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Muddy Glory: America's Indian Wars in the Philippines
Book covering history of American "Indian Wars" in the Phillipines 1899-1935
256 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1981
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October 22, 2012
Roth, Russell. Muddy Glory: America’s ‘Indian Wars’ in the Philippines, 1899-1935. West Hanover, MA: The Christopher Publishing House, 1981.
May, Glenn A. “Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902” Pacific Historical Review 52 (November 1983), 351-377.
People familiar with the Spanish American War often forget that it begot another war, the Philippine-American War. While history remembers the Spanish-American War as a glorious endeavor, a “splendid little war” in the words of then president William McKinley, the Philippine-American war receives little historical fanfare. Why? The war involved a struggle for independence that had the United States as an imperial antagonist. The war also cost over 4000 American and countless Filipino lives. In his Muddy Glory: America’s ‘Indian Wars’ in the Philippines, 1899-1935, journalist Russell Roth aims to “…dispel both the secret and the lack of understanding” regarding the war. He proceeds to do this using soldier letters, writings, dispatches, and a slew of secondary sources.
As the name of the book and Roth suggests, Muddy Glory mostly concerns the United States’ engagements with Filipino guerillas. The figure head, Emilio Aguinaldo only warrants periodic mentions as Roth relates that General Frederick Funston locates and captures him early in the book. The guerillas particularly interest Roth. Unconventional tactics like cult following fighters, suicidal juramentados, and head hunting Igorots have the American soldiers resorting to measures utilized in America’s Indian Wars. American response often proved desperate, if not brutal. General Franklin Bell’s orders to shoot all un-uniformed civilians acting as soldiers and re-concentration policies effectively squashed Batangan resistance, but it also gave American politicians truths to hide. Author Glenn A. May would agree with the assertion that the Philippine-American War characterized such behavior. In his “Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902,” he compares the war with the troublesome Vietnam War. May’s essay particularly concerned how Americans “won” the Philippine-American War. With his eye to the comparability of the wars, May’s essay exhaustively addresses his theory. His conclusion leaves the reader with little question that the Communist Vietnamese forces fought a better war than Filipino insurgents.
Muddy Glory lacks the conclusivity and the unity of May’s argument. The book’s organization perplexes readers. The first chapter synthesizes the events of the war. Following chapters address some of the fighting ethnic groups individually. Other chapters regard tragic figures such as constabulary Captain Leonard Furlong or the actions of the beleaguered “Buffalo Soldiers.” The strangest inclusion to a book which intends to illuminate the guerilla nature of the Philippine-American War is Roth’s chapter on the Order of the Carabao, a fraternal order of Philippine-American War and Pacific Theater World War II veterans. Perhaps Roth’s membership in the order warrants the chapter’s inclusion. Roth’s veteran and journalist background makes Muddy Glory a project of personal interest to him, which makes for a hard comparison with the straight laced scholarship of May.
Ultimately, acknowledgment of foreign resistance to American occupation ties the
two works together. May particularly concentrates on the Aguinaldo years, while treating the war as an American victory upon Aguinaldo’s surrender. May argues that Aguinaldo’s lack of touch with the lower class masses, a connection that Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap successfully utilized, largely contributed to his failure. Roth makes no such assertions. While, he liberally relays instances of guerilla resistance across Philippine ethnic lines, he declines to tie examples together to make a definitive argument. Muddy Glory does succeed in relaying the unsavory nature of the Philippine-American War, often detailing the battles in gruesome detail as a military historian might. Roth also continually refers to the desire of the American politicians to play off the Philippine-American War as a success. Roth presents the tension between positive publicity and the reality of the war in nearly every chapter and the confliction is most evident, even if the author fails to dwell on its significance, in the chapter on Private Herman Miller’s request for a Medal of Honor. Because of the nature of Miller’s heroic deeds (Miller was on the defense rather than charging) and their confliction with the notion of America fighting a successful war, the Senate blocked Miller’s receipt of the honor so as not to draw attention to the desperate situation of American soldiers abroad.
