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Europeans in Africa
Paperback
Published January 1, 1971
About the author
Robert O. Collins
46 books17 followersA specialist in the history of East Africa and Sudan, Robert O. Collins was Professor of History at the University of California, Santa Barbara, where he taught from 1965 to 1994.
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July 29, 2019
Collins presents a very brief overview of Europeans in Africa. Hundreds of years is simplified into a mere 160 pages. Collins tries to maintain an academic aloofness; but his biases do appear. Although he does not comment on current affairs (ca. 1970), he was writing at a time of coups and civil wars wracking across Africa in the wake of decolonization. He carefully avoids blaming the victim; but at the same time tries to disentangle European responsibility. It is a strange balancing act made more difficult by the brevity of his work.
Collins begins with the basic argument that Africa's value to Europeans was in slaves. For hundreds of years, that was the basis of the relationship. European trading posts on the coasts and powerful inland empires. In-between were petty chiefdoms and merchants scrambling to hold onto the middle ground. Collins takes the approach that the insatiable demand for slaves provided economic, political, and social changes in African societies to supply slaves. That translated into seemingly constant wars on the mainland and the destabilization of thriving nations like Oyo and Kongo. Once the British, the only heroes in the book, forcefully put an end to slave-trading in the 19th Century, European interest in Africa declined to maintaining watering holes for ships on the way to India and Asia.
The Europeans return to Africa almost unwillingly in the late 19th Century. A mixture of nationalism and curiosity about fabled cities spurred exploration, which in turn, spurred investment and colonial opportunities. The costs of maintaining military outposts and garrisons was not worth the cost; but a gradual race for colonies ensued. Collins describes a reluctant land rush, first in West Africa, then East Africa, and finally South Africa with the Belgians and their wily King Leopold advancing their interests as a peacemaker, deal-maker, and lesser of evils status gaining a huge chunk of South-Central Africa.
It is in places like this that Collins' brevity hurts the reader. For example, in the 1870s Bismark got colonial fever and quickly seized territories in Africa. Then, just as suddenly, decided that was enough and went back to his isolationist tendencies. Almost nothing more is said about German Africa. Similarly, he presents the British as reluctant occupiers at nearly every turn. By the time they are marching against the Fulani Emirs, they were not so much looking to race against the French as they were merely securing their sphere of influence, as they had already partitioned that part of Africa. Firstly, it is hard to understand where the Fulani Emirs were. Second, if they already had recognition for that part of Africa, why wage war. Thirdly, what incentives were there for that war anyway? Lastly, Collins describes such a war as a quick British victory. The truth is the British were almost forced back to their starting point and nearly lost an entire field army. But such knowledge would not help to describe the British in a positive light.
One of the biggest problems in the book is bias. Collins' rush to glorify Union Jack and criticisze everyone else is tiresome. He glosses over the Boer Wars and the Mau Maus by saying the British exerted control over the Boers and suppressed the Mau Mau riots. That is the best spin on things. In contrast, he compares the Portuguese Prazeros as mercenaries and local warlords in the mold of Col. Kurtz in Apocalypse Now. Yet somehow, Portuguese imperialism lasted in Africa longer than any other European power. Elsewhere he repeats how awful the Belgians were in the Congo; but never offers examples. It appears that conventional wisdom is to say the Belgians were the worst colonial administrators.
He presents an interesting comparison contrast between the colonial powers. I say interesting because I have my doubts based on his bias. However, the simplification that the British sought to use existing institutions, the French sought to create a pan-French culture, and the Portuguese sought to impose Western institutions is an interesting observation especially in modern terms as the United States tries nation-building around the world.
Overall, I do not recommend this book for the problems outlined above. The brevity and bias counterbalance the good. The lack of maps or images also detracts from the value of the book. It is hard to imagine Britain and France going to war over who reached Fashoda. Where is Fashoda? Well, it is on the back cover. I would like to know more about the race to Fashoda; but I am left wondering. Maybe Collins is trying to pique interest. I cannot say.
Collins begins with the basic argument that Africa's value to Europeans was in slaves. For hundreds of years, that was the basis of the relationship. European trading posts on the coasts and powerful inland empires. In-between were petty chiefdoms and merchants scrambling to hold onto the middle ground. Collins takes the approach that the insatiable demand for slaves provided economic, political, and social changes in African societies to supply slaves. That translated into seemingly constant wars on the mainland and the destabilization of thriving nations like Oyo and Kongo. Once the British, the only heroes in the book, forcefully put an end to slave-trading in the 19th Century, European interest in Africa declined to maintaining watering holes for ships on the way to India and Asia.
The Europeans return to Africa almost unwillingly in the late 19th Century. A mixture of nationalism and curiosity about fabled cities spurred exploration, which in turn, spurred investment and colonial opportunities. The costs of maintaining military outposts and garrisons was not worth the cost; but a gradual race for colonies ensued. Collins describes a reluctant land rush, first in West Africa, then East Africa, and finally South Africa with the Belgians and their wily King Leopold advancing their interests as a peacemaker, deal-maker, and lesser of evils status gaining a huge chunk of South-Central Africa.
It is in places like this that Collins' brevity hurts the reader. For example, in the 1870s Bismark got colonial fever and quickly seized territories in Africa. Then, just as suddenly, decided that was enough and went back to his isolationist tendencies. Almost nothing more is said about German Africa. Similarly, he presents the British as reluctant occupiers at nearly every turn. By the time they are marching against the Fulani Emirs, they were not so much looking to race against the French as they were merely securing their sphere of influence, as they had already partitioned that part of Africa. Firstly, it is hard to understand where the Fulani Emirs were. Second, if they already had recognition for that part of Africa, why wage war. Thirdly, what incentives were there for that war anyway? Lastly, Collins describes such a war as a quick British victory. The truth is the British were almost forced back to their starting point and nearly lost an entire field army. But such knowledge would not help to describe the British in a positive light.
One of the biggest problems in the book is bias. Collins' rush to glorify Union Jack and criticisze everyone else is tiresome. He glosses over the Boer Wars and the Mau Maus by saying the British exerted control over the Boers and suppressed the Mau Mau riots. That is the best spin on things. In contrast, he compares the Portuguese Prazeros as mercenaries and local warlords in the mold of Col. Kurtz in Apocalypse Now. Yet somehow, Portuguese imperialism lasted in Africa longer than any other European power. Elsewhere he repeats how awful the Belgians were in the Congo; but never offers examples. It appears that conventional wisdom is to say the Belgians were the worst colonial administrators.
He presents an interesting comparison contrast between the colonial powers. I say interesting because I have my doubts based on his bias. However, the simplification that the British sought to use existing institutions, the French sought to create a pan-French culture, and the Portuguese sought to impose Western institutions is an interesting observation especially in modern terms as the United States tries nation-building around the world.
Overall, I do not recommend this book for the problems outlined above. The brevity and bias counterbalance the good. The lack of maps or images also detracts from the value of the book. It is hard to imagine Britain and France going to war over who reached Fashoda. Where is Fashoda? Well, it is on the back cover. I would like to know more about the race to Fashoda; but I am left wondering. Maybe Collins is trying to pique interest. I cannot say.
Displaying 1 of 1 review