find an effective counter to the massive Allied air raids that were flying at will over the Reich. Price recounts the telling statistics that despite the best efforts of the Germans, loss rates for the Allied bombers never climbed much above 3% per mission from all sources. The German fighter loss rate was higher, and unlike the Allies, who could easily replace both pilots and 'planes, the Luftwaffe was rapidly running out of experienced pilots.
The thinking of the Nazi hierarchy did not help either - there were several attempts at "decisive blows" such as Operation Bodenplatte. Given the overwhelming material advantage of the Allies, these large-scale operations never had a chance of having a decisive impact on the Allies war effort, and in fact usually resulted in the loss of precious pilots, while using up ever more of the dwindling stocks of fuel.
As the final few months of the War closed in, more desperate tactics began to be thought of. The strange piggy-back Mistel "flying bombs" were used in a vain attempt to slow the Russian advance, and pilots were trained for ramming attacks against the bomber formations. These schemes did nothing to halt the inevitable.
For those with an interest in this subject, this book is well worth picking up: it is well-written and contains useful charts and statistics, as well as a bibliography. The index is next-to-useless, but that is to be expected in a work published by Greenhill. One for aficionados.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
July 8, 2021
Many books have been written on the Luftwaffe, but one of the most interesting aspects is that despite many saying "What if X or Y was done differebtly", they fail to adress that by its nature and the nature of the german war machine, ultimaly, it would still end with german defeat and no ammount of jet fighters or wonder weapons would change that. Add to that the several mistakes and missplaces confidence of the german high command and one can see how the Luftwafe was slated to be defeates by the might of the Allies and USSR.
January 10, 2023
Excellent read and more focused on the actual operations than many similar titles that focus on more conjectural Luft '46 type technology.
WOuld have been even better if the narratives and first-hand reports could have been expanded upon further.
WOuld have been even better if the narratives and first-hand reports could have been expanded upon further.
July 12, 2025
enjoyable read and was very well written
I enjoyed this book immensely. The author did a splendid job of providing both the facts and a fine summation of the strategy of the Luftwaffe during the war. Very well done.
I enjoyed this book immensely. The author did a splendid job of providing both the facts and a fine summation of the strategy of the Luftwaffe during the war. Very well done.
January 25, 2026
very readable history of the Luftwaffe last read with an overall evaluation
How the lufvfwaffe was ground down and fought on. The evaluation of equipment seems solid in 2026. The effect of American strategic bombing is well described
How the lufvfwaffe was ground down and fought on. The evaluation of equipment seems solid in 2026. The effect of American strategic bombing is well described
January 28, 2020
This was an information look at the final year of the once powerful Luftwaffe, highlighting some of the misconceptions many have. If you are interested in the period, it is well worth reading!
September 5, 2007
A fairly decent book on the title subject, but pretty dry and of use mostly to scholars and WW2 aviation devotees.
Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 reviews