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The Myth of Liberal Individualism
Colin Bird mounts a powerful and original challenge to the traditional view that the ideas associated with the liberal political tradition--the meaning of political freedom, the notion of inviolable human rights, the idea of privacy--cohere around an "individualist" conception of the relation among individuals, society and the state. He argues that by taking this conception for granted, theorists have exaggerated the unity and integrity of liberal political ideals, and limited our perception of the issues they raise.
- GenresPolitics
236 pages, Paperback
First published May 13, 1999
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August 27, 2019
This is a thoughtful and genuinely innovative book. I would love to give it five stars, but unfortunately its structure is confusing and the argument is hard to follow. It's definitely not a book to read from start to finish--read the introduction, then chapters 5-6, then go back and read 1-4. The poor structure and opaque writing is a shame because it the argument is spot on.
Bird's argument is that "liberal individualism," which we mostly think of as a coherent theoretical position, actually involves two ideas that are in tension with each other. Simplifying greatly, these are 1) what is valuable /to/ individuals and 2) the value /of/ individuals. We can think of 1) as the legacy from JS Mill, and 2) as the legacy of Kant.
The tension between these two ideas comes out most clearly in Bird's discussion of Nozick's libertarianism in chapter 5, since libertarianism understands itself as a self-consciously "individualistic" position compared to other liberalisms. Libertarianism as Bird interprets it involves both a view that people are self-owners, as well as a view that people's rights (including self-ownership) are inviolable and impose "side-constraints" on how we may use others. Bird shows, however, that these two commitments are not mutually reinforcing but actually in deep tension with each other. For example, the commitment to self-ownership rights is consistent with, and perhaps requires, that we /maximize/ the exercise of self-ownership rights rather than treat these rights as side-constraints. The commitment to a Kantian view of persons as inviolable, and the value /of/ individuals as opposed to what is valuable /to/ individuals, implies limits on how individuals may permissibly use their ownership rights. This is perhaps clearest in the case of voluntary slavery, which Nozickian libertarians might permit but would be inconsistent (according to Kant's view) with respecting the value /of individuals.
While the incoherence between these two ideas is clearest in the case of libertarian theories, Bird demonstrates implications for liberal theories and their critics generally. To take just one upshot, for example, various criticisms of liberal theories as "atomistic" and "individualistic" are predicated on a confusion. As Bird puts it, one consequence of his argument is that we should understand liberalism as "an unstable alliance of antagonistic principles and ideals." The effect is that the liberal tradition is more up for grabs and open to theoretical development that we have appreciated.
Bird's argument is that "liberal individualism," which we mostly think of as a coherent theoretical position, actually involves two ideas that are in tension with each other. Simplifying greatly, these are 1) what is valuable /to/ individuals and 2) the value /of/ individuals. We can think of 1) as the legacy from JS Mill, and 2) as the legacy of Kant.
The tension between these two ideas comes out most clearly in Bird's discussion of Nozick's libertarianism in chapter 5, since libertarianism understands itself as a self-consciously "individualistic" position compared to other liberalisms. Libertarianism as Bird interprets it involves both a view that people are self-owners, as well as a view that people's rights (including self-ownership) are inviolable and impose "side-constraints" on how we may use others. Bird shows, however, that these two commitments are not mutually reinforcing but actually in deep tension with each other. For example, the commitment to self-ownership rights is consistent with, and perhaps requires, that we /maximize/ the exercise of self-ownership rights rather than treat these rights as side-constraints. The commitment to a Kantian view of persons as inviolable, and the value /of/ individuals as opposed to what is valuable /to/ individuals, implies limits on how individuals may permissibly use their ownership rights. This is perhaps clearest in the case of voluntary slavery, which Nozickian libertarians might permit but would be inconsistent (according to Kant's view) with respecting the value /of individuals.
While the incoherence between these two ideas is clearest in the case of libertarian theories, Bird demonstrates implications for liberal theories and their critics generally. To take just one upshot, for example, various criticisms of liberal theories as "atomistic" and "individualistic" are predicated on a confusion. As Bird puts it, one consequence of his argument is that we should understand liberalism as "an unstable alliance of antagonistic principles and ideals." The effect is that the liberal tradition is more up for grabs and open to theoretical development that we have appreciated.
Displaying 1 of 1 review