Three questions motivate this book’s account of evidence for the existence of God. First, if God’s existence is hidden, why suppose He exists at all? Second, if God exists, why is He hidden, particularly if God seeks to communicate with people? Third, what are the implications of divine hiddenness for philosophy, theology, and religion’s supposed knowledge of God? This book answers these questions on the basis of a new account of evidence and knowledge of divine reality that challenges skepticism about God’s existence. The central thesis is that we should expect evidence of divine reality to be purposively available to humans, that is, available only in a manner suitable to divine purposes in self-revelation. This lesson generates a seismic shift in our understanding of evidence and knowledge of divine reality. The result is a needed reorienting of religious epistemology to accommodate the character and purposes of an authoritative, perfectly loving God.
Paul Moser is an American analytic philosopher who writes on epistemology and the philosophy of religion. He is professor and chair of the Department of Philosophy at Loyola University Chicago and editor of American Philosophical Quarterly. He is the author of many works in epistemology and the philosophy of religion, in which he has supported versions of epistemic foundationalism and volitional theism. His latest work brings these two positions together to support volitional evidentialism about theistic belief, in contrast to fideism and traditional natural theology. His work draws from some epistemological and theological insights of Blaise Pascal, John Oman, and H. H. Farmer, but adds (i) a notion of purposively available evidence of God’s existence, (ii) a notion of authoritative evidence in contrast with spectator evidence, and (iii) a notion of personifying evidence of God whereby some willing humans become salient evidence of God's existence.
Paul Moser has conclusive evidence that God exists. Sounds impressive, until we learn that the evidence is essentially his conscience, or rather, his guilty conscience. Moser interprets the pangs of conscience, and his reaction to them, as a god that personally communicates commands and empowers obedience, at least insofar as Moser adjusts his thoughts and behavior to conform to the perceived demands of his conscience/god.
What is this god like? It is, says Moser, a perfectly loving god. From this premise, Moser derives other attributes with an alacrity comparable to the deduction of Herr Krug's pen from Hegel's Absolute. Dozens of times throughout the book, Moser invokes the formula, "A perfectly loving god would [INSERT AN ATTRIBUTE, ATTITUDE OR ACTION]." For example:
"a perfectly loving God would work by killing attitudes obstructing life in order to bring life." (Location 420.)
"a perfectly loving God would seek to break down self-destructive opposition to God (at least in cases where there’s hope for correction), but not by means of a counterproductive direct assault." (555.)
"a perfectly loving God as creator would have a right to take a human life and thus terminate the exercise of a human will, in accordance with moral perfection." (562.)
"a perfectly loving God would allow certain kinds of pain and suffering." (1003.)
"a perfectly loving God would sometimes hide in ways that allow people to have serious doubts about God, even at times when they apparently need God’s felt presence." (2434.)
Moser never provides the reasoning by which he connects his general premise of a perfectly loving god to his conclusion of a specified attribute. He simply makes these proclamations as if the attributes were self-evident given the general premise.
Once Moser has compiled his lengthy list of attributes for "a perfectly loving God worthy of worship" he then commences a search through the world's religions for an acceptable candidate that might satisfy these requirements and be deserving of Moser's adoration. At the start, all gods that are not monotheistic are summarily rejected. Allah does not last long either, and Moser then proceeds to the "God of Jewish and Christian monotheism." (952.) Moser is quick to point out that he does not assume such a god exists, and then continues to further pare the candidates.
We learn that the Psalmist said things about Yahweh that do not square with Moser's perfectly loving god, so Moser gravitates toward Christian theism and the sayings of Jesus and the Apostle Paul. (4115.) Moser expressly denies that the Bible itself possesses any inherent authority when it comes to knowledge of the perfectly loving god. (3224.) It appears that Moser alone is the ultimate authority on that topic, and statements in the Bible are only useful insofar as they affirm Moser's own view of god. Those who understand Jesus and Paul's words as revealing a deity that differs from Moser's god are portrayed as idol worshippers with morally distorted views of the divine. (2278.) This includes Protestants. (2283.)
But Moser's own knowledge of the perfectly loving god is largely derived from a source that Moser himself denounces. Moser rejects natural theology on the ground that it purports to establish a deity's existence through objective rational argument instead of the subjective experience of a guilty conscience and obedience to the conscience, which Moser claims is the only foundation for conclusive evidence and knowledge of god. Yet, when Moser creates his list of attributes for the perfectly loving god, he relies entirely on rationalizations and does not purport to establish these attributes upon the inward movements of his own conscience. For example, when Moser states that god has the right to take human life and terminate the exercise of human will, Moser derived this conclusion from his assumed premise that god is perfectly loving. Moser made no attempt to ground this knowledge on his experience of the inner workings of his conscience.
Also, Moser provides no explanation as to why he attributes the movements of his conscience to a god. Again, he seems to be borrowing a page from natural theology by suggesting that man's moral sensibility evinces the voice of a deity that alternatively convicts or approves his thought and actions. Even assuming that Moser perceives his conscience as operating in this way, he never explains how he makes the leap from the subjective experience of his own conscience to an objective, transcendent god.
In addition, there is not only a circularity in Moser's theory of divine knowledge, but the circle is broken as well. According to Moser, before god reveals conclusive evidence and knowledge of himself to someone, that person must first become "attuned" to god by wholeheartedly determining to subjugate his own will to god’s will (by obeying the dictates of his conscience). Yet, Moser also states that before one can become attuned to god, he most first have an accurate understanding of the true nature and demands of this god, otherwise the person will tune-in to a cognitive idol of his own making. Therefore, before a person can obtain true knowledge from god, the person must already possess true knowledge of god. Moser does not explain how that is possible.
