In this authoritative book, the only work to cover the full sweep of German foreign policy since the end of World War II, noted scholar Helga Haftendorn explores Germany's remarkable recovery from wartime defeat and destruction. Offspring of the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic entered the international arena in 1949 under three crippling constraints: they were held accountable for the crimes of the Third Reich, they were fully dependent on the occupation powers, and their international room for maneuver was limited by an East-West conflict that placed Bonn and East Berlin on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain. Tracing the FRG's strategy of multilateralism, Haftendorn convincingly demonstrates how these liabilities transformed into opportunities as Germany found a security guarantee in NATO membership and economic and political rewards in the system of European integration. The author's overview of past half-century shows a high degree of continuity and consistency in German foreign policy despite the tumultuous events of the era. However, Haftendorn argues that Germany's traditional policy of self-restraint was increasingly counterbalanced by a more assertive stance after reunification and the rise of a post-war generation to power. Although the country's leaders continued to value international institutions, the benefits were increasingly weighed against Germany's enlightened self-interest. Scholars and students of contemporary Germany, Europe, and East-West relations will find this nuanced and knowledgeable study invaluable.
Helga Haftendorn's book traces Germany's journey from being an "object of policy to a subject again" (399) during the years of the Cold War. The transformation occured through the surrender of sovereignty and embrace of multilaterism, which built up trust towards both German states. Haftendorn's piece is long an exhaustively researched, however, I found that it did little to move beyond a cursory overview of the period. Recommended as a reference for those new to the operation of German foreign policy during this period. As a side note, I did enjoy the inclusion of chapters concerning the GDR.
Quotes:
1. When the two German states started to develop foreign policies of their own in the 1950s, their primary goal was to reduce the restraints imposed on them and to expand their political range of action. To this end they both employed a strategy of restraint as a means to translate restrictions on their sovereignty into voluntarily accepted limitations. (6)
2. The conflict of priorities between policy based on cooperation with France or relying on the United States became a structural condition of German foreign policy that limited its freedom of action even after the end of the occupation regime. (76)
3. For the Federal Republic the alliance provided a security net that extended far beyond matters of military affairs. It protected it from Soviet pressures and provided a forum for thorough consultations on East-West relations. Hence, it also expanded Bonn’s range of action in foreign policy. And after the adoption of the Harmel Report, it also provided a multilateral framework for a common détente policy. All in all, NATO had succeeded in adapting itself to changed international conditions and had emerged from the NATO crisis stronger than before. And as no other state followed France’s example, Germany’s membership in NATO was no longer in any way put into question. (114)
4. East Berlin was a master at extorting hard deutschmarks for humanitarian improvements. But it ended up by exchanging a dependence on Moscow with a dependence on West Germany. (149)
5. In spite of many differences, the foreign policy of each of the two German states was marked by a high degree of continuity and consistency and changed only when the international structures into which it was embedded changed. Both shared the core policy goals of safeguarding the well-being of their population through economic integration, political stability, preservation of peace, and participation in the community of nations on an equal basis. The Federal Republic practiced a strategy of multilateralism and of adherence to integrative institutions, while the GDR used its socialist ideology as an instrument to shape its relations with “brother states” and “imperialist powers.” (401)