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Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical
This book is a discussion of some of Kierkegaard's central ideas, showing their relevance to contemporary debates in epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of religion. Anthony Rudd's aim is not simply to expound Kierkegaard's ideas but to draw on them creatively in order to illuminate
questions about the foundations of morality and the nature of personal identity, as discussed by analytical philosophers such as MacIntyre, Parfit, Williams, and Foot. Rudd seeks a way forward from the sterile conflict between the view that morality and religion are based on objective reasoning and
the view that they are merely expressions of subjective emotions. He argues that morality and religion must be understood in terms of the individual's search for a sense of meaning in his or her own life, but emphasizes that this does not imply that values are arbitrary or merely subjective.
questions about the foundations of morality and the nature of personal identity, as discussed by analytical philosophers such as MacIntyre, Parfit, Williams, and Foot. Rudd seeks a way forward from the sterile conflict between the view that morality and religion are based on objective reasoning and
the view that they are merely expressions of subjective emotions. He argues that morality and religion must be understood in terms of the individual's search for a sense of meaning in his or her own life, but emphasizes that this does not imply that values are arbitrary or merely subjective.
- GenresPhilosophy
198 pages, Hardcover
First published July 29, 1993
21 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
August 5, 2016
Rudd’s book is a succinct and useful interpretation of Kierkegaard’s ethical writings. Eithor/Or I, Either/Or II and Fear and Trembling typically possess the most relevance for ethical thought in the contemporary academy. Rudd provides an interesting contextualization of these sources in terms of contemporary ethics. The threshold of ethical limitation in Kierkegaard’s overall corpus is an important historical precedent in philosophy.
Rudd also engages Alasdair MacIntyre in a fruitful discussion regarding "objective" versus "subjective" moral codes, Kantian rationality, in addition to existential engagement, that is, in opposition to alienation in modern societies.
Moreover, another Rudd project of value that was born of this effort is “Kierkegaard After MacIntyre". Rudd edited with John Davenport the volume for an entire cohort of leading Kierkegaard scholars. The two books can be read together in order to understand the full spectrum of the debate.
Side bar: The archetype of the Aesthete was the subject of a thesis of mine for a seminar in Catholic philosophy with a Dominican priest. I think I shot wide of the mark in trying to incorporate too much Protestant thought into a half-baked thesis. However, continuing to think about the same subject matter is still useful, especially when having spent considerable amounts of time studying the various lines of argument involved.
In this regard, The Limits of the Ethical contains an interesting thesis for students of Kierkegaard. The integration of Kierkegaard with contemporary ethics in academic philosophy is a potentially productive pursuit. For example, MacIntyre (in After Virtue) recognized the importance of Kierkegaard to the development of ethical thought since the Enlightenment. In other words, Kierkegaard was historically the first important philosopher to recognize the inherent irrationality underlying the practice of ethics.
The subjective aspect of moral decision making is the central theme of Fear and Trembling and an overarching concern of Either/Or. Rudd eloquently outlines the related views involved for the interested reader. The theme itself is one of prime importance in the writings of most "canonized" existential philosophers. Rudd’s contribution to the conversation is well deserved.
Rudd also engages Alasdair MacIntyre in a fruitful discussion regarding "objective" versus "subjective" moral codes, Kantian rationality, in addition to existential engagement, that is, in opposition to alienation in modern societies.
Moreover, another Rudd project of value that was born of this effort is “Kierkegaard After MacIntyre". Rudd edited with John Davenport the volume for an entire cohort of leading Kierkegaard scholars. The two books can be read together in order to understand the full spectrum of the debate.
Side bar: The archetype of the Aesthete was the subject of a thesis of mine for a seminar in Catholic philosophy with a Dominican priest. I think I shot wide of the mark in trying to incorporate too much Protestant thought into a half-baked thesis. However, continuing to think about the same subject matter is still useful, especially when having spent considerable amounts of time studying the various lines of argument involved.
In this regard, The Limits of the Ethical contains an interesting thesis for students of Kierkegaard. The integration of Kierkegaard with contemporary ethics in academic philosophy is a potentially productive pursuit. For example, MacIntyre (in After Virtue) recognized the importance of Kierkegaard to the development of ethical thought since the Enlightenment. In other words, Kierkegaard was historically the first important philosopher to recognize the inherent irrationality underlying the practice of ethics.
The subjective aspect of moral decision making is the central theme of Fear and Trembling and an overarching concern of Either/Or. Rudd eloquently outlines the related views involved for the interested reader. The theme itself is one of prime importance in the writings of most "canonized" existential philosophers. Rudd’s contribution to the conversation is well deserved.