Finally, what if Moser is wrong? What if the true God is different than Moser's idealization of a perfectly loving god? After all, Moser never establishes his own authority to speak on behalf of God, and he recognizes no authority beyond himself and his own conscience. If Moser is wrong, then all the errors he assigns to other people's conception of god turn back upon his own. If he is wrong, then his perfectly loving god is nothing more than "a convenient idol of my own making" and Moser becomes the willing recipient of "at most a counterfeit." (2629; 2656.) Moser's theory of divine knowledge provides no basis for discerning whether a given conception of god, including Moser's own, is correct or counterfeit.
Under Moser's epistemology, a true knowledge of God would remain as elusive as ever.
Imagine an earthly father decides to imitate Moser's perfectly authoritative and loving God in his relations with his daughter. First, right after conception, the father ought to abandon the mother and the girl, and see to it that the mother remains tight-lipped on his existence. He should make sure there is absolutely NO evidence at all that he is alive or cares for her at all. Since the father wants to imitate and be like Moser’s perfectly authoritative and loving God, he decides that he will ONLY give authoritative evidence of his existence to his daughter, once she, without any evidence at all that he cares or lives, decides to enter a state of abject submission and thus becomes properly attuned. She must first announce that she (the miserable worm) doesn’t deserve to know anything, and she doesn’t want to create an idol of what her father is like or determine his character; she humbly promises to obey her father no matter what, and to be under her authoritative and loving father's dictates (if he is indeed alive). Once she counts the cost, lays down all her rights, picks up her cross, and promises to obey, not talk back, and be a subservient, dutiful daughter, ONLY then, should the father (who is like Moser’s god) allow her to experience some unreproducible and subjective sense that he exists. But LORD FORBID, not in some obvious or objective manner, like showing up or giving her a phone call. No, maybe as she sleeps, the elusive dad might play a record that whispers “He is real… your dad is perfectly authoritative and loving, and he wants to rule you” and bam… she’ll wake up, with this mysterious, wholly authoritative evidence that her dad is alive!
So yes, Moser’s god gives us no evidence at all that he exists, because he is against any type of spectator evidence or natural theology. Moser’s god will only allow people evidence that he exists, IF AND ONLY IF they enter into some submissive state. Only then will the perfectly authoritative and “loving” elusive god give them some authoritative evidence, which is nothing but some subjective, vague, groundless certainty in the conscience that he exists. This is ingenious, for anyone who cannot find evidence that God exists, Moser can say it is entirely their fault, for the perfectly authoritative god will only allow people to know of his existence, if and only if on his terms, which is they must abase themselves and promise to make him Lord of their life. Okay, so suppose a skeptic humbles themself, and declares that they are wholly and completely willing to obey this god whom they have no evidence of his existence, and what if they still don’t get any perfectly authoritative “evidence”, what then? For Moser, obviously, they are to blame; they were NOT truly submissive and subservient enough to be attuned to obtain the vague and subjective signal in their conscience that the perfectly authoritative and loving God exists.
Yes, Moser can always blame the victim and claim they were not properly attuned (submissive enough). But I still think my own experience provides evidence against his atrocious and long winded and repetitive argument. I grew up a pastor’s kid. I eventually felt called into full-time missions. I was all into Lordship salvation. I wanted to be on fire for God, wholly sold out, to obey him and know him and to make him known. But guess what I got as the years continued? Well, God continued to be pretty dang elusive. The hiddenness, silence, and absence of God continued to erode my faith. Anyhow, to make a long story short, I think I truly, with every ounce of my being, intended to be attuned. I did not want an idol; I wanted to obey and be led wherever he led me. But no, I was not gifted this “perfectly authoritative” evidence, or if I did, it was fleeting. While I still remain within the Christian tribe, I would be best described as a Christian agnostic. My childlike faith was suffocated—primarily due to God being so elusive. I am past the dark night of the soul, since I am past having any expectations or hopes of personal union with God.
Let me finish this review with one more criticism. He repeats “perfectly authoritative God" a million times throughout this book, but what the heck are the authoritative commands? He ultimately begs the question, as he assumes the Bible works as this authority, but never once gives a justification for it. I don't think scripture surely can work, since it is complex, huge, ancient, and ambiguous. If the bible is to be our authority, that is a problem, since no two people can agree on what is authoritative and what is not. He also repeats how God is “perfectly loving” and creates tons of assertions on what a loving God would do, but the bible is chock-full of God commanding and doing unloving things.
Okay, one last thing. His style of writing is poor. He uses the words perfectly authoritative and loving almost 700 times in this book. He repeats himself, using the same words, again and again, entire phrases to be rehashed again and again.
And do note, if you want philosophy, the last half of this book is Moser trying to be an old-time Lordship revivalist (Like Ravenhill or Reidhead), trying to get people to repent, surrender, and truly make Jesus their Lord. Most philosophy is a sin, most truth seeking and question asking is a sin, he'd likely consider all skeptics to be actively engaging in rebellion, so obviously, God will remain elusive to them. Paul Moser is one unique cat, I'll give you that. His book practices what he preaches.
I didn’t give this a higher rating for one reason: he repeats himself too much. He makes some good points, but he does so in the first couple chapters, then restates the same concepts for another 150 pages. He is not a fan of natural theology, so he doesn’t let evidence shape his argument.
He asserts some important (and I believe, true) points about human idolatry and how it pertains to knowledge of God and cognitive barriers that might prevent that knowledge, but I think he weakens the strength of the book by not tightening up the argument as a whole.
Having said all that, I liked this book, and it is an important piece in the divine hiddenness arguments!