Hitler, Dönitz, and the Baltic Sea: The Third Reich's Last Hope, 1944-1945

by Howard D. Grier

The popular conception of Hitler in the final years of World War II is that of a deranged Fuhrer stubbornly demanding the defense of every foot of ground on all fronts and ordering hopeless attacks with nonexistent divisions. To imply that Hitler had a rational plan to win the war flies in the face of widely accepted interpretations, but historian Howard D. Grier persuasively argues here that Hitler did possess a strategy to regain the initiative in 1944-45 and that the Baltic theater played the key role in his plan.

In examining that strategy, Grier answers lingering questions about the Third Reich's final months and also provides evidence of its emphasis upon naval affairs and of Admiral Karl Dönitz's influence in shaping Hitler's grand strategy. Dönitz intended to starve Britain into submission and halt the shipment of American troops and supplies to Europe with a fleet of new Type XXI U-boats. But to test the new submarines and train their crews the Nazis needed control of the Baltic Sea and possession of its ports, and to launch their U-boat offensive they needed Norway, the only suitable location that remained after the loss of France in the summer of 1944.

This work analyzes German naval strategy from 1944 to 1945 and its role in shaping the war on land in the Baltic. The first six chapters provide an operational history of warfare on the northern sector of the eastern front and give evidence of the navy s demands that the Baltic coast be protected in order to preserve U-boat training areas. The next three chapters look at possible reasons for Hitler's defense of the Baltic coast, concluding that the most likely reason was Hitler's belief in Dönitz's ability to turn the tide of war with his new submarines. A final chapter discusses Dönitz's personal and ideological relationship with Hitler, his influence in shaping overall strategy, and the reason Hitler selected the admiral as his successor rather than a general or Nazi Party official. With Grier's thorough examination of Hitler's strategic motives and the reasons behind his decision to defend coastal sectors in the Baltic late in the war, readers are offered an important new interpretation of events for their consideration.

Genres: World War II

320 pages, Hardcover

First published June 1, 2007

Reviews

[Shrike58 · Rating 4 out of 5]

This turned out to be a fascinating examination of German end game of 1944-1945 emphasizing that there was very much a coherent strategy to justify the tenacious German hold on the Baltic coast in the Baltic States and East Prussia, which even by Hitlerian standards might appear to have been a low-percentage decision. Essentially, the advanced German submarines were seen as the last potential war-changing weapon in the Reich's arsenal and without havens in the Baltic their potential could not be brought to fruition. Further, this argument was bolstered by Adm. Karl Donitz at all turns and, due to absolute loyalty to Hitler and the Nazi Order, his strategic preferences were accepted. Apart from that there are interesting side examinations of the German operational situation in the land of the eastern Baltic, the Swedish influence on German strategy, the programmatic failures to bring the Type XXI submarines online sooner, and the general psychological atmosphere in the German high command at the end of the war.

Originally written: Jun 13, 2018.

[Lawrence · Rating 5 out of 5]

The popular conception of Hitler in the final years of World War II is that of a deranged Fuhrer stubbornly demanding the defense of every foot of ground on all fronts and ordering hopeless attacks with nonexistent divisions. To imply that Hitler had a rational plan to win the war flies in the face of widely accepted interpretations, but historian Howard D. Grier persuasively argues here that Hitler did possess a strategy to regain the initiative in 1944-45 and that the Baltic theater played the key role in his plan. In examining that strategy, Grier answers lingering questions about the Third Reich's final months and also provides evidence of its emphasis upon naval affairs and of Admiral Karl Donitz's influence in shaping Hitler's grand strategy. Donitz intended to starve Britain into submission and halt the shipment of American troops and supplies to Europe with a fleet of new Type XXI U-boats. But to test the new submarines and train their crews the Nazis needed control of the Baltic Sea and possession of its ports, and to launch their U-boat offensive they needed Norway, the only suitable location that remained after the loss of France in the summer of 1944. This work analyzes German naval strategy from 1944 to 1945 and its role in shaping the war on land in the Baltic. The first six chapters provide an operational history of warfare on the northern sector of the eastern front and give evidence of the navy s demands that the Baltic coast be protected in order to preserve U-boat training areas. The next three chapters look at possible reasons for Hitler's defense of the Baltic coast, concluding that the most likely reason was Hitler's belief in Donitz's ability to turn the tide of war with his new submarines. A final chapter discusses Donitz's personal and ideological relationship with Hitler, his influence in shaping overall strategy, and the reason Hitler selected the admiral as his successor rather than a general or Nazi Party official.

[Shawn · Rating 3 out of 5]

I really enjoyed the very logical premise for this work. David Grier Grier challenges the traditional interpretation of the forgotten legions of the Third Reich abandoned in the Baltic and seeks to demonstrate the very deliberate (and possibly overly desperate) reasons that Hitler and Doenitz sought to keep control of the Northern Sea. He goes into great detail tracing the hard fought withdrawals from Leningrad into Estonia and finally Latvia and forms the tardy appearing decisions to retreat into a plausible explanation of the less appreciated strategic value placed on the Northern front by the Nazi's. He further demonstrates how leaders were chosen in this area less for operational efficiency than for political obedience, but does not suggest necessarily that this led to military disaster. In fact, the author attributes greater operational freedom to those that enjoyed Hitler's favour, even when they knowingly chose to disobey orders.
Unfortunately, I found that the story arc lost some steam as the book wore on. I think this was due to the decision to proceed geographically, and thus have to jump around chronologically and the end product thus comes across as a series of more disjointed stories than a cohesive analysis of the entire theatre. This is unfortunate as I do applaud the new perspective that this work provides.