RAF on the Offensive: The Rebirth of Tactical Air Power 1940-1941

by Gregory Peter Baughen, Greg Baughen

An previously published cover edition for this ISBN can be found here.

Long before the start of the Second World War it had been believed that strategic bombing would be the deciding factor in any future conflict. Then Hitler launched the Blitzkrieg upon France and the Low Countries in 1940, and the much-vaunted French Army and the British Expeditionary Force were swept away in just six weeks.This new form of warfare shook the Air Ministry, but the expected invasion never came and the Battle of Britain was fought in the air. It seemed that air forces operating independently could determine the course of the war. An Army scarcely seemed necessary for the defence of the UK and no British army could ever be powerful enough to mount an invasion of Europe on its own. Bombing Germany into defeat seemed Britain's only option. In North Africa, however, Commonwealth armies and air forces were demonstrating that they too could use blitzkrieg tactics to crush opponents. Britain was also no longer alone; Greece and then the Soviet Union joined the fight.RAF on the Offensive describes how British air power developed after the Battle of Britain. Attitudes were beginning to change - the fighter, rather than the bomber, was re-emerging as the principal means of gaining air superiority. As 1941 drew to a close, the strategic air offensive appeared to be achieving little and conventional land warfare seemed poised to replace it as the way to defeat the enemy. Which direction, then, would the war take?

320 pages, Hardcover

Published February 1, 2019

Reviews

[Robert Neil Smith]

Before 1942, Baughen argues, the British War Office and Churchill believed wholeheartedly in air power and in particular the efficacy of bombers. We might think of nippy fighters zipping around the sky chasing ME-109s as being all important, but the RAF’s concern centred on how to bring down high altitude bombers. Bombing the enemy’s production capacity in return would win the war. British aircraft development lagged that of Germany, and US airplanes arriving in England were mostly ignored. Britain’s early attempts to bomb Germany into submission early in the war, however, yielded some results but the casualty rate was too high. The search began for better bombers and more of them, all but ignoring the tactical air war necessities in support of ground forces in North Africa and Greece, and, of course, the German successes in such tactics across Europe. Baughen traces the development of Britain’s air strategy through the fog of war and that of high-level military politics. He argues that the relentless pursuit of a bomber strategy, and the RAF’s determination to maintain its independence, jeopardized Britain’s security. But, by the end of 1942, the tide was turning in favour of the Allies and tactical air operations became more viable and necessary. Baughen concludes his book with the Allies at that crossroads.
RAF on the Offensive is not for beginners. Baughen jumps straight into his story, mixing technology, politics, and tactics in a high-octane ride into Britain’s war effort, making it sometimes difficult to hang onto his coattails. Baughen knows his stuff, however, when it comes to WWII warplanes and tactics. His understanding of the political machinations seems a bit cut-and-dry at times, producing a strident indictment, making me wonder how Britain survived the war let alone won it. Nevertheless, this was an entertaining and informative read and made me think a bit more in-depth about how WWII was fought.

[Shrike58]

What I liked best about the author's examination of the French air effort in 1940 remains true here, as Baughen has a real talent for linking doctrine and strategy with procurement and deployment; particular note is made of the ill-use of American lend-lease aircraft because they didn't fit in with the RAF obsession with strategic bombers and point-defense interceptors. As for what gives me pause, while I agree with Baughen that the cult of independent airpower is at odds with what really works, operational coherence, I'm not sure from what I read about his grasp of overall British strategy. Maybe this is just because I haven't read his earlier works, but there is a little more scent of 20/20 hindsight in this book, though I intend to look at more of Baughen's work. Rounding up from 3.5.

[Adam]

Read for research, decent read on all the ‘big picture’ stuff going on at the Air Ministry, War Office, Churchill, Portal etc. Superbly researched and well written but quite dry and specialist topic written for someone with special interest, not general reader.