Librarian Note: There is more than one author by this name in the Goodreads database.
Born Peter Charles Smith in North Elmham, Norfolk, in 1940, eldest son of Ernest & Eileen. Educated at Hamonds School, Swaffham. Married Patricia nee Ireson 1963. Two children, son Paul David and daughter Dawn Tracey.
Editor Balfour Books, Cambridge; Cape Sun, London; World War II Investigator, London.
After living in London, Kent and Cambridge now resides in a north-Bedfordshire village with his wife and Annie the Black Labby.
I purchased my copy of this book used in hardback at an antiques mall in Independence MO in February 2024. I really struggled with what rating to give this book; I found it to be almost equal parts frustrating and fascinating. The author recounts the history of dive bombing as a method of delivering explosives from an aircraft onto a target by telling the stories of various scenarios where dive bombing was employed, starting in WW1 and going through the Vietnam War. What I found frustrating is that some basic questions were never answered, such as what makes dive bombing a better method for delivering bombs than dropping them straight and level? Instead the author merely states that pilots started doing it in WW1 and then kept it up through subsequent conflicts. But why? Certainly diving a plane almost straight down into anti-aircraft fire seems risky, but why was it worth the risk? Where the book got interesting was when it covered the use of dive bombers in WW2, when the technique was used to the greatest extent to the greatest effect. All the major combatants used dive bombers to some extent, often employing planes specifically designed for dive bombing. But even this portion of the book had its frustrations as the author endlessly wrote on about how even when Germany demonstrated the efficacy of dive bombing in combat, the RAF refused to consider dive bombing as a legitimate strategy and refused to order plans specifically designed for dive bombing. There was WAY too much of the book dedicated to this debate within the RAF. But then things got interesting again as the author described how planes not specifically designed for dive bombing were adapted into effective dive bombers, causing the purpose-built dive bombers to be phased out. In the end, the interesting outweighed the frustrating and I'm giving the book four out of five stars.
This is a very good account of the history of dive bombing as you might expect from Peter C Smith. It is very readable and does not drown you in detail. An ideal complement to his other books on dive bombers and dive bombing.
This book started well but by half way had spiralled into an endless examination of why the RAF did not employ dive bombers.This question was 'done to death' in my view and came to dominate most of the remainder of the book.A comprehensive history? Not really.
Very well written book, that details the history, politics and actions of dive bombing, along with the inevitable and continuing ineptitude of the British establishment, in this case, RAF high command.
One of the key facets of the narrative of the fall of France in 1940 was that the RAF didn't "do" close air support. We all know about the Trenchardian bias towards strategic bombing and the bomber that would "always get through". The other side of the coin is a set of political decisions made to elimate dive bombing from the RAF's skillset. They (simoultaneously and eperately from the USMC) invented the technique, but abandoned it in the mid 1930's.
That's nothing in itself, but what this story focuses on in part is the doggedness with which they stuck to this decision even after encountering Stukas in France, Norway and Africa. There was a bitter battle in the press and Parliament over the RAF's continued insistence that dive-bombing was not relevant, culminating at one point in a failed motion of censure against Mr. Churchill's government. The adoption of fighter-bomber techniques eventually made the question less relevant, at least for the close support role.
Caught in the middle of all this was the Fleet Air Arm. They favoured dive bombing (as all naval aviators did) but, dependent on the RAF for aircraft, training and doctrine, were saddled with the barely adequate Blackburn Skua and woeful support for their needs.
There are digressions into the histories of other air Force's dive bombing experiences. Each looks into the development of doctrine and aircraft for the role and then their combat employment. The problem, however, is that these accounts are chopped up and scattered throughout the book. This makes the book very disorganized and somewhat annoying to read. The phrase "which I will touch on later" or the like happens often.
The biggest failing of this book, however, is an excessive dependence on personal accounts. These obviously have an important role in any history, but there are too many accounts of minor actions which do little to add tour our understanding of technique or doctrine. The sheer number of these detracted from the already scattered narrative of the book.
On top of this, Smith has an obvious axe to grind, and while I generally agree with his criticisms of the RAF, he does get pretty vehement, which further detracts from his account. Nevertheless, an interesting look at how tactics and equipment develop, even if it does have to be aggressively skimmed in places.
At first, I too thought the book a little slow, but if you persevere, there is so much to take in. It is in chronological order, so can seem a bit repetitive, but when you think how accurate the JU87 was it is hard to understand the British stance. Eventually, you will get to the Douglas Skyraider and how that was a most successful aircraft. The subject is thoroughly researched and interesting,