The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947-1960

Columbia Studies in Contemporary American History

by H.W. Brands

The Specter of Neutralism: The Us and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947- 1960 Book Description H W Brands has contributed to The Specter of Neutralism: The Us and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947- 1960 as an author.About the Author: H.W. Brands is Professor of History, Texas A&M University. His books on American foriegn policy include The Devil We Knew, Bound to Empire, and Inside the Cold War.

384 pages, Hardcover

First published October 15, 1990

About the author

H.W. Brands is an acclaimed American historian and author of over thirty books on U.S. history, including Pulitzer Prize finalists The First American and Traitor to His Class. He holds the Jack S. Blanton Sr. Chair in History at the University of Texas at Austin, where he earned his PhD. Originally trained in mathematics, Brands turned to history as a way to pursue his passion for writing. His biographical works on figures like Franklin, Jackson, Grant, and both Roosevelts have earned critical and popular praise for their readability and depth. Raised in Oregon and educated at Stanford, Reed College, and Portland State, he began his teaching career in high schools before entering academia. He later taught at Texas A&M and Vanderbilt before returning to UT Austin. Brands challenges conventional reverence for the Founding Fathers, advocating for a more progressive and evolving view of American democracy. In addition to academic works, his commentary has featured in major documentaries. His books, published internationally and translated into multiple languages, examine U.S. political, economic, and cultural development with compelling narrative force. Beyond academia, he is a public intellectual contributing to national conversations on history and governance.

Reviews

[Rhuff · Rating 4 out of 5]

In our modern unilateral globe, the very concept of a third world has been rendered passe. But at one time its existence as a geopolitical pivot was a necessary focus for cold war policy planners. In this book Professor Brands studies three strategic "emerging nations" of the 50s, as they struggled for identity in the bipolar postwar world: India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt. Each country was a regional "key" for American interests, but also an ideological frontier. Too close affinity for either camp would have exposed these nations to the frontline chaos of Korea and Vietnam; thus it was in their interests to distance themselves from either bloc and play off both.

The US, especially in the Eisenhower years, was suspicious of neutralism. But as Brands writes, Washington had little choice but to play along. In the case of Egypt and India (and Iran), replacing Britain as a trading partner without colonial baggage was sold as a mutual win. Encouraging neutralism was well enough in the Soviet sphere, as in Yugoslavia; but considered a different animal when anti-colonial, anti-imperialist regimes emerged in the Western Hemisphere, as in Cuba.

Here the critique leveled at American policy - "an overly ideological approach toward nonaligned and developing nations [that] misinterpreted the revolutionary changes shaping that middle ground [pursuing] rigid policies often productive of the very results they aimed to prevent" [p. 313] - is well-founded. Yet elsewhere US policy makers showed a flexibility and even sagacity that is altogether lacking now.

I do disagree with his assertion that "their cold war was chiefly a struggle against the Soviet Union"; that "Only coincidentally - to the degree communism served as a vehicle for the expansion of Soviet influence - was it a battle against communism" [pp. 313-314]. The rise of "Red China" was more than an extension of the Great Soviet Threat; Korea and Vietnam were fought as proxies against China as well as "world communism." In fact, one can plausibly argue that it was the post-WW II threat of a new world order undermining old privilege and power that was the real enemy: abroad or at home, whether or not clothed in Communism or Soviet power. To the CIA's mercenaries overthrowing land reform in Guatemala, or the murderers of three civil rights workers in Neshoba, MS, the connection was causal.

When there were *no alternatives*, Truman was more than happy to pragmatically split the Soviet bloc using dissident Communists like Tito; or Reagan by supporting a radical labor movement like Solidarity. But the thrust of cold war mobilization in the West was most definitely ideological. This is shown by the overt encouragement of pro-capitalist, anti-Communist governments in central and east Europe after 1989. Yugoslavia itself was to be torn apart by overt ideological rejection of socialist federation, when neutralism and non-alignment had become expendable in the newest NWO.

A good look at a world whose passing we should regret.

[Julian Pritchard · Rating 4 out of 5]

Exhaustively researched, careful analysis of US foreign policy towards Tito, Nasser, and Nehru