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The US Lobby and Australian Defence Policy
Australian society and its leaders generally take for granted the importance and value of this nation’s relationship with the United States. The US is commonly thought of as the world’s great purveyor of liberal values and the rule of law, and as a powerful friend indispensable to Australian security. In The US Lobby and Australian Defence Policy Vince Scappatura demonstrates how these conceptions are underpinned by the work of the Australian American Leadership Dialogue, Australia’s most important, private, pro-US lobby group. As the inner workings of this lobby are unveiled for the first time, Scappatura also discusses the considerable costs to Australia of its strong military ties to the US, draws into question notions of “benign” US power, and demonstrates that suggestions of the US keeping Australia safe from invasion are flatly wrong. For Australia’s national security elite, other considerations, to do with power and wealth and spreading political influence, are to the fore...
240 pages, Paperback
Published June 1, 2019
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July 7, 2019
My daughter spoke at an IPAN (The Independent and Peaceful Australia Network) event the other night and the author of this book was also on the panel. He covered some of the material discussed in this book, but I was also interested in what he had to say about the fact China’s growth of GDP couldn’t be directly equated to its growth in economic power, mostly since a disproportionate amount of that growth is owned and controlled by foreign, mostly US, corporations – something that isn’t really covered in this book. I found this interesting, since it seemed on the night that the author, while he was talking, was implying that a war between China and the US was growing increasingly likely – but that didn’t seem an immediately obvious conclusion if US corporations would suffer major losses due to such a war. I take it that his reason for expecting a war is that the US simply cannot accept that China might have any control at all over its shipping, and so US hegemony demands to be absolute.
I bought this book at the event and have found it very interesting, particularly the first two parts of the book – which present a contrarian view of the US-Australian alliance. The last part of the book provides a case study of how Australian political elites are socialised into supporting the alliance, and I didn’t find this section quite as interesting, not least because the author spent a lot of time here qualifying his argument to the point where I wanted to say, look, just spit it out. All the same, when he did spit it out, I found much of this worthwhile too, particularly the discussion at the end on Julia Gillard and her conversion to a true believer in American exceptionalism as something that paved the way for her eventually to become Prime Minister. I couldn’t help wonder what role Shorten’s all too candid view of Trump as a fool and global danger might have played in his recent – and highly unexpected – election defeat.
Australia is a very long way away from anywhere. We sometimes like to say that we are ‘part of Asia’ – but Sydney is actually further from Beijing than London is, and you never really hear England say it is ‘part of Asia’, although it could with at least as much justification as we do. All the same, Australian history has been, for the most part, a history of fear about the ‘yellow peril’ to our north. That is, we are a nation about the size of the US, but with a tiny population and to our north are what we have been constantly told are the teeming hordes of Asia, waiting to sweep down and take over Australia in a heartbeat if we are not defended by powerful allies. The first Act of the Australian parliament upon Federation in 1901 was the White Australia Policy, premised on eugenic notions of white superiority, it was designed to keep Asians out and was only overturned in law in the 1970s, although it had been greatly relaxed in the 1960s. The author quotes a speech by Billy Hughes – an early Prime Minister – comparing Australia and the US, although, in terms we would be much less comfortable with today, saying that while we had eradicated the native Aboriginal peoples in both countries to claim the land, we need to be sure we don’t allow others to do to us what we did to them. Of course, psychologically this is all terribly interesting.
The fear of Asia and of Australia’s small population has meant that Australian political leaders have always relied on ‘great and powerful friends’ – first in Britain, and then in the US. The book makes it clear that this fear is anything but rational. And this is particularly true today. Australia isn’t only a long way away – but it has a GDP about the same size as Russia. If China is unable to invade Taiwan (which has a GDP about 40% that of Australia) it isn’t in the least bit clear how it would succeed in invading Australia.
