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Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control Between the Wars
Emily O. Goldman presents an interesting and stimulating interpretation of the interwar naval conferences. . . Goldman's effort is an important interpretive contribution that adds much to the ever-growing debate on the Washington Conference. -Journal of American History "Sunken Treaties makes an important contribution to the study of arms control. Unlike many examinations of arms control that narrowly focus on weaponry and their characteristics, this study puts arms control within a broader international political framework. Goldman analyzes a complex attempt at multilateral arms control that sought to limit a variety of nonnuclear weapons technologies. This perspective on arms control-multilateral and nonnuclear-is of great importance for understanding better the dynamics of the post-Cold War international security environment. By providing a broader perspective, Sunken Treaties helps enhance the theory of arms control, providing guidelines for evaluating when it might be effective an
368 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1994
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January 9, 2020
Shortly after the end of World War One, then known as the Great War as a reflection of its terrible impact, the five victorious powers (Great Britain, United States, Japan, France and Italy)...
...entered into another arms race.
Fortunately, the proposed weapons remained mostly on the drawing board and, as financial restraints started to bite, those five powers, and particularly the first three, entered into a number of treaties as part of the 1922 Washington Naval Conference. Until Japan's exit in 1936 from its terms (as amended by later agreements), the powers mostly complied. To a certain extent, the arms control process was successful, World War Two notwithstanding, but it was complicated.
Emily O Goldman's book is not intended as the definitive book on the Washington Treaties process. Instead, she draws on secondary sources to explain what succeeded, and why arms control eventually failed. Goldman is primarily a Cold War historian, and her axe to grind is her perceived over reliance by commentators on seeing arms control through the lenses of the SALT and START nuclear weapons treaties. The latter treaties were bipolarand technically focussed. Goldman believes more lessons can be drawn from the multilateral Washington Treaties:
- why even conflicting political interests could converge to reach agreement (or at least bridge disagreements) on political matters, which would allow agreement on military weapons; and
- why a breakdown in political agreement or bridges) can mean that military arms treaties that a delinked from political matters will fail to resolve tensions (e.g. the technically focussed London Naval Treaty of 1930).
As the French case between the wars reminds us, technical agreements alone are unlikely to enhance long-term security if they are not part of wider understandings about future structures of political order and are not grounded in a convergence of political vision.
Goldman details how the technical limitations agreed at Washington were tied to political considerations, such as commerical interests in China, or the balance of power in Europe while Germany was quiscient. Agreement was possible while each party felt its sphere of interest was secure (though the French were shortchanged, Goldman noting that their political needs for security were not met).
Goldman also discusses "System Maintenance", i.e. the actions of the parties under the treaties in the face of changing political situations, either internally (changing Japanese Governments) or externally (the rise of nationalism in China, the resurrection of Germany). Goldman holds that the previously converging political interests diverged, even between the United States and Great Britain over the unity of China, and the parties undermined the previously agreed political understandings (Japan's withdrawal from the Washington Treaties, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935).
They failed to implement any measures to enhance the stability of China or create a sound government that could revise prior unequal treaties gradually and peacefully.
In tying the interwar period with the post Cold War situation, Goldman emphasises the need to find ways to protect the political interests of parties entering into arms control agreements. She ends with the then-current Ukrainian intransigence (in the early 90s) over the surrender of its nuclear weapons without a security guarantee. After publication of this book, Russia agreed to guarantee Ukraine's borders and Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons. Also after publication of this book, Russia ignored that guarantee, occupied Crimea and supported separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. This isn't a swipe at Goldman on a particular point, especially as she expressly refers to in the same section the need for meaningful guarantees and consideration to regional groupings for protection, and elsewhere states that maintenance is harder than formation. What it instead suggests is that this book is a very good summary of why international relations are difficult, particularly when there are limited means, and variable desires, to enforce agreement. The Iran nuclear deal is another example of where even political matters are accounted for, albeit incompletely, a change in regime of one the signatories (the United States) can render an agreement void.
In sum, a primary objective of arms control should be to make technical treaties part of a web of understandings with the by-product that weapons become a less critical index of great-power status.
Like I said, complicated.
...entered into another arms race.
Fortunately, the proposed weapons remained mostly on the drawing board and, as financial restraints started to bite, those five powers, and particularly the first three, entered into a number of treaties as part of the 1922 Washington Naval Conference. Until Japan's exit in 1936 from its terms (as amended by later agreements), the powers mostly complied. To a certain extent, the arms control process was successful, World War Two notwithstanding, but it was complicated.
Emily O Goldman's book is not intended as the definitive book on the Washington Treaties process. Instead, she draws on secondary sources to explain what succeeded, and why arms control eventually failed. Goldman is primarily a Cold War historian, and her axe to grind is her perceived over reliance by commentators on seeing arms control through the lenses of the SALT and START nuclear weapons treaties. The latter treaties were bipolarand technically focussed. Goldman believes more lessons can be drawn from the multilateral Washington Treaties:
- why even conflicting political interests could converge to reach agreement (or at least bridge disagreements) on political matters, which would allow agreement on military weapons; and
- why a breakdown in political agreement or bridges) can mean that military arms treaties that a delinked from political matters will fail to resolve tensions (e.g. the technically focussed London Naval Treaty of 1930).
As the French case between the wars reminds us, technical agreements alone are unlikely to enhance long-term security if they are not part of wider understandings about future structures of political order and are not grounded in a convergence of political vision.
Goldman details how the technical limitations agreed at Washington were tied to political considerations, such as commerical interests in China, or the balance of power in Europe while Germany was quiscient. Agreement was possible while each party felt its sphere of interest was secure (though the French were shortchanged, Goldman noting that their political needs for security were not met).
Goldman also discusses "System Maintenance", i.e. the actions of the parties under the treaties in the face of changing political situations, either internally (changing Japanese Governments) or externally (the rise of nationalism in China, the resurrection of Germany). Goldman holds that the previously converging political interests diverged, even between the United States and Great Britain over the unity of China, and the parties undermined the previously agreed political understandings (Japan's withdrawal from the Washington Treaties, the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935).
They failed to implement any measures to enhance the stability of China or create a sound government that could revise prior unequal treaties gradually and peacefully.
In tying the interwar period with the post Cold War situation, Goldman emphasises the need to find ways to protect the political interests of parties entering into arms control agreements. She ends with the then-current Ukrainian intransigence (in the early 90s) over the surrender of its nuclear weapons without a security guarantee. After publication of this book, Russia agreed to guarantee Ukraine's borders and Ukraine surrendered its nuclear weapons. Also after publication of this book, Russia ignored that guarantee, occupied Crimea and supported separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine. This isn't a swipe at Goldman on a particular point, especially as she expressly refers to in the same section the need for meaningful guarantees and consideration to regional groupings for protection, and elsewhere states that maintenance is harder than formation. What it instead suggests is that this book is a very good summary of why international relations are difficult, particularly when there are limited means, and variable desires, to enforce agreement. The Iran nuclear deal is another example of where even political matters are accounted for, albeit incompletely, a change in regime of one the signatories (the United States) can render an agreement void.
In sum, a primary objective of arms control should be to make technical treaties part of a web of understandings with the by-product that weapons become a less critical index of great-power status.
Like I said, complicated.
Displaying 1 of 1 review