British Generalship on the Western Front 1914–1918: Defeat into Victory

by Simon Robbins

This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and material. The reasons for the poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916, are analysed. The high command rapidly learnt from the defeats of 1915-16 and performed much better in 1916-18, an especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a younger, more professional leadership and the development of the first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since. During 1917-18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.

Genres: Military History

270 pages, Hardcover

First published December 17, 2004

Reviews

[Mark · Rating 5 out of 5]

An accessible academic study of British generalship on the western front during the First World War, based on the author’s PhD thesis.

Challengers the accepted, popular, view that the generals were incompetent, callous men, sat far behind the front lines unworried about the casualties. Robbins sets out a compelling argument that British generals were in a steep learning curve enforced by their intrinsic culture and the fact that the army had been designed for imperial policing rather than continental conflict. By the end of the war British generals arguably have no rival, out-planning and out-fighting the Germans and performing more effectively than their allies.

Robbins is not afraid to level criticism where he sees it due, Haig’s adherence to total victory in a single battle through 1916-17, when only able to deliver a strategy of attrition for example.

Though an academic study, British generalship is a relatively easy read, heavily referenced for those who want to explore specific points in more detail, significant use has been made of primary source material. My only criticism, perhaps more from an academic standpoint is the lack of engagement with the wider historical debate and work of other historians. This does not, however, detract from an otherwise excellent book. Recommended to serious students, but also those who want to understand the command challenges of the western front to contextualise more popular history and even mythology.