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The Drift to War 1922-1939
Examines the rise of fascism in Europe in the years before World War II and why it was not stopped, arguing that a weak League of Nations and secret negotiations between Neville Chamberlain and Hitler were to blame
372 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1989
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
September 16, 2018
Most impressive. This book is a very detailed challenge to the British Foreign policy of the 1930's, and goes far beyond the 'benefit of hindsight' , but presents a coherent argument to explain why Appeasement failed. The greatest errors included:
The failure to cancel reparations from Germany - as Lloyd George proposed- in the wake of the post 1929 crisis. A more moderate regime was effectively penalised, and the Nazis exploited the economic uncertainty.
Mussolini was antagonistic to Hitler when he first came to power, but from around 1936 onward the two leaders' affinity developed. The writer's case was that it was in Britain and France's interests to keep the two men apart.
There is a great emphasis on the plight of Austria, in fact the writer counts Austria as more significant than Spain, arguing that once Austria was brought into the Nazi remit, then the way lay open for more expansion into Eastern and South Eastern Europe.
The book presents a case for showing how dismal the Munich Crisis was for Britain. The writer's view is that a British refusal to permit any encroachment of Czechoslovakia's territory in 1938 would have led to Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and various East European countries arraigned against Germany. In fact Germany would not have been strong enough in military terms to win, and that the Hitler's regime would have faced an internal coup. Giving in to Hitler gave him far more prestige and acclaim within Germany, and more time to re-arm.
Britain's dithering about forming an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1939, led to the latter deciding to see an agreement with Germany . The writer accepts the theory that Soviet spies in Britain reported the British government's hesitance to Stalin.
The writer returns to the theme of how harshly the pre- Nazi regimes were treated by Britain and France, and how deferential the British political leadership could be towards the Nazis.
Heartily recommended.
The failure to cancel reparations from Germany - as Lloyd George proposed- in the wake of the post 1929 crisis. A more moderate regime was effectively penalised, and the Nazis exploited the economic uncertainty.
Mussolini was antagonistic to Hitler when he first came to power, but from around 1936 onward the two leaders' affinity developed. The writer's case was that it was in Britain and France's interests to keep the two men apart.
There is a great emphasis on the plight of Austria, in fact the writer counts Austria as more significant than Spain, arguing that once Austria was brought into the Nazi remit, then the way lay open for more expansion into Eastern and South Eastern Europe.
The book presents a case for showing how dismal the Munich Crisis was for Britain. The writer's view is that a British refusal to permit any encroachment of Czechoslovakia's territory in 1938 would have led to Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and various East European countries arraigned against Germany. In fact Germany would not have been strong enough in military terms to win, and that the Hitler's regime would have faced an internal coup. Giving in to Hitler gave him far more prestige and acclaim within Germany, and more time to re-arm.
Britain's dithering about forming an alliance with the Soviet Union in 1939, led to the latter deciding to see an agreement with Germany . The writer accepts the theory that Soviet spies in Britain reported the British government's hesitance to Stalin.
The writer returns to the theme of how harshly the pre- Nazi regimes were treated by Britain and France, and how deferential the British political leadership could be towards the Nazis.
Heartily recommended.
December 4, 2014
This is one of the most well researched and sobering books about the politics of Europe after World War 1. It is extremely well written in an objective manner and the author assists our understanding of the many unfamiliar personalities by brief notes before the index. Lamb constantly references his sources and compares and contrasts alleged facts from different viewpoints to arrive at the truth.
As you progress it is difficult to avoid a growing sense of fury and despair at how millions of innocent lives were eventually sacrificed due to the intransigence and personal prejudices of the politicians involved in a seemingly endless round of negotiations with no outcome - which often proved their intention. Lamb demonstrates that the interests of faction and party often proved more important in many countries than the prevention of rising Nazi aggression. This inevitably led to war.
From an English viewpoint the reputations of Eden, Simon, Henderson and Neville Chamberlain do not fare well. It is sobering to learn that a Prime Minister could lie to the House of Commons and disregard the decisions of cabinet. That a Foreign Secretary could follow his own agenda, based on his own likes and dislikes, regardless of the potential outcome.
For those who seriously study the history of that time, I thoroughly recommend Lamb's book. We have a different attitude to politicians now, perhaps believing things were better then. This book soon corrects that view.
As you progress it is difficult to avoid a growing sense of fury and despair at how millions of innocent lives were eventually sacrificed due to the intransigence and personal prejudices of the politicians involved in a seemingly endless round of negotiations with no outcome - which often proved their intention. Lamb demonstrates that the interests of faction and party often proved more important in many countries than the prevention of rising Nazi aggression. This inevitably led to war.
