Reordering Iraq is the lynchpin of America's successful involvement in the Middle East. The challenge may be impossible. The Future of Iraq provides a primer on the history and political dynamics of this pivotal state divided by ethnic, religious, and political antagonisms, and provocatively argues that the least discussed future of Iraq might be the best: Managed partition.
Anderson and Stansfield incisively analyze the dilemmas of American policy. They suggest that even a significant American presence will not stabilize Iraq because it is an artificial state and its people have never shared a common identity. In addition the legacy of tyrannical rule and the primacy of political violence is eroded social bonds and entrenched tribal allegiances, fallow ground for democracy. They provide the basic information and the provocative analysis crucial to informed debate and decision.
This is an excellent book for those who want to know more about how the ethnically artificial Iraqi state was created by the colonial powers, mainly the British, in the 1920s, and why; and how it "progressed" toward the Ba'athist dictatorship under Saddam Hussein with attendant intrigues and atrocities. The first chapter covers the period from 1920 to1958 under the Hashemite Monarchy; the second from 1958 to 1968; the third from 1968 to1988; the fourth begins with the end of the Iraq-Iran War and ends in 2003. Then there are three chapters devoted to the three main ethnic groups, the Shi'a, the Sunnis, and the Kurds. There is an epilogue and an index.
I came away from my reading with the sense that no matter what is done, Iraq is headed for massive bloodshed resulting eventually in a new Sunni dictatorship or a Shi'a theocracy--neither of which is what the Bush Administration had in mind. Clearly the authors--Liam Anderson, a political science professor at Wayne State University, and Gareth Stansfield, an expert on Iraqi and especially Kurdish affairs--do not think it likely that democracy will arise out of the ashes. They give three likely scenarios in terms of options for the United States in Chapter Eight, "The Democracy Dilemma" (which is where the time-strapped reader might begin reading).
The first option they call "Democracy Lite" in which there is a "short-term occupation" with an attempt "to establish a functioning democratic system," and then a pullout. (p. 191) The authors argue rather convincingly that this will never work mainly because the various political divisions within Iraq will prevent it, the Sunnis because they fear the Shi'a majority, the Shi'a because they don't really believe in democracy, and the Kurds because they want their own autonomous state.
The next option is a long-term occupation (a minimum of ten years). Here the prospects for democracy are better, but such an occupation is likely to unify the dissident elements of Iraq in an insurgency effort against a foreign power, as has happened in the past. Indeed, the attacks against Coalition forces and those Iraqis who support the Coalition have increased substantially since this book was finished a year ago. So the real question then becomes, how long will the American people put up with the cost in dollars and bloodshed before pulling out?
The third option is the installation of a puppet regime and the quick withdrawal of US troops. The authors call this the "default option" (p. 209) and condemn it as spelling "disaster for Iraq" and "seriously detrimental to U.S. interests." (p. 211)
Instead of these three options, the authors opt for a fourth possibility which they call "The Managed Partition of Iraq." The idea here is to give autonomy to the Kurds in the north, and to give the rest of the country to the Sunnis and the Shi'a, or to have that territory divided between them, with the Shi'a controlling the southern portion in a kind of "state of Basra" with "a mixed Sunni/Shi'a state of Baghdad in the center." (p. 222)
There are enormous problems with each of these options, as the authors painstakingly point out, and enormous uncertainties. Clearly the Bush Administration does not agree with--or was unaware of--such obstacles when it embarked on its foolhardy invasion of Iraq. Certainly, Bush's father knew enough of the history of Iraq and the region to realize that leaving Saddam Hussein in power was the best way to further American interests in the area since we had good control over the weakened dictator. Bush the Second has ignored the lessons of history (and reality) for his "faith-based" scenario, which, according to the authors of this tightly argued and finely detailed book, can only lead to a nightmare since the prospect of a democracy any time soon is close to nil.
Bottom line: This book can be read in two ways: from the beginning straight through for those of you who want the background information and history of the Iraqi state, or beginning with Chapter Eight where the authors give their take on the prospects for Iraq. One can also, as in a textbook, read just the "Conclusion" sections at the end of each chapter, and then read Chapter Eight and the Epilogue. Since I am not an expert, I found reading the book from cover to cover informative and definitely worth my time. The presentation is clear, balanced and sharply realistic.
--Dennis Littrell, author of the mystery novel, “Teddy and Teri”
The book opens with a history of the state of Iraq from its establishment after WWI to the present time. An understanding of this history is vital in coming to an understanding of the present difficulties facing the country. Two very salient points demonstrated persuasively by Iraq's history are that violence as a political instrument was institutionalized in Iraq long before the regime of Saddam Hussein. His regime was more a logical culmination of events which preceded it than a historical aberration. The second point relates to the primary reason for the development of institutionalized violence. The state of Iraq was constructed from disparate ethnic, religious and cultural groups to serve the political ends of the British at the time. This political expediency has lead to a state that has never been able to develop the sense of unity necessary to become a nation. Violence has been the primary means of keeping forces in line that could tear the state apart.
The history is followed by an examination of the perspectives of each of the three major groups that make up the state of Iraq - the Sunni Arabs, the Shi'a Arabs and the Kurds. Though this structure entails a certain amount of repetition of information from the first section of the book ( especially in the section on the Shi'a), it does help us understand the position of each of the three groups and what they stand to gain or lose as a result of different potential constructions of their future.
The third section of the book is devoted to examining the options available for the future of Iraq, including their potential positive and negative consequences and the likelihood of prevailing conditions allowing each option to become reality.
All three major groups in Iraq are shown warts and all. The book shows no favoritism in its analysis. The issues are analyzed with penetrating depth and the belief of the American government that the people of Iraq would welcome Western style democracy with open arms is scathingly laid bare as the ludicrously naïve position it is. A must read for all who truly want to understand the situation in Iraq.
I really enjoyed this book and can take away some further knowledge of the Middle East! I am always a little concerned reading this type of book as I find a lot of them bias in American/British favour... this book tells it how it is! Worth reading
I couldn’t have finished The Future of Iraq at a more critical time. As U.S. operations in Venezuela unfold, one can only hope that decision-makers are studying the historical events outlined here.
Authors Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield showcase Iraq’s internal struggles, specifically the imbalance of political representation between the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds. They explain this history of the Iraqi people craving for stability after decades of unrest, and how Saddam Hussein seized the opportunity to eliminate his competition. He promised to restore the glory of Iraq and improve the quality of life, but delivered only unprecedented cruelty refusing to step down even when he failed to fulfill his promises. Much of his downfall can be linked to the Iran/Iraq eight year war in the 1980s.
Published in 2004 less than a year after Operation Iraqi Freedom was announced, the book feels foretelling. Many of the reasons why the U.S. failed in Iraq can be traced directly to the history laid out in these pages. Anderson and Stansfield’s work is more than just a history lesson; it is a vital case study on how dictators maintain power and a cautionary tale of why nation-building so often fails.
This book is structured in a very simple manner, following the history of this country:
First, the monarchy from 1920-1958;
Second, the revolution from 1958-1968;
Third, the Ba'ath Regime from 1968-1988;
Fourth, the wreck of Iraq from 1988-2003.
These chapters recount the history of Iraq from its beginnings after World War I--when the British created a country where none has existed before--with three parties holding very different views--Sunnis, Shiites, Kurds.
Each of these three groups is examined as the basis for speculation as to what is to come in the future. The authors wonder if Iraq might end up splintering into three distinct countries--Sunni, Shia, and Kurd. Questions emerge from this scenario: Is this desirable? Would the needs of all three groups be optimized in this manner? Will this encourage additional "ethnic cleansing"? Even beyond what we have seen? Would such a solution mark success--or failure--of the American intervention?
The future? We cannot say for sure at this point, although matters appear more promising than 4 or 5 years ago. However, it does appear that the American intervention never really understood the historical and cultural context. We can hope that Iraq has a solid future as a country.
The Future of Iraq, Updated Edition: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division? suffers from the curse of many PoliSci/history books that events on the ground date them before they reach the public, thusly the last section on the US can do with Iraq is absolite unless your comparing what the US government has done with the ideas in the book. That being said, this book does provide a nice history that would allow the average reader an explanation as to why Iraq is such a fragmented state and has given the United States military and civilian leaders so many problems over the last seven years from both an Iraqi view, and the view of the Bush administration. For a better understanding of Iraq try[[ASIN:1588264386 The Iraq War: Causes And Consequences (Middle East in the International System)]by Rick Fawn, which breaks down the impact on the Iraq War for the United States throughout Europe and the Middle East country by country.