There simply are no nations in Asia that have the military capacity (or even the desire) to invade Australia. So that, rather than our military alliance with the US making us safer, in many ways it does the exact opposite. For instance, during the Cold War the presence of highly significant US military bases here (Pin Gap in particular) were about the only reason we could be a military target. This is similarly the case now, where it is inconceivable that China would see Australia as a threat, other than due to our nearly complete integration into the US military such that we would almost certainly be used as a base and provide active military support during any conflict with China. This puts Australia in a very unusual position, not least since China is by far our largest trading partner.
The point the author makes is that while the US alliance is generally phrased in moral terms – about its role in the extension of democracy and free trade, with the US always being presented an unequivocal force for good – with Australia constantly reminded of the benefits of having a great and powerful friend to protect us and our interests, this narrative is barely related to the facts of the case and almost entirely ignores the dangers the relationship presents, or the benefits that accrue virtually solely to the Australian elite through this relationship.
The author shows that the US could hardly be seen as an unequivocal force for good in the world (or even in the region) – with even the US now questioning the point of the Iraq War. It would also be hard to find anyone who would say Vietnam was a boon for the region or the world (I suspect even in the US) – but both of these wars involved Australia providing both support and participation – and in the case of Iraq, this was despite the overwhelming majority of the Australian people being opposed to the war even before it started. All the same, the author makes it clear that our participation in US adventures has generally been at the minimum necessary to display our loyalty to the relationship – that is, we do our bit, but little more than that.
The last part of the book is dedicated to an analysis of a US-Australian forum designed to build relationships between the leadership of the two nations. This is called the Australian and American Leadership Dialogue (AALD) and appears to be mostly funded by corporate interests in both countries. It was set up by Australians – concerned that the leaders of both countries who had fought side-by-side with each other in WWII were retiring or dying, and that therefore this close basis for the relationship was disappearing. It was felt necessary to build new ways to link the next generation of leaders. The author spends a lot of time discussing the role of organisations like AALD in influencing policy – or at least the policy common sense that makes ‘the alliance’ something that can remain an unchallengeable axiom. There is some discussion of Walter Lippmann’s work on public opinion and other marketing research from the early part of the 20th century to support how such joint discussion can be used to create a kind of policy common sense.
Much of the last part of the book is based on interviews with people who had attended AALD sessions – sessions which are held in secret and remain secret – despite many senior journalists being invited. The author makes the point that these sessions are generally an exercise in ‘Duchessing’. This is a term I’d never heard before, but I like it very much. The idea being that Australian politicians used to be called over to the UK to be set straight on foreign policy (basically, to do what the UK wanted), but rather than the Brits being quite so crass as to just sit them down and tell them how to think, the Australian politicians would find themselves at some manor house in the country with some minor royalty or other and being treated like a Duchess. The message being, ‘you are one of us and this is our interest – which is your interest too’. The author’s point being how remarkably effective this generally proved to be.
And it appears to continue to be effective. The people invited to the AALD functions are generally supporters of the alliance anyway, but since they are often leaders or potential leaders, there is more bang for buck in strengthening their commitment to the cause than in trying to find converts. The author says that if you can convince leaders, often followers will follow (hence the name, I guess). While we generally consider it to be something of a waste of time to preach to the converted, clearly, the elite don’t seem to think so. He says that Gillard attended the AALD as someone not fully trusted and gave a speech that made all of the right noises – transforming her from a left-leaning politician to someone from the sensible and pragmatic centre (read: a shift from being merely to the right of the majority of Australians on the US alliance, to being in tune with the Murdoch press). The author doesn’t say this gained her the prime ministership, but others effectively are quoted as saying so. The ability of a room full of powerful supporters of the US alliance to shift someone’s views is discussed at length in this book – perhaps undermined slightly by our having to rely on Mark Latham as one of the main people explaining this transition.
