Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary democracy works. The authors formulate a theoretical model of how parties create new governments and either maintain them in office or, after a resignation or no-confidence vote, replace them. The theory involves strategic interaction, derives consequences, formulates empirical hypotheses on the basis of these, and tests the hypotheses with data drawn from the postwar European experience with parliamentary democracy.
I am equal parts appalled and impressed that the authors were able to write 300+ pages on this topic, with over 5 chapters dedicated to the model. I am guided to believe that this may have been one of the first books in which economic modeling and theory was applied to political science, hence the strong emphasis.
However, I appreciated the application of game theory and WINSET to model the issue space in a two deminsional area. I also learned about the importance of ministerial positions within parliamentary systems. Prior to the book, I fell into the common misconception that they were just extensions of the majority party or coalition. The complicated interactions between the parliament, cabinet, and civil servants was fascinating.
As the rise of computation took over many fields, political economist attempted at transforming themselves as quasi mathematicians by focusing on probabilistic models generated by simulations. Sadly, this text is basically a demonstration of a model, by chapter 2, which is not constructed as W.H Rickers or James M Buchanan would, by normally using game theory instead of analysis. The first chapter is very insightful and the model does give us interesting bits into parliamentary political strategies, but it's the kind of thing where a demonstration would have been better than a book.