From an English viewpoint the reputations of Eden, Simon, Henderson and Neville Chamberlain do not fare well. It is sobering to learn that a Prime Minister could lie to the House of Commons and disregard the decisions of cabinet. That a Foreign Secretary could follow his own agenda, based on his own likes and dislikes, regardless of the potential outcome.
For those who seriously study the history of that time, I thoroughly recommend Lamb's book. We have a different attitude to politicians now, perhaps believing things were better then. This book soon corrects that view.
April 24, 2013
A very sobering read which illustrates the unwitting contribution of French and British statesmen to the rise of the Third Reich. From ludicrous French intransigence over Versailles to the trivial, subjective motivations of some British statesmen, specifically Anthony Eden, which failed to thwart and indeed encouraged Hitler's early grasp of opportunities and power.
Well written and researched the book comprehensively relates the main events of the period while explaining the domestic political context in Britain, at least, which is essential to the story. It also identifies and develops numerous, relevant threads of official opinion which dissented from the policies adopted and illustrates how narrowly success may have been averted.
We have largely forgotten or rewritten this inglorious chapter of European history to protect reputations but the verdict is clear as was apparent to many at the time; stopping Hitler's rise was not only possible but might have been easily accomplished if not for the purely selfish political aspirations of those whom should have known better.
An avoidable tragedy with includes the stunning mental image of a genuinely perplexed Mussolini, prepared to stand with the West against Hitler before Anschluss, watching as the French dither and his British allies desert him.
A tough read, to be sure, unless inter-war diplomacy is your bag, but arguably a necessary one for historians. Which probably explains the book's relative obscurity.
Well written and researched the book comprehensively relates the main events of the period while explaining the domestic political context in Britain, at least, which is essential to the story. It also identifies and develops numerous, relevant threads of official opinion which dissented from the policies adopted and illustrates how narrowly success may have been averted.
We have largely forgotten or rewritten this inglorious chapter of European history to protect reputations but the verdict is clear as was apparent to many at the time; stopping Hitler's rise was not only possible but might have been easily accomplished if not for the purely selfish political aspirations of those whom should have known better.
An avoidable tragedy with includes the stunning mental image of a genuinely perplexed Mussolini, prepared to stand with the West against Hitler before Anschluss, watching as the French dither and his British allies desert him.
A tough read, to be sure, unless inter-war diplomacy is your bag, but arguably a necessary one for historians. Which probably explains the book's relative obscurity.
November 6, 2024
A well-worn topic--but this is one of the best inter-war histories. A diplomatic history from the British point-of-view. The author convincingly shows that Germany was handled poorly during the Weimar period, but more sympathetically with the accession of Hitler.
It's sad to see the clear preference of most British politicians for their electoral prestige over their obligations as leaders. This is the first time that I've read that Italy was more important than Ethiopia because of the danger to Austria (without Italian support).
At least as significant was Italy's intervention in Spain; it hardly seems enlightened to leave both the Spanish republic and Ethiopia to Mussolini's whims, yet checking Hitler, particularly over Austria, was more important in the long run.
Another lack of strategic insight was the assumption that Germany was much more powerful than it was, especially in 1938. Even the entreaties of anti-war Germany generals couldn't budge British leadership's belief that Hitler's army was too strong to fight.
Baldwin, Eden, and their minions didn't recognize a good thing (Weimar Germany), when it existed, and then, when challenged by Hitler, didn't want to believe that there was a danger.
This is an excellent resource for those interested in the inter-war years; it reads smoothly and it's loaded with quotes and references from primary sources.
It's sad to see the clear preference of most British politicians for their electoral prestige over their obligations as leaders. This is the first time that I've read that Italy was more important than Ethiopia because of the danger to Austria (without Italian support).
At least as significant was Italy's intervention in Spain; it hardly seems enlightened to leave both the Spanish republic and Ethiopia to Mussolini's whims, yet checking Hitler, particularly over Austria, was more important in the long run.
Another lack of strategic insight was the assumption that Germany was much more powerful than it was, especially in 1938. Even the entreaties of anti-war Germany generals couldn't budge British leadership's belief that Hitler's army was too strong to fight.
Baldwin, Eden, and their minions didn't recognize a good thing (Weimar Germany), when it existed, and then, when challenged by Hitler, didn't want to believe that there was a danger.
This is an excellent resource for those interested in the inter-war years; it reads smoothly and it's loaded with quotes and references from primary sources.
January 26, 2015
Mostly skim read but interesting read
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews