Economists have in recent years found the theory of games to be an attractive route for exploring imperfectly competitive markets. In this collection of articles, some of the best minds in contemporary economics on both sides of the Atlantic explore both the potential and the limitations of this theoretical framework.In a lengthy introduction, the editors conduct a comprehensive survey of the hypothesis of game theory and its goals, which provides a unique perspective on the subject. At the same time, they warn the theory is not sufficiently well developed to provide an analysis of all games.The papers, which follow fall into three equilibrium theory, imperfect competition and the design of organizations. Together they explore and illustrate many aspects of the economic application of game theory in industrial organization."This volume brings together a number of important recent papers on game theory and its application to imperfect competition and incentives". Alan Brandenburger, Economica"Like all good collections, it has the virtue of providing the non-specialist with an up-to-date review of the literature. The book is well produced and contains a very good bibliography". R.Rothschild, British Book News
Professor of Economics at UCL, after holding corresponding positions at LSE and the University of Pennsylvania and Michigan. Onetime Professor of Mathematics at LSE.
Author of 77 published papers and 11 books. Research in evolutionary game theory, bargaining theory, experimental economics, political philosophy, mathematics and statistics.
Grants from National Science Foundation (3), ESRC (1), STICERD (2) and others. Chairman of LSE Economics Theory Workshop (10 years), Director of Michigan Economic Laboratory (5 years). Fellow of the Econometric Society and British Academy. Extensive collaboration with 25 co-authors.
Awarded the CBE in the New Years Honours List 2001 largely for his role in designing the UK 3G Spectrum Auction.