Napoleon III's motives for intervening in Mexico in the 1860s were consistent with his foreign policy, which was based on his belief that free trade was the best foundation for peace. He saw the establishment of a friendly government in Mexico as an opportunity to expand that policy to encompass the world by ensuring European access to American markets, and preventing monopoly by the United States. His attempts to achieve this, however, were thwarted by his representatives in Mexico and the suspicions of his neighbours.
arcydzieło nauk historycznych, chyba najlepsza monografia jaką czytałem w ostatnich latach. gratuluję Pani Cunningham za niezwykłe studium, będzie Pani moją idolką
Cunningham writes a revisionist history of Emperor Napoleon III of France's intentions and activities in Mexico from 1861 to 1867. Instead of arguments that Napoleon sought to establish French control in Mexico and the region for French strategic and economic gains, the author stresses the emperor's "selfless and humanitarian motives" to stablize the political situation in Mexico and enable access for all nations to the markets of Central America. Cunningham believes that Napoleon had no long-term French goals in Mexico, believing that the combined actions of Britain, Spain, and France would quickly resolve the issues in Mexico in 1862. (Britain and Spain pulled out of Mexico in April 1862.) The author goes to great lengths to show that Napoleon (in France) was misinformed by French leaders on the scene, and some of them misunderstood his intentions or made their own decisions -- that were not in line with the emperor's thoughts -- to take action that resulted in the Franco-Mexican War and the establishment of Emperor Maximilian on the Mexican throne in 1864. Cunningham fully believes that Napoleon wanted to quickly resolve the issues in Mexico and then pull French forces out of the region. The author sees Napoleon's foreign policy as idealistic and the emperor as "the visionary who foresaw the establishment of the United Nations and related organizations, and a European Parliment" (p.212). This is an interesting read, based on archival sources, but some of the arguments are hard to swallow.
This is a well researched and well written analysis of the policy imperatives that informed Napoleon III's intervention in Mexico in the 1860s. This was a tragic and disastrous episode which culminated in the execution of Archduke Maximilian (imposed as Mexican Emperor) in 1867.
This is not a comprehensive account of the intervention but rather a consideration of the attitudes and motives behind the various participants. It is a revisionist history in that Cunningham seeks to defend Napoleon from the various charges - duplicity, aggrandizement, incompetence - that were levelled at him both at the time and subsequently. Rather Cunningham shows - through a careful analysis of contemporary records - how Napoleon's motives were perhaps laudable (such as the encouragement of free trade) but were thwarted and twisted by the machinations of his subordinates in Mexico, the abandonment of the initial intervention by Britain and Spain, and the unsuitability and incompetence of Maximilian himself.
This is a challenging thesis and while it is very slanted towards Napoleon and does not consider the more traditional views of the situation - such as the internal situation in Mexico itself - it does offer a good basis for a revision of the received story of the intervention.