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The Structure of Freedom
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419 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1958
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May 23, 2013
Bay reviews the "nature of freedom," which he says has been a controversial topic since "the dawn of philosophy," and he draws extensively from the empiricist-utilitarian (Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, and [both] Mills) and idealist (primarily Rousseau) traditions, as well as from the writings of various modern theorists (Laski, Lasswell, Horney, Maslow, Fromm). In this review, Bay notes how he agrees or disagrees with each theorist, and then he states his own position, which is the endorsement of freedom of expression as a political value, with priority directed toward those who are least free, and that such freedom should be maximized by political means.
By freedom of expression, Bay's "structure" of freedom, if understood accurately, is what he calls "a third freedom concept" that combines the utilitarian viewpoint (freedom from external coercion) and Rousseau's perspective (providing the positive conditions to produce good citizens) with Bay's own view - drawing heavily from Fromm - that promotes the development of psychological freedom (full individuality, productivity, and freedom from manipulation that takes us away from our true self). Bay's third freedom concept aligns with but corrects the excesses of the utilitarians (too much individual freedom) and Rousseau (forces people to be free via various socialization practices). To this, Bay adds his notion of psychological freedom whereby the state promotes policies that generally address Maslow-like hierarchical needs that in the end allow all of us to flourish.
This is where Bay's argument starts to bump into some problems. It's all good and well to advocate for the full individuality of one's true self but pulling in the various organs of the state, or others for that matter, to encourage such is quite another once we move beyond a "basic" level of human needs, however these might be defined. Tucked away as a footnote in Bay's book is a quote from Thoreau that leaps out: "'If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life.'" Everyone has opinions about what is good for individuals, but the line between individual freedom and social coercion is very thin and the last thing we need is to add to this natural tension between individual and group life the formal power of the state. An additional problem is that Bay and Fromm presume there is such a thing as a "true self" yet pretty much deny that there is such a thing as fixed human nature (Bay writes, "I share with Rousseau the general belief that human nature can change."), which leaves open the question about what, then, is the "true self." Or Bay presumes that it's all a "good human nature" that doesn't need much government regulation once basic needs are met, and that the self-interested human nature of the utilitarians need not be ("...selfishness seems both undesirable and unnecessary, if one defines it as callousness to the interests of other people."). Given these issues, we are better left with the natural sorting out of the age-old tension between self-interest (which is different than "selfishness") and the needs of the social order, as opposed to interjecting government into what is best left to a private and personal realm.
Bay is at his best in arguing for political science to engage in these normative questions, although he perhaps presumes that political scientists are the charriot drivers, rather than students of those who are (viz., "Politics must in large measure proceed by trial and error - especially in view of the limited guidance political scientists have been able to provide up to now.") Bay and other theorists also discuss freedom's value as a given, but do not pursue that line of thought further as to why it is a given. Bay rightly states that "Freedom is the soil required for the full growth of other values." There's a biological basis for that statement as we need to be free to pursue our self-interested ends, including those that are social and bind us to our group as group solidarity is good for individual security. This gives a richer meaning to freedom and its non-transcendental importance to us as biological beings, including why there is tension between individual freedom and the conforming demands of group life. Bay also says that while security is important, it is a derivative value compared to freedom. It is nothing of the sort from a biological perspective. Security (defensiveness) is the flip side of freedom as defending the integrity of the self allows us to be free. A dead dog, after all, doesn't hunt. Seen from that perspective, personal power is not a bad thing at all. Power gives us the capacity to be who we need to be and to defend against threats to our freedom. Freedom to be, security, and power constitute a biologically-derived structure that allows us to survive and to survive well. Government's proper role then is to lay out the conditions that allow freedom to occur in ways that are compatible with social order.
Most of Bay's book beyond the introductory discussion gets quite wonky and can be skipped over.
By freedom of expression, Bay's "structure" of freedom, if understood accurately, is what he calls "a third freedom concept" that combines the utilitarian viewpoint (freedom from external coercion) and Rousseau's perspective (providing the positive conditions to produce good citizens) with Bay's own view - drawing heavily from Fromm - that promotes the development of psychological freedom (full individuality, productivity, and freedom from manipulation that takes us away from our true self). Bay's third freedom concept aligns with but corrects the excesses of the utilitarians (too much individual freedom) and Rousseau (forces people to be free via various socialization practices). To this, Bay adds his notion of psychological freedom whereby the state promotes policies that generally address Maslow-like hierarchical needs that in the end allow all of us to flourish.
This is where Bay's argument starts to bump into some problems. It's all good and well to advocate for the full individuality of one's true self but pulling in the various organs of the state, or others for that matter, to encourage such is quite another once we move beyond a "basic" level of human needs, however these might be defined. Tucked away as a footnote in Bay's book is a quote from Thoreau that leaps out: "'If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life.'" Everyone has opinions about what is good for individuals, but the line between individual freedom and social coercion is very thin and the last thing we need is to add to this natural tension between individual and group life the formal power of the state. An additional problem is that Bay and Fromm presume there is such a thing as a "true self" yet pretty much deny that there is such a thing as fixed human nature (Bay writes, "I share with Rousseau the general belief that human nature can change."), which leaves open the question about what, then, is the "true self." Or Bay presumes that it's all a "good human nature" that doesn't need much government regulation once basic needs are met, and that the self-interested human nature of the utilitarians need not be ("...selfishness seems both undesirable and unnecessary, if one defines it as callousness to the interests of other people."). Given these issues, we are better left with the natural sorting out of the age-old tension between self-interest (which is different than "selfishness") and the needs of the social order, as opposed to interjecting government into what is best left to a private and personal realm.
Bay is at his best in arguing for political science to engage in these normative questions, although he perhaps presumes that political scientists are the charriot drivers, rather than students of those who are (viz., "Politics must in large measure proceed by trial and error - especially in view of the limited guidance political scientists have been able to provide up to now.") Bay and other theorists also discuss freedom's value as a given, but do not pursue that line of thought further as to why it is a given. Bay rightly states that "Freedom is the soil required for the full growth of other values." There's a biological basis for that statement as we need to be free to pursue our self-interested ends, including those that are social and bind us to our group as group solidarity is good for individual security. This gives a richer meaning to freedom and its non-transcendental importance to us as biological beings, including why there is tension between individual freedom and the conforming demands of group life. Bay also says that while security is important, it is a derivative value compared to freedom. It is nothing of the sort from a biological perspective. Security (defensiveness) is the flip side of freedom as defending the integrity of the self allows us to be free. A dead dog, after all, doesn't hunt. Seen from that perspective, personal power is not a bad thing at all. Power gives us the capacity to be who we need to be and to defend against threats to our freedom. Freedom to be, security, and power constitute a biologically-derived structure that allows us to survive and to survive well. Government's proper role then is to lay out the conditions that allow freedom to occur in ways that are compatible with social order.
Most of Bay's book beyond the introductory discussion gets quite wonky and can be skipped over.
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