What do you think?
Rate this book
The Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on U. S. Involvement in the Persian Gulf War
This book is a reexamination of the Persian Gulf War by a number of academic and military historians to determine what we did right, what we did wrong, and how our performance could have been improved. This study addresses the questions: Why did the war happen? Was the Gulf War a vindication of Vietnam? Did the American military really learn anything from the war in Vietnam? Did they really adapt? What did the Allies actually win in the Gulf War, if anything? Finally, have we learned anything from the Gulf War? Some authors conclude that in retrospect many analysts have become convinced that despite its military successes the United States garnered little of worth from the Gulf War. Others believe a great deal was achieved, and some have withheld final judgement.
376 pages, Hardcover
First published February 16, 1996
5 people want to read
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 of 1 review
September 11, 2025
As a Desert Shield/Desert Storm Army veteran, I was looking forward to this book as I have read many books about the operational side of the conflict. Well, I was disappointed.
There were good chapters on the deployment, the logistics and the air campaign but there were only two chapters on the ground portion. One was about the Marines and, of course, written in the guise of they were the greatest thing to every happen.
The other chapter literally centered on how the "Hail Mary Pass" was an incorrect term and doctrine said that the ground campaign should have been done exactly how it was. The author of the chapter got completely hung up on an "improper term". He completely overlooks the largest air assault mission ever carried out in combat. He completely overlooks the largest armor maneuver ever carried out by the US Army. It is an entire chapter that just prattles on about the proper employment of doctrine. He closes out his chapter basically saying that the conflict was a defeat because Saddam was still in power and too much of the Republican Guard was left intact.
Maybe I am being over critical as much of the book is good analysis of build up and conflict. It does point out what went write and what went wrong usually following up with lessons learned. In some cases, it even highlights how changes have been made implementing those lessons.
However, at the end of the day when reading this book, it comes across as the air power and the Marine Corps won conflict pretty much by themselves.
There were good chapters on the deployment, the logistics and the air campaign but there were only two chapters on the ground portion. One was about the Marines and, of course, written in the guise of they were the greatest thing to every happen.
The other chapter literally centered on how the "Hail Mary Pass" was an incorrect term and doctrine said that the ground campaign should have been done exactly how it was. The author of the chapter got completely hung up on an "improper term". He completely overlooks the largest air assault mission ever carried out in combat. He completely overlooks the largest armor maneuver ever carried out by the US Army. It is an entire chapter that just prattles on about the proper employment of doctrine. He closes out his chapter basically saying that the conflict was a defeat because Saddam was still in power and too much of the Republican Guard was left intact.
Maybe I am being over critical as much of the book is good analysis of build up and conflict. It does point out what went write and what went wrong usually following up with lessons learned. In some cases, it even highlights how changes have been made implementing those lessons.
However, at the end of the day when reading this book, it comes across as the air power and the Marine Corps won conflict pretty much by themselves.
Displaying 1 of 1 review