Juergen Habermas developed his theory of communicative
action and rationality as a foundation for a critical
theory of society paving the way for a discourse-theoritical
conception of morality, law and democracy. However, the
essays in this volume focus on the the implications of
his ideas on what he calls "theoretical philosophy"; that
is epistemology and metaphysics, rather than practical
philosophy that is most closely associated with his name.
As one of the few modern thinkers working on the
development of a comprehensive philosophy, Habermas
brings together the traditions of Humboldt, Hegel, and
Heidegger with those of Frege, Quine, and Davidson in an
attempt to bridge the gap between the so-called continental
and analytical philosophical approaches within his own
pragmatic perspective and philosophy of language.
Habermas embraces a "linguistic turn" in order to address
the issue of action coordination and social integration within
an 'intersubjectivist' framework that attempts to avoids the
limitations of both objectivism and subjectivism. Habermas
tries to avoid reducing social or moral issues to mere
objectively observable phenomena and instead theorizes
from the point of view of participating agents. But he has
also been critical of social and ethical theories that accord
too much authority to the subject or a contextualism that
gives up all claims to objective knowledge. And his theory
of communicative action situates rationality within everyday
communication and regards the critical power of reason to
be contained in ordinary language.
Habermas may be regarded as a Kantian pragmatist who
"detranscendentalizes" Kant. In other words, there is
for him a transition from understanding the possibility
of human experience shaped by the mind to a
Wittgensteinian conception of experience as linguistic
expressions of human activities, interests, actions, beliefs,
and concerns. Several of the essays in this volume are
devoted these themes in his own Kantian pragmatic terms.
Habermas himself says it no better: "As subjects capable
of speech and action, we already find ourselves in a
linguistically structured lifeworld. How can the normativity
that is unavoidable from the perspective of the participants
in this lifeworld be reconciled with the contingency of
sociocultural forms of life that have evolved naturally?...
How can we reconcile the assumption that there is a world
existing independently of our descriptions of it and that
is the same for all observers with the linguistic insight
we have no direct, linguistically unmediated access to
"brute" reality?..."