Nuclear Illusion and Reality

by Solly Zuckerman

Hardcover

First published January 1, 1983

About the author

Solomon "Solly" Zuckerman, Baron Zuckerman OM KCB FRS (30 May 1904 – 1 April 1993) was a British public servant, doctor, zoologist and operational research pioneer. He is best remembered as a scientific advisor to the Allies on bombing strategy in the Second World War, for his work to advance the cause of nuclear non-proliferation, and for his role in bringing attention to global economic issues.
After studying medicine at the University of Cape Town and later attending Yale University, he went to London in 1926 to complete his studies at University College Hospital Medical School.
Lord Zuckerman was married to Joan, Lady Zuckerman, born Lady Joan Alice Violet Isaacs (July 19, 1918 – March 25, 2000) a British hostess, writer and painter.

Reviews

[Michael Watson · Rating 3 out of 5]

An interesting book. It is perhaps dated now, published as it was in 1982, but some of its insights are still worthwhile. While it does briefly treat strategic nuclear weapons and deterrence in the sense of “mutually assured destruction,” the greater part of the book deals with the impact of tactical nuclear weapons in the context of the confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw pact during the Cold War. The basic messages are that tactical or theater-level use of nuclear weapons - that is, using them as an extension to conventional weapons within the context of an otherwise conventional war, against “military” targets such as armor or troop formations or command centers - does not have a rational basis. This is for several reasons. First, some of the “legitimate” military targets are located within places that are also strategic targets. Second, even using nuclear weapons against military formations would inevitably inflict terrible collateral damage on the civilian population of the contested territory. And finally, no nation is likely to give up without using every means at its disposal to preserve itself, so a “tactical” nuclear war would be extremely likely to lead to a “strategic” nuclear war, in which the U.S., Britain, and France and the USSR devastated one another’s homelands.

I am not certain to what extent Zuckerman’s arguments are still good in 2022. He speaks of deterrence mostly in its larger Strategic context, and it’s certainly arguable that tactical nuclear weapons also have a deterrent effect against invading neighbor nations that are either themselves nuclear armed or else under a nuclear umbrella. But I am inclined to accept his premise that it would be extremely difficult to avoid escalation following any first use of a tactical nuclear weapon, however small.