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Columbia Studies in Contemporary American History
American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949: A Study in Counterrevolution
American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949: A Study in Counterrevolution (Columbia Contemporary American History Series)
445 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 1982
41 people want to read
About the author
Lawrence S. Wittner
14 books5 followersRaised in Brooklyn, NY, Lawrence Wittner attended Columbia College and, in 1967, received his Ph.D. in History from Columbia University. Thereafter, he taught at Hampton Institute, at Vassar College, at Japanese universities (under the Fulbright program), and (starting in 1974) at SUNY/Albany, where he rose to the rank of Professor History before his retirement in 2010. A prolific, award-winning writer, he is the author of nine books and has edited or co-edited another four. He has also written hundreds of articles and book reviews for scholarly journals, as well as for popular publications such as the Huffington Post. His latest published books are his memoirs (Working for Peace and Justice) and a satirical novel about corporatization and rebellion at an American public university (What’s Going On at UAardvark?). A long-time activist in social movements, he is currently a national board member of Peace Action (the largest peace organization in the United States) and the executive secretary of the Albany County Central Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO.
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November 15, 2024
Democracy is a good thing as long as people with the wrong thoughts are excluded from participation. If this outcome is not guaranteed then you bring it about by any means necessary, including savage violence. This is an operative principle of U.S. foreign policy, not just in places like Indonesia and Guatemala, but even in Greece -- supposedly part of the civilized West, and in the period following World War II, when the "democratic peace" is alleged to have reigned in the "civilized" world. Considerable insight into the application of this principle in postwar Greece by the U.S. can be gained by examining the careful, detailed, well balanced, and meticulously documented scholarly treatment afforded the topic in this volume by the outstanding scholar Lawrence Wittner.
An examination of America's engagement in the civil conflict in Greece after World War II can also be an illuminating case study of the dynamics of the Cold War and teach us what that confrontation really entailed. The key question pertaining to such an inquiry would be whether the orthodox version (evil Communist aggression versus noble Free World self-defense), or the more nuanced approach suggested by some scholars; one that insists that both sides did ugly things, turns out to be the accurate one. Wittner summarizes his conclusion as follows: "In general, [the book's findings] bolsters the 'revisionist' case, [over the origins of the Cold War] for it emphasizes the 'Open Door' concerns of American officials and the limited ambitions of Soviet diplomacy." The findings do also show, however, that "Washington policymakers genuinely feared the extension of Soviet power, viewed the Greek left as a catspaw for masterminds in the Kremlin, and had little interest in exploiting Greece economically." (xi) The book thus lends itself to partially reinforcing both views, perhaps not a surprising outcome, given the fact that both perspectives can be said to have some roots in reality.
During World War II, Greece was occupied by Germany. As Wittner puts it, "In the midst of widespread suffering and repression, a vigorous resistance movement arose within Greece to contest the Axis occupation" -- the National Liberation Front (EAM), formally under Communist control, but "never a narrow, sectarian affair, but an unorthodox, predominantly non-Communist organization". (2-3) Eventually, Great Britain intervened militarily in Greece, the country having been historically considered a British sphere of influence. Right from the start, the British were strongly suspicious of the anti-Nazi resistance. The EAM were in fact perfectly happy to participate in a parliamentary political system. There was also no doubt that they constituted an indigenous movement -- Stalin was very careful not to intervene in Greece, a fact greatly appreciated by Churchill (Tito provided little more than empty bluster in support of the Greek left during the initial stage of conflict). Despite this, after German withdrawal, the British insisted on restoration of the exiled monarchy, which Greeks viewed as little more than a holdover from the country's fascist past. A coalition government with EAM participation existed for a period under British guns. The EAM's refusal to unilaterally disarm led it to resign from the cabinet. Pro-EAM protests erupted, which the government responded to by firing on civilians. An armed conflict broke out between the EAM and the British-led forces. Throughout this period, there were some American clucking of tongues about Britain's conduct, but contrary to the naive beliefs of some on the Greek left, America's fundamental goals in Greece differed little from those of Britain. Thus, the British were prepared to violently intervene to prevent Greek democracy, which it found unacceptable if the anti-Nazi resistance movement, nominally but not actually Communist, and lacking foreign backing, was allowed to participate on even terms.
Eventually, parliamentary elections were held amidst an atmosphere of right-wing terror. The left boycotted the elections, which brought to power a corrupt and repressive government. The left was split on the question of whether or not to take up armed resistance. Wittner reviews how U.S. postwar policy towards Greece (as with Iran and Turkey) was strongly shaped by the desire to maintain U.S. control over the immense energy resources of the Middle East, upon which the American economy had grown increasingly dependent. Throughout, the Russian threat was invoked. As was the case during the war, the allegation by and large continued to lack merit throughout the postwar period. As Wittner perceptively observes, "Ironically, the grim specter of Soviet expansionism that haunted American policymakers was contradicted by the reality of Soviet policy toward Greece. At international conferences, of course, the Russians frequently raised the Greek issue, but it remained a riposte to Western attacks on Russian policies elsewhere rather than a serious effort to put the Greek left in power." (56-57). By 1947, devastated Britain had a hard time maintaining its support for the Greek government. Pressures mounted on the United States to take over responsibility for the Greek situation.
This came to pass through the large-scale aid program known as the Truman Doctrine. The book features an intricate discussion of how this administration initiative was pushed through in the face of considerable opposition from various elements of the U.S. Congress and public, notably New Deal-liberals. One such liberal critique (and a perceptive one) is noted as follows: "Once the United States took on the responsibility for funding the Greek and Turkish governments, [New Republic editor Henry Wallace] told an overflow crowd at Madison Square Garden, 'every fascist dictator will know that he has credit in our bank.' The real crisis was not one 'of the Greek economy, but of the American spirit.'" (82). The initiative did, however, enjoy solid business support (in the business press, the objective of securing oil resources was discussed with perfect candor). Apparent obstacles in the Truman administration's way, like the Doctrine's apparent incompatibility with the principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign nations enshrined in the UN Charter, as well as the need for cosmetic arrangements aimed at concealing the impression of infringement of Greek sovereignty, were skillfully maneuvered around. An American mission aimed at shoring up the Greek government in the face of indigenous armed opposition (by now tepidly backed by neighboring countries, but not by the Soviets), was thus established.
The intricate maneuverings of the U.S. aid mission and the U.S. Embassy (sometimes in cooperation, sometimes each others' rivals) to control the Greek political system while the civil war raged, are documented thoroughly in the book. The idea that the left would get to participate in politics on minimally even-handed terms was categorically rejected. Instead, the Americans supported a "coalition government" consisting primarily of the right-wing Populist party with a token Liberal providing a fig leaf of pluralism. Anyone not 100% committed to the American anti-Communist crusade were hysterically denounced by U.S. officials as "fellow-travelers" or "appeasers", including the avowedly non-Communist Socialist Party. As Wittner observes: "the uncompromising hostility of the Americans toward the only party of substance on Greece's non-Communist left owed less to the politics of the latter than to the political orientation of the former." (132) Even Liberals deemed insufficiently militant were rejected. By contrast, the "political orientation" of the American mission remained friendly indeed towards right-wing extremists and former Nazi collaborators. The Americans at one point even apparently flirted with the idea of instituting a full-blown military dictatorship. Understood all along was the fact that the real rulers of the country was a corrupt and venal oligarchy. Preserving this status quo at the expense of the Greek people's right to self-determination is what the American intervention was about in a nutshell, concealed with tales about "Communist aggression" for public relations reasons (which, irrelevantly, may have been believed by planners).
The particular methods by which the military campaign was carried out is reviewed in some detail. The enterprise was no joke -- in fact, it was remarkably brutal. The Greek government, with full U.S. support, deployed mass arbitrary arrests as well as torture against suspected rebel sympathizers. Many of them were sent to prison islands (where they were subject to "reindoctrination") or forcibly exiled. Political killings were utilized on a systematic basis, again with U.S. support. As Wittner writes, "behind the U.S. support for political executions lay the determination of American and Greek officials to destroy the Greek Communist Party" (148) -- that is, to destroy a leading element of the former anti-Nazi resistance. Civil liberties were sharply curtailed. Propaganda warfare was waged on a large scale, to counter the rather unfavorable press coverage that deeply infuriated American officials involved in the campaign -- not exactly an unfamiliar theme. Not once did the U.S. mission indicate the slightest intention of moving towards reconciliation and peace until the Red menace had been firmly stamped out once and for all. Reading this account leads one to assume that this campaign in many respects were to serve as a model for similar interventions carried out by the U.S. in later years, notably in Indochina (this is explicitly confirmed later in the book).
The economic policies pursued by the U.S. aid mission in Greece are also discussed. By the time the U.S. took over the country, it was marked with very high poverty and inequality. Little was done in the way of investment to alleviate this problem (excepting, of course, the massive expenditures required to keep the military effort on course). The American rulers' commitment to budgetary austerity and determination to fight inflation took priority (history repeated itself when the "Troika" conquered Greece six decades later). Many public employees were laid off. Subsidies on food ended. It was determined that the expressed need for increased government revenue, would have to be attained through increased taxation. U.S. government economic analysts had expressed the desirability of shifting the tax burden more onto the country's rich, who enjoyed virtual immunity from income taxation. This idea, however, was in the end deemed undesirable (for some odd reason). Instead, the exact opposite was done. Eugene Clay, chief economic adviser for the U.S. mission "estimated that the new tax structure confiscated one-third of the national income -- a tremendous burden in a country so close to the margin of existence, and one which fell disproportionately upon those least able to pay." (175) From these policy decisions, one can discern rather clearly why there was such a pressing need to annihilate the left. The plight of the great majority remained miserable at the end of the U.S. mission (adding the massive devastation wrought by the military campaign).
There were also widespread American efforts to subvert and undermine the Greek trade union movement. This involved endeavoring to make sure that the labor leadership consisted virtually exclusively of rightists. For a brief period, strikes were punishable by death, a piece of legislation essentially tolerated by the Americans. Communist trade unionists were not only removed from any influence, but in many instances murdered, a practice which the AFL was happy to condone. Eventually, a solid right-wing labor leadership was attained. Even this element aroused fury when it got too uppity (for example, asking for a wage raise). As observed by Wittner, "American officials [having] destroyed Communist influence in the trade unions, ... adopted a policy of undeviating hostility to wage increases." (216) The idea of promoting working class interests in any way evidently is what offended the Americans, even when this was done by dedicated anti-Communists.
In reviewing the dynamics of the military conflict raging between the U.S.-supplied government and the rebels, it is noted that the latter were always vastly outnumbered. Nevertheless, the rebels persevered for quite a while, compelling the Americans to increase supplies of armaments to the Greek government and eventually take over the military leadership (contrary to their original intentions). An illustrative description of the spirit of the conflict was provided by the assistant director of the U.S. military advisory group in January 1949, cited in the book. Assailing the "dismal failure" of the Greek National Army (GNA), he then went on to say: "Practically all [GNA] commanders ... invariably plead unfavorable weather, forbidding terrain, inadequate strength, and serious dangers to other vital areas, as a defense for their inertia and failures. Yet the inferior bandits continue to operate in the same weather and over the same terrain as must the GNA, with high success, in complete defiance of and with bold indifference to a greatly superior, better fed, better organized and better equipped GNA." (248) Nevertheless, the government did finally succeed in crushing the "bandits" not very long after this assessment. The author's conclusion is that the rebel defeat owed less to American support for the government (even though this is recognized to have been an important factor) than to the final abandonment of support for the rebels by Tito.
The complex and fascinating international dynamics to the Greek conflict are insightfully discussed. As already noted, throughout the period when they ran the Greek government, the Americans constantly hammered on the refrain that they were engaged in defense against a plot from the Kremlin. The reality was radically different. As Wittner concludes: "unlike American aid to the Athens government -- which dwarfed external assistance to the rebels -- Soviet aid was nonexistent, a point not contested by U.S. officials." (255) Evidence as clear, explicit, and unambiguous as it gets is provided to show that Stalin indeed denied support for the Greek guerrillas. In early 1948, Stalin told Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders: "The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible." (262) In fact, a very serious rift developed between Stalin and Tito over the Greek issue, causing the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform. When Moscow's hostility towards the Greek cause became apparent, this influenced neighboring Bulgaria and Albania to largely cease supporting the rebels. Tito, however, maintained his support, until elements on the Greek left loyal to Stalin, wrestled control of the rebel movement and renounced Titoism. This proved a less than brilliant move, since the rebels' one and only remaining lifeline was thereby cut. Despite the untenability of the charge of Soviet proxy warfare, the Americans remained firm in their commitment, throughout the conflict, that any peaceful settlement (proposals to that effect were repeatedly advanced by the Communists) was out of the question until the rebels had been destroyed.
Finally, the war's aftermath is reviewed. As Wittner formulates the question to be pondered: "After its ordeal of war and destruction, the nation faced the long-postponed prospect of peaceful reconstruction under democratic auspices. The only question remaining was: Would Greece's rightist rulers and their American patron allow it?" (284) Sort of. Greece remained nominally a parliamentary democracy for a couple of decades afterwards. America remained highly influential in the country's political affairs. Despite the fact that the left had been virtually wiped out, the Americans remained deeply on guard against any political force, like the Liberal Party, that showed the slightest indication of being anything less than totally committed to militant anti-communism. The economic consequences were mixed. The country did enjoy substantial growth, though on something rather like a Third World-type model. Poverty remained a severe problem. The covert machinations of U.S. intelligence continued to permeate most facets of the Greek body politic. After a period of rule by the mildly reformist Papandreou government, there came a fascist military coup in 1967, supported (and probably directly participated in) by the Americans. The junta was overthrown and something like social democracy was restored in 1974, with a tone of hostility to the U.S. (for some odd reason).
In sum, America's intervention in Greece was quite ugly and destructive. The U.S.'s alignment was with corrupt, brutal, reactionary and quite anti-democratic forces. Greek self-determination was sacrificed at the expense of this U.S. policy commitment, which was motivated in large part by the American desire to maintain control over Middle East energy resources, as was stressed again and again in internal government planning documents. Can the American policy be justified? Perhaps one can argue that the alternative would have been even worse: Greece becoming a Soviet satellite. On the other hand, a more benign outcome is equally possible. As Wittner puts it, "if British and American policy of the 1940s had been more tolerant of the left [it] might have followed the pattern of its counterparts in France and Italy" rather than succumbing to the Kremlin's pull. (311) In my view, quite apart from any question of right or left, it was scandalous for the United States and Britain to side with the elements in Greece that had collaborated with the Nazis and to violently suppress the anti-Nazi resistance, particularly considering the fact that the resistance was known to be indigenous and not supported by Stalin. Whatever one's judgment, Wittner's book is a rich, detailed, fascinating, thoughtful, and superbly authored study of what actually did take place in Greece under U.S. auspices in the aftermath of World War II, which is indispensable reading for anyone who wants to evaluate what took place.
An examination of America's engagement in the civil conflict in Greece after World War II can also be an illuminating case study of the dynamics of the Cold War and teach us what that confrontation really entailed. The key question pertaining to such an inquiry would be whether the orthodox version (evil Communist aggression versus noble Free World self-defense), or the more nuanced approach suggested by some scholars; one that insists that both sides did ugly things, turns out to be the accurate one. Wittner summarizes his conclusion as follows: "In general, [the book's findings] bolsters the 'revisionist' case, [over the origins of the Cold War] for it emphasizes the 'Open Door' concerns of American officials and the limited ambitions of Soviet diplomacy." The findings do also show, however, that "Washington policymakers genuinely feared the extension of Soviet power, viewed the Greek left as a catspaw for masterminds in the Kremlin, and had little interest in exploiting Greece economically." (xi) The book thus lends itself to partially reinforcing both views, perhaps not a surprising outcome, given the fact that both perspectives can be said to have some roots in reality.
During World War II, Greece was occupied by Germany. As Wittner puts it, "In the midst of widespread suffering and repression, a vigorous resistance movement arose within Greece to contest the Axis occupation" -- the National Liberation Front (EAM), formally under Communist control, but "never a narrow, sectarian affair, but an unorthodox, predominantly non-Communist organization". (2-3) Eventually, Great Britain intervened militarