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Husserl's Account of Our Consciousness of Time
Having asked, What, then, is time? Augustine admitted, I know well enough what it is, provided that nobody asks me; but if I am asked what it is and try to explain, I am baffled. We all have a sense of time, but the description and explanation of it remain remarkably elusive.
Through a series of detailed descriptions, Husserl attempted to clarify this sense of time. This book traces the development of his account of our temporal self-awareness, starting with his early 1905-1909 lectures on time consciousness and proceeding through the 1917-18 Bernau Manuscripts, the Analyses of Passive Syntheses of the 1920s and ending with the C, B and E manuscripts on time and instincts of the 1930s.
Although it covers all the stages of Husserls account of temporality, the book is nonetheless systematic in its approach. It is organized about a number of basic topics in the theory of time and presents and critically appraises Husserls positions on the issues pertaining to each.
Through a series of detailed descriptions, Husserl attempted to clarify this sense of time. This book traces the development of his account of our temporal self-awareness, starting with his early 1905-1909 lectures on time consciousness and proceeding through the 1917-18 Bernau Manuscripts, the Analyses of Passive Syntheses of the 1920s and ending with the C, B and E manuscripts on time and instincts of the 1930s.
Although it covers all the stages of Husserls account of temporality, the book is nonetheless systematic in its approach. It is organized about a number of basic topics in the theory of time and presents and critically appraises Husserls positions on the issues pertaining to each.
138 pages, ebook
First published November 1, 2010
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September 24, 2018
‘In his final work, the Crisis, Husserl saw the difficulties of his time as a crisis involving our self-responsibility. The responsibility he focused on was not that of facing the abyss of our freedom, that is, of realizing that our choices were ultimately our own, that the world they established would ultimately determine what counted as evidence.
Neither was it the responsibility of responding to différance by deconstructing the terms and arguments of other positions, both political and theoretical. What Husserl had in mind was the responsibility of responding to what appeared, of limiting our own assertions and the actions based on these to what the discoverable evidence could support. As involving the consistency and rationality of our theses, such responsibility was, he thought, a life-long task. Implicit in any call to responsibility is, of course, the possibility of being irresponsible. The very transcendence that allows us to be ahead of ourselves gives us this freedom. We can, for example, content ourselves with merely signative intentions, intentions detached from the possibility of intuitive fulfillment. To do so, however, is not just to engage in empty talk or base our actions on empty assertions. It is to decouple ourselves from the constitutive process with its structure of thesis and evidence. As such, it is to implicitly deny the very origin of our transcendence. Regarding the political scene on the eve of war, Husserl argued that we do so only at our gravest peril. No one who considers our current situation, both political and ecological, can doubt that a similar argument is needed today.’
Amen to that brother.
[...this essay is probably at least a 4, but my understanding of it was limited, so my rating is limited ;]
Neither was it the responsibility of responding to différance by deconstructing the terms and arguments of other positions, both political and theoretical. What Husserl had in mind was the responsibility of responding to what appeared, of limiting our own assertions and the actions based on these to what the discoverable evidence could support. As involving the consistency and rationality of our theses, such responsibility was, he thought, a life-long task. Implicit in any call to responsibility is, of course, the possibility of being irresponsible. The very transcendence that allows us to be ahead of ourselves gives us this freedom. We can, for example, content ourselves with merely signative intentions, intentions detached from the possibility of intuitive fulfillment. To do so, however, is not just to engage in empty talk or base our actions on empty assertions. It is to decouple ourselves from the constitutive process with its structure of thesis and evidence. As such, it is to implicitly deny the very origin of our transcendence. Regarding the political scene on the eve of war, Husserl argued that we do so only at our gravest peril. No one who considers our current situation, both political and ecological, can doubt that a similar argument is needed today.’
Amen to that brother.
[...this essay is probably at least a 4, but my understanding of it was limited, so my rating is limited ;]
Displaying 1 of 1 review