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Causation in Science and the Methods of Scientific Discovery
Some of the chief goals of science - understanding, explanation, prediction, and application in new technologies - can only be conducted with any purpose if the world has some significant degree of constancy in what follows from what. While causal questions are relevant to all sciences and social sciences, how we discover causal connections is no easy matter. What is the source of such predictability and how does it operate? This is a question that goes beyond science itself and requires a philosophical approach. Causation is the main foundation upon which the possibility of science rests, but what methods should we adopt in order to identify causes in science? Causation often lies hidden and, as we must work to uncover it, it is vital we adopt the right methods in science for doing so and that we have a good philosophical understanding of what causation is. The choice of methods will inevitably reflect what one takes causation to be, making an accurate account of causation an
even more pressing matter, as the enquiry concerns the correct norms for the empirical study of the world. In Causation in Science and the Methods of Scientific Discovery , Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford propose nine new norms of scientific discovery, recognising that some of the greatest challenges that we face can only be solved if we understand what has caused the problem and what, if anything, could then cause its alleviation.
even more pressing matter, as the enquiry concerns the correct norms for the empirical study of the world. In Causation in Science and the Methods of Scientific Discovery , Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford propose nine new norms of scientific discovery, recognising that some of the greatest challenges that we face can only be solved if we understand what has caused the problem and what, if anything, could then cause its alleviation.
- GenresPhilosophyScience
304 pages, Hardcover
Published December 18, 2018
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February 3, 2024
The old gods of science won't do anymore; scientism, linear causation in complex dynamic systems, the idea(l) of causation itself, reductionism, frequency as (proxy for) probability; the authors do an admirable job in dissecting the hubris we have had in valuing our current methods of scientific enquiry and provide useful pointers for a healthy way forward; a redress and re-cognition of the philosophy in and of science; a salutary shot in the arm for scientists (and doctors!) everywhere.
"If we take the norms to be definitive or constitutive of science, then clearly one can only consider the validity of those norms by stepping outside of the scientific practice itself. Consideration of the normative aspect of science is thus inherently a philosophical and abstract enterprise rather than an empirical one. The key issue is whether the current norms of a practice could be wrong or incomplete. One cannot make this judgement from within that practice."
"Second, it has to be acknowledged that there is philosophy in science whether one likes it or not. Science rests on philosophical assumptions, including metaphysical ones. These assumptions cannot be proven by science itself, but only assumed, and this shows us that scientism is untenable."
"Epistemic humility is the view that there are some truths that are unknowable. It does not mean that there is nothing we can know, which is the claim of the sceptic, but that there are certain truths that cannot be known no matter how much other knowledge we have."
"In medicine, there are risks involved in applying the results from RCTs directly to individual patients (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). The intervention that works for most patients might not be suitable for all. Unless we assume that each individual patient is statistically average, which is unlikely, individual propensities cannot be inferred from statistical frequencies. This is a well-known problem, also referred to as the ecological fallacy."
"The norm that policy should be based on the best available evidence seems irrefutable. But we should not expect that a decision can be made just by considering the evidence. The best possible RCTs and meta-analyses might show which of the known interventions benefits most people. But there is no policy that automatically follows from that. For this we need another norm, derived not from the realm of science but from ethics."
On the philosophy of science and medicine in particular be sure to check out:
Bernoulli's Fallacy: Statistical Illogic and the Crisis of Modern Science
How Doctors Think: Clinical Judgment and the Practice of Medicine
Intuition in Medicine: A Philosophical Defense of Clinical Reasoning
Making Medical Knowledge
Medical Reasoning: The Nature and Use of Medical Knowledge
"If we take the norms to be definitive or constitutive of science, then clearly one can only consider the validity of those norms by stepping outside of the scientific practice itself. Consideration of the normative aspect of science is thus inherently a philosophical and abstract enterprise rather than an empirical one. The key issue is whether the current norms of a practice could be wrong or incomplete. One cannot make this judgement from within that practice."
"Second, it has to be acknowledged that there is philosophy in science whether one likes it or not. Science rests on philosophical assumptions, including metaphysical ones. These assumptions cannot be proven by science itself, but only assumed, and this shows us that scientism is untenable."
"Epistemic humility is the view that there are some truths that are unknowable. It does not mean that there is nothing we can know, which is the claim of the sceptic, but that there are certain truths that cannot be known no matter how much other knowledge we have."
"In medicine, there are risks involved in applying the results from RCTs directly to individual patients (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). The intervention that works for most patients might not be suitable for all. Unless we assume that each individual patient is statistically average, which is unlikely, individual propensities cannot be inferred from statistical frequencies. This is a well-known problem, also referred to as the ecological fallacy."
"The norm that policy should be based on the best available evidence seems irrefutable. But we should not expect that a decision can be made just by considering the evidence. The best possible RCTs and meta-analyses might show which of the known interventions benefits most people. But there is no policy that automatically follows from that. For this we need another norm, derived not from the realm of science but from ethics."
On the philosophy of science and medicine in particular be sure to check out:
Bernoulli's Fallacy: Statistical Illogic and the Crisis of Modern Science
How Doctors Think: Clinical Judgment and the Practice of Medicine
Intuition in Medicine: A Philosophical Defense of Clinical Reasoning
Making Medical Knowledge
Medical Reasoning: The Nature and Use of Medical Knowledge
Displaying 1 of 1 review