Still, the point stands, I think. Virtually everyone interviewed says the process of Duchessing has clearly worked on some politicians, never themselves, of course, but others. And that this is mostly directed towards members of the Labor Party, presumably since they are the most likely to want to question the alliance. I was also struck by the regrettable fact that people often have no difficulty at all in believing that other people are impacted by advertising, but that they, themselves, are obviously immune when politicians were explaining the impact of Duchessing on others. If the best that you can come up with to assert that you are immune from the persuasive powers of US Duchessing is to say, ‘I’ve always been a strong supporter of the US alliance’ it does beg the question…
This is an interesting book particularly for some very useful information on the history of the US-Australian alliance. It also has the benefit of being short, quick and easy to read.
I bought this book at the event and have found it very interesting, particularly the first two parts of the book – which present a contrarian view of the US-Australian alliance. The last part of the book provides a case study of how Australian political elites are socialised into supporting the alliance, and I didn’t find this section quite as interesting, not least because the author spent a lot of time here qualifying his argument to the point where I wanted to say, look, just spit it out. All the same, when he did spit it out, I found much of this worthwhile too, particularly the discussion at the end on Julia Gillard and her conversion to a true believer in American exceptionalism as something that paved the way for her eventually to become Prime Minister. I couldn’t help wonder what role Shorten’s all too candid view of Trump as a fool and global danger might have played in his recent – and highly unexpected – election defeat.
Australia is a very long way away from anywhere. We sometimes like to say that we are ‘part of Asia’ – but Sydney is actually further from Beijing than London is, and you never really hear England say it is ‘part of Asia’, although it could with at least as much justification as we do. All the same, Australian history has been, for the most part, a history of fear about the ‘yellow peril’ to our north. That is, we are a nation about the size of the US, but with a tiny population and to our north are what we have been constantly told are the teeming hordes of Asia, waiting to sweep down and take over Australia in a heartbeat if we are not defended by powerful allies. The first Act of the Australian parliament upon Federation in 1901 was the White Australia Policy, premised on eugenic notions of white superiority, it was designed to keep Asians out and was only overturned in law in the 1970s, although it had been greatly relaxed in the 1960s. The author quotes a speech by Billy Hughes – an early Prime Minister – comparing Australia and the US, although, in terms we would be much less comfortable with today, saying that while we had eradicated the native Aboriginal peoples in both countries to claim the land, we need to be sure we don’t allow others to do to us what we did to them. Of course, psychologically this is all terribly interesting.
The fear of Asia and of Australia’s small population has meant that Australian political leaders have always relied on ‘great and powerful friends’ – first in Britain, and then in the US. The book makes it clear that this fear is anything but rational. And this is particularly true today. Australia isn’t only a long way away – but it has a GDP about the same size as Russia. If China is unable to invade Taiwan (which has a GDP about 40% that of Australia) it isn’t in the least bit clear how it would succeed in invading Australia.
There simply are no nations in Asia that have the military capacity (or even the desire) to invade Australia. So that, rather than our military alliance with the US making us safer, in many ways it does the exact opposite. For instance, during the Cold War the presence of highly significant US military bases here (Pin Gap in particular) were about the only reason we could be a military target. This is similarly the case now, where it is inconceivable that China would see Australia as a threat, other than due to our nearly complete integration into the US military such that we would almost certainly be used as a base and provide active military support during any conflict with China. This puts Australia in a very unusual position, not least since China is by far our largest trading partner.
The point the author makes is that while the US alliance is generally phrased in moral terms – about its role in the extension of democracy and free trade, with the US always being presented an unequivocal force for good – with Australia constantly reminded of the benefits of having a great and powerful friend to protect us and our interests, this narrative is barely related to the facts of the case and almost entirely ignores the dangers the relationship presents, or the benefits that accrue virtually solely to the Australian elite through this relationship.
