A RADICAL PROPOSAL FOR ELIMINATING "NEGLIGENCE," "INTENT," ETC., FROM TORT LAW
Richard Allen Epstein (born 1943) is a Professor of Law at the New York University School of Law, as well as associated with the Cato Institute, the Hoover Institution, and the Heartland Institute. He has written many books, including 'Mortal Peril: Our Inalienable Right to Health Care?', 'Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, Why Progressive Institutions are Unsustainable etc.
He states in the Introduction to this 1980 essay (originally published in 1973/4), "The task is to develop a normative theory of torts that takes into account common sense notions of individual responsibility... This common sense approach to torts as a branch of common law ... does not regard economic theory as the primary means to establish the rules of legal responsibility."
He asserts, "(the) theory of strict liability, holds the defendant prima facie liable for the harm caused whether or not either of the two further conditions relating to negligence and intent is satisfied." (Pg. 5) He argues, "the only proper question for tort law is whether the plaintiff or the defendant will be required to bear the harm upon the plaintiff." (Pg. 77)
Later, he expands, "The doctrine of strict liability holds that proof that the defendant caused harm creates that presumption because proof of the nonreciprocal source of the harm is sufficient to upset the balance where one person must win and the other must lose. There is no room to consider... allegations that the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff, or could have avoided the harm he caused by the use of reasonable care. The choice is plaintiff or defendant, and the analysis of causation is the tool which, prima facie, fastens responsibility upon the defendant." (Pg. 25)
He suggests that "the rules of strict liability are in the end preferable on economic grounds because they reduce the administrative costs of decision." (Pg. 48) He acknowledges that "Damages in tort still do not permit a plaintiff to make a profit; and in some cases it is arguable that they do not permit recovery of adequate compensation." (Pg. 68)
Epstein's book is, as always, challenging and thought-provoking. (One may raise a thoughtful eyebrow when considering its applications to certain specific situations of "harm," however.)