While Roth’s did not pronounce his argument like May, both works provide evidence of unconventional war, one which the American public finds unpalatable. The mere association of the war with Vietnam causes little wonder as to why Americans forget the Philippine-American War. Luckily, Russell Roth proposes to help readers remember.
May, Glenn A. “Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902” Pacific Historical Review 52 (November 1983), 351-377.
People familiar with the Spanish American War often forget that it begot another war, the Philippine-American War. While history remembers the Spanish-American War as a glorious endeavor, a “splendid little war” in the words of then president William McKinley, the Philippine-American war receives little historical fanfare. Why? The war involved a struggle for independence that had the United States as an imperial antagonist. The war also cost over 4000 American and countless Filipino lives. In his Muddy Glory: America’s ‘Indian Wars’ in the Philippines, 1899-1935, journalist Russell Roth aims to “…dispel both the secret and the lack of understanding” regarding the war. He proceeds to do this using soldier letters, writings, dispatches, and a slew of secondary sources.
As the name of the book and Roth suggests, Muddy Glory mostly concerns the United States’ engagements with Filipino guerillas. The figure head, Emilio Aguinaldo only warrants periodic mentions as Roth relates that General Frederick Funston locates and captures him early in the book. The guerillas particularly interest Roth. Unconventional tactics like cult following fighters, suicidal juramentados, and head hunting Igorots have the American soldiers resorting to measures utilized in America’s Indian Wars. American response often proved desperate, if not brutal. General Franklin Bell’s orders to shoot all un-uniformed civilians acting as soldiers and re-concentration policies effectively squashed Batangan resistance, but it also gave American politicians truths to hide. Author Glenn A. May would agree with the assertion that the Philippine-American War characterized such behavior. In his “Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902,” he compares the war with the troublesome Vietnam War. May’s essay particularly concerned how Americans “won” the Philippine-American War. With his eye to the comparability of the wars, May’s essay exhaustively addresses his theory. His conclusion leaves the reader with little question that the Communist Vietnamese forces fought a better war than Filipino insurgents.
Muddy Glory lacks the conclusivity and the unity of May’s argument. The book’s organization perplexes readers. The first chapter synthesizes the events of the war. Following chapters address some of the fighting ethnic groups individually. Other chapters regard tragic figures such as constabulary Captain Leonard Furlong or the actions of the beleaguered “Buffalo Soldiers.” The strangest inclusion to a book which intends to illuminate the guerilla nature of the Philippine-American War is Roth’s chapter on the Order of the Carabao, a fraternal order of Philippine-American War and Pacific Theater World War II veterans. Perhaps Roth’s membership in the order warrants the chapter’s inclusion. Roth’s veteran and journalist background makes Muddy Glory a project of personal interest to him, which makes for a hard comparison with the straight laced scholarship of May.
Ultimately, acknowledgment of foreign resistance to American occupation ties the
two works together. May particularly concentrates on the Aguinaldo years, while treating the war as an American victory upon Aguinaldo’s surrender. May argues that Aguinaldo’s lack of touch with the lower class masses, a connection that Vietnam’s Vo Nguyen Giap successfully utilized, largely contributed to his failure. Roth makes no such assertions. While, he liberally relays instances of guerilla resistance across Philippine ethnic lines, he declines to tie examples together to make a definitive argument. Muddy Glory does succeed in relaying the unsavory nature of the Philippine-American War, often detailing the battles in gruesome detail as a military historian might. Roth also continually refers to the desire of the American politicians to play off the Philippine-American War as a success. Roth presents the tension between positive publicity and the reality of the war in nearly every chapter and the confliction is most evident, even if the author fails to dwell on its significance, in the chapter on Private Herman Miller’s request for a Medal of Honor. Because of the nature of Miller’s heroic deeds (Miller was on the defense rather than charging) and their confliction with the notion of America fighting a successful war, the Senate blocked Miller’s receipt of the honor so as not to draw attention to the desperate situation of American soldiers abroad.
While Roth’s did not pronounce his argument like May, both works provide evidence of unconventional war, one which the American public finds unpalatable. The mere association of the war with Vietnam causes little wonder as to why Americans forget the Philippine-American War. Luckily, Russell Roth proposes to help readers remember.
Displaying 1 of 1 review