The author shows that the US could hardly be seen as an unequivocal force for good in the world (or even in the region) – with even the US now questioning the point of the Iraq War. It would also be hard to find anyone who would say Vietnam was a boon for the region or the world (I suspect even in the US) – but both of these wars involved Australia providing both support and participation – and in the case of Iraq, this was despite the overwhelming majority of the Australian people being opposed to the war even before it started. All the same, the author makes it clear that our participation in US adventures has generally been at the minimum necessary to display our loyalty to the relationship – that is, we do our bit, but little more than that.
The last part of the book is dedicated to an analysis of a US-Australian forum designed to build relationships between the leadership of the two nations. This is called the Australian and American Leadership Dialogue (AALD) and appears to be mostly funded by corporate interests in both countries. It was set up by Australians – concerned that the leaders of both countries who had fought side-by-side with each other in WWII were retiring or dying, and that therefore this close basis for the relationship was disappearing. It was felt necessary to build new ways to link the next generation of leaders. The author spends a lot of time discussing the role of organisations like AALD in influencing policy – or at least the policy common sense that makes ‘the alliance’ something that can remain an unchallengeable axiom. There is some discussion of Walter Lippmann’s work on public opinion and other marketing research from the early part of the 20th century to support how such joint discussion can be used to create a kind of policy common sense.
Much of the last part of the book is based on interviews with people who had attended AALD sessions – sessions which are held in secret and remain secret – despite many senior journalists being invited. The author makes the point that these sessions are generally an exercise in ‘Duchessing’. This is a term I’d never heard before, but I like it very much. The idea being that Australian politicians used to be called over to the UK to be set straight on foreign policy (basically, to do what the UK wanted), but rather than the Brits being quite so crass as to just sit them down and tell them how to think, the Australian politicians would find themselves at some manor house in the country with some minor royalty or other and being treated like a Duchess. The message being, ‘you are one of us and this is our interest – which is your interest too’. The author’s point being how remarkably effective this generally proved to be.
And it appears to continue to be effective. The people invited to the AALD functions are generally supporters of the alliance anyway, but since they are often leaders or potential leaders, there is more bang for buck in strengthening their commitment to the cause than in trying to find converts. The author says that if you can convince leaders, often followers will follow (hence the name, I guess). While we generally consider it to be something of a waste of time to preach to the converted, clearly, the elite don’t seem to think so. He says that Gillard attended the AALD as someone not fully trusted and gave a speech that made all of the right noises – transforming her from a left-leaning politician to someone from the sensible and pragmatic centre (read: a shift from being merely to the right of the majority of Australians on the US alliance, to being in tune with the Murdoch press). The author doesn’t say this gained her the prime ministership, but others effectively are quoted as saying so. The ability of a room full of powerful supporters of the US alliance to shift someone’s views is discussed at length in this book – perhaps undermined slightly by our having to rely on Mark Latham as one of the main people explaining this transition.
Still, the point stands, I think. Virtually everyone interviewed says the process of Duchessing has clearly worked on some politicians, never themselves, of course, but others. And that this is mostly directed towards members of the Labor Party, presumably since they are the most likely to want to question the alliance. I was also struck by the regrettable fact that people often have no difficulty at all in believing that other people are impacted by advertising, but that they, themselves, are obviously immune when politicians were explaining the impact of Duchessing on others. If the best that you can come up with to assert that you are immune from the persuasive powers of US Duchessing is to say, ‘I’ve always been a strong supporter of the US alliance’ it does beg the question…
This is an interesting book particularly for some very useful information on the history of the US-Australian alliance. It also has the benefit of being short, quick and easy to read.
Want to Read
July 7, 2019..
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{Not a Review}
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My notes:
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Paul Monk's review of Hugh White's 'How to Defend Australia' https://www.theaustralian.com.au/arts... Saturday June 6th 2019
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{Not a Review}
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My notes:
======++++++======
Paul Monk's review of Hugh White's 'How to Defend Australia' https://www.theaustralian.com.au/arts... Saturday June 6th 2019
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews