Once a very important book, it was one of the first to use game-theoretic analysis to build a predictive model that could be applied to political coalitions in many countries. It's now pretty outdated, and of interest primarily as a tool to understand the development of political science.
Written in 1962, it is interesting to see how his predictions and observations relate to today. As such, some of this book is out of date and irrelevant. He focuses on domestic and international politics and applies game theory to explain their evolutions. It is an interesting book, but there are a lot of equations and tables, so much of the book is dense. Recommend for political and/or game theorists.
Professor Riker is almost the first person to adopt rational choice theory in the field of political science. This book is also one of the pioneering works on political science using behavioral research (specifically, the method of game theory), and the discussion is in political science. The core issue, whether domestic or international, is alliances.
The book has a seamingly obvious thesis: that politicians seek to form minimum winning coalitions . Riker shifts the incentive of the leader to be a winner, from other theorisists that would consider something akin to power maximization. How does this apply to contexts where winning is not the objective in a democratic society?
This book was an important theoretical contribution when it was first published. It described te dynamics of coalition politics. The key principle is what is termed "the size principle." When forming coalitions, there is a rational desire to develop a "minimum winning coalition." This is a coalition in which--if one member defects--the coalition becomes a minority. This is an aspect of rational choice theory.
The book also addresses why actors may not always follow the size principle. Of considerable historical value.