Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: An Introduction

Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts

by David G. Stern

David Stern examines Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations in this new introduction to a classic philosophical text, paying particular attention to the arguments of the Investigations as well as the way in which the work is written, especially the role of dialogue. While he concentrates on helping readers interpret the primary text, he also provides guidance to the unusually wide range of existing interpretations, and why they have inspired such a diversity of readings.

Genres: Philosophy

228 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2004

Reviews

[Illiterate · Rating 4 out of 5]

Stern focuses on the structure of the text, distinguishing 3 voices: interlocutor (TLP etc), narrator (ordinary language etc), commentator (dismissing all philosophy).

[Harry Vincent · Rating 4 out of 5]

8/10

[Doctor Moss · Rating 5 out of 5]

David Stern understands the Philosophical Investigations much better than I do. I wish I had read this book a long time ago.

Stern has done his homework in ferreting out the different voices to be heard in the Investigations. Such a "literary" perspective is taken often for philosophers such as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, but rarely, if ever, for Wittgenstein. Stern shows that "reading Wittgenstein" is an essential dimension in understanding his subtle views on language and mind.

His recommendation is to recognize 3 voices. The usual reading recognizes two -- the voices of Wittgenstein and an "interlocutor". Stern identifies a third voice, while also renaming the first the "narrator" rather than "Wittgenstein". The third voice, a "commentator", discounts or even makes fun of the very idea of taking any definitive "philosophical" position on the question at hand, whether the traditional philosophical position or the anti-philosophical or ordinary language position (typically taken to be the voice of Wittgenstein himself).

This third voice enables Wittgenstein to escape dogmatic interpretations of "rules" and "practices" in his later philosophy of language. He recognizes that the rules of language are not guarantees of linguistic objectivity in any deep sense. Rather, they are intrinsic to a "form of life" through which languages are used to practical ends of communication and behavior. Any description of our linguistic practices, even Wittgenstein's own, is no more than partially true, just another way of characterizing the practices making up our language games. This step back is characteristic of the ancient skeptics, known as Pyrronhists, who were expert at such subtle argument. Stern explains how Wittgenstein's long-noticed skepticism about any foundations for language is clarified by the role played by this third voice of the Investigation's "commentator."

I think it's important to consider that all three of the voices Stern identifies are Wittgenstein's own voices, in a kind of interminable three-way conversation, not only failing to reach a resolution to philosophical problems, but losing the ground to stand on in trying to resolve them in the first place. Wittgenstein follows the paths that philosophers follow, taking them through an internal dialogue led by the temptations to theorize, until, in that third voice, he recognizes the futility of the lines of thinking he has followed. He doesn't disown those lines of thought as those of others -- after all, these are the temptations of philosophy itself, and we are all seduced by them.

Stern formulates his general point in numerous ways.. One that I found particularly clear appears on page 170, during his discussion of rule following:

". . . it would be closer to the truth to approach [Wittgenstein] as a quietist who sees that any attempt to explicitly articulate quietism will lead to dogmatism of one kind or another, and that therefore the best way to advocate quietism is to write a genuinely conflicted dialogue in which non-Pyrrhonian participants play the leading roles."

Any attempt at non-Pyrrhonian, positive philosophical theories runs up against the limits of theorizing itself.

Maybe it comes down to something like this. All there really is is our speaking, acting, judging, deciding, . . . -- all of our living ("the human form of life"). And there is no theory of it, no account of it from the outside that gets it all right. It's as if we were trying to make a perfectly accurate map of the world. If it were perfectly accurate, it would just be the world itself, not something "about" or "of" it.

[Nathan Albright · Rating 4 out of 5]

Who is the ideal reader of a book like this?  Picture yourself as an undergraduate (or graduate) student of philosophy, who for some reason known to no one else and half-forgotten by you yourself, took a course that required you to read and attempt to interpret Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations.  If that applies to you, this is a book you would likely enjoy and appreciate and may even find as a lifesaver when it comes to one's efforts to maintain a high GPA.  Alternatively, one could be interested in philosophy in general but not know Wittgenstein's writings very well and so not be able to get a grip on what he has to say.  To be honest, though, it is unlikely that Wittgenstein had a grip on what he said, considering his view that all valid philosophical statements were tautologies, and that he could not even manage to stay silent about what was not, and thus violated his own ethical maxims.  It stands to reason that it would take a great deal of effort for someone to translate Wittgenstein's investigations into something that was comprehensible by mere mortals and this book certainly does the trick nicely and deserves appreciation accordingly.

This relatively short book of 150 pages or so is divided into five chapters of very unequal size and complexity.  The book opens with a preface that is extremely short and then moves into a discussion of the context in which Wittgenstein wrote his philosophical investigations, namely as an attack on his previous work of philosophy that had come out of his experiences in World War I (1).  After that the author briefly discusses the themes of the Philosophical Investigations (2), namely various thoughts about language and nominalism, precision, and the independence of the internal world from the external one.  The author then spends the vast majority of the book engaged in the task of reading and summarizing Wittgenstein's text (3), which is divided into four sections that look at the Augustinian picture of understanding language and communication, expressing the philosopher's ideal of precision in language as well as the issue of family resemblance, using various means to attempt to grasp meaning and understanding, and finally dealing with the question of the inner and outer as it relates to understanding.  The author then completes this book with a brief discussion of the reception and influence of this work (4), even if it impoverished philosophical studies from later thinkers, as well as a brief guide to further reading (5) as well as notes, references, and an index.

Is this a worthwhile book?  If you want to understand some of what is wrong with contemporary philosophy, and why it is that some of the self-professed greatest thinkers of our times waste so much time in word games and obvious fallacies and solipsism, this book is certainly a worthwhile one to read.  I do not know if this book has a large intended audience, but it does not present too much difficulty and makes it possible to understand Wittgenstein's later thinking, even if one does not agree with it.  As someone who believes that it is worthwhile to understand that which one does not agree with, I found much to appreciate about this book.  Not only did this book help explain what it is that Wittgenstein was (not very successfully) attempting to relate when it comes to language and perspective, but this book made it less likely that I would want to read wha Wittgenstein had to offer, and that is probably for the best as far as it goes.  Sometimes it is good to read a little bit so that one does not see it as worthwhile to read a lot more, and that is definitely the case here.

[Tim · Rating 3 out of 5]

Moderately helpful but uninspiring. Readable in the sense that it's fairly clear, on the whole, but not in the sense of being enjoyable.

I would suggest you read the PI before you read this - even if you don't have much idea what LW is on about, you're more likely to be intrigued than if you start here; if you do that, you may well conclude that whatever he's on about, it's dry and academic and nothing worth bothering with.

It is, though.

[Annie Tschetter]

This is the companion guide we used during class. I found it helpful at certain times. The explanation of the 'rule-following paradox' was useful here. I also appreciated the introduction to the Pyrrhonian and anti-Pyrrhonian interpretations that other scholars have taken towards the Investigations and how each interpretation changes the conclusions we are able to draw.

[Chris · Rating 5 out of 5]

Stern makes Wittgenstein very approachable, with a nice through line that W. makes a quietest argument through a conflicted dialogue with increasingly seductive arguments, and the secondary literature is, in some ways, having been seduced.

[George · Rating 3 out of 5]

Somewhat overrated. Arif Ahmed’s guide is better.

[Brett · Rating 5 out of 5]

really good introduction to the Investigations