March 3, 2018
I'm grading this book, like others in the Kierkegaard literature, on the curve; for the vast majority of what is written on SK struggles incredibly to be as much as half-right, and, as one person told me, one must catch as catch can.
Well, what may one catch from Professor Rudd? In this case, one may get a pretty good idea of what Kierkegaard's system may look like if transposed into the language, mood, and situation of contemporary (i.e., post-Rawlsian, post-Plantingian) analytic philosophy. What does this amount to? Rudd claims that his book is a work of conceptual clarification, and that is what you get: a pretty fair account of the ethical as the free taking up of one's own materials and unifying these by means of projects; of the personal virtues (temperance, courage, and prudence) and civic virtues (justice, benevolence) as emerging as necessities for such projects, the former universally so, the latter or sometimes so; and a fairly straightforward, if abrupt, account of what is gained by the transition from the ethical to the religious existence spheres.
Rudd notes the shifting status of SK's own conception of the religious, as it varies between more-temporal and less-temporal forms. He doesn't explain why that might be, or clarify what concepts are in tension to produce this shifting commitment; and in fact it is not that clear why a person, rather than a philosopher, should want the kind of unity that he claims marks the religious sphere. He places the accent of the religious sphere on the possession of an absolute telos (whereas the ethical telos is always marked by its being personal or relative to a given society, in a certain sense); but this doesn't seem to correspond to the kind of reasons that SK himself recommended the religious existence sphere.
I think that Rudd encounters this difficulty because passion, and love, are not large enough features of his reconstruction of Kierkegaard's thought. However, this move would be very ungainly in an analytic reconstruction, because it would imply that was essential to the self, and to the completion of the ethical and religious spheres, was something that someone experienced and was passive with respect to acquiring, rather than something that could be clarified and chosen or not chosen as rationally recommended. The situation of the Knights in F&T, however, is precisely that of someone to which something (acquisition of infinite passion) has happened, and who are then called upon to respond to it, rather than to freely define themselves merely in terms of their material; and this passion introduces numerous complications, but also clarifies everything, on the demand to go beyond the ethical sphere to the religious sphere to find a way of responding to the vulnerability such passion exposes a person to.
On the whole, very useful, but only in a certain key. Valuable to anyone who wants to bring SK's ideas into analytic philosophy but to be read with a certain circumspection.
Well, what may one catch from Professor Rudd? In this case, one may get a pretty good idea of what Kierkegaard's system may look like if transposed into the language, mood, and situation of contemporary (i.e., post-Rawlsian, post-Plantingian) analytic philosophy. What does this amount to? Rudd claims that his book is a work of conceptual clarification, and that is what you get: a pretty fair account of the ethical as the free taking up of one's own materials and unifying these by means of projects; of the personal virtues (temperance, courage, and prudence) and civic virtues (justice, benevolence) as emerging as necessities for such projects, the former universally so, the latter or sometimes so; and a fairly straightforward, if abrupt, account of what is gained by the transition from the ethical to the religious existence spheres.
Rudd notes the shifting status of SK's own conception of the religious, as it varies between more-temporal and less-temporal forms. He doesn't explain why that might be, or clarify what concepts are in tension to produce this shifting commitment; and in fact it is not that clear why a person, rather than a philosopher, should want the kind of unity that he claims marks the religious sphere. He places the accent of the religious sphere on the possession of an absolute telos (whereas the ethical telos is always marked by its being personal or relative to a given society, in a certain sense); but this doesn't seem to correspond to the kind of reasons that SK himself recommended the religious existence sphere.
I think that Rudd encounters this difficulty because passion, and love, are not large enough features of his reconstruction of Kierkegaard's thought. However, this move would be very ungainly in an analytic reconstruction, because it would imply that was essential to the self, and to the completion of the ethical and religious spheres, was something that someone experienced and was passive with respect to acquiring, rather than something that could be clarified and chosen or not chosen as rationally recommended. The situation of the Knights in F&T, however, is precisely that of someone to which something (acquisition of infinite passion) has happened, and who are then called upon to respond to it, rather than to freely define themselves merely in terms of their material; and this passion introduces numerous complications, but also clarifies everything, on the demand to go beyond the ethical sphere to the religious sphere to find a way of responding to the vulnerability such passion exposes a person to.
On the whole, very useful, but only in a certain key. Valuable to anyone who wants to bring SK's ideas into analytic philosophy but to be read with a certain circumspection.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews