The collapse of the Soviet Union has opened the history of the Red Army to the West, providing a more complex picture of World War II than was previously available. Details of the struggle between the Soviet forces and the Axis powers can now be seen through the efforts of veterans such as Colonel Dmitriy Loza. Loza draws on his own experiences and those of acquaintances to illustrate particular problems, combat situations, and the functioning of the Soviet Army in its struggle with the German and Japanese armies.
Dmitry Fedorovich Loza (Russian: Дмитрий Фёдорович Лоза) was a Ukrainian Red Army Colonel and Hero of the Soviet Union. He served as an Armor officer during World War II, fighting in the Vienna Offensive and in the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation. Loza was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union for his leadership of a tank battalion in the Vienna Offensive. Postwar, he was a senior lecturer at the Frunze Military Academy before retiring from the Soviet Army in 1967.
An interesting book, parts of which seem a little suspect. Memories of shared sacrifices during the Great Patriotic War are one of the few things that bind Russians together, and all governments since its end have been careful to manage the narrative. As a result, Russian war memoirs sound a lot alike, as if the same editor had taken charge of the stories, emphasizing certain aspects (courage, skill, loyalty) and omitting other, less commendable ones. You never hear soldiers complaining about the incompetence of their commanders, the arbitrariness of discipline, crime and atrocities, cowardice, or terror.
The book is a collection of short chapters on different subjects. Some of them are tales of combat, either the author’s or other peoples’. The combat stories are well written, and possibly even true, or at least had some truth to them before they were worked over to provide suitably uplifting material for future generations.
Of more interest are the final chapters, which deal with the organization of the Red Army. These parts are less likely to have been editorially managed, since they deal solely with facts and procedures. They cover areas like communications, resupply of food, ammunition, and fuel, and casualty evacuation. They show the Army as professionally and conscientiously organized to provide services at all levels of command. In reality they probably failed to come close to the prescribed standards, but of course that would be equally true of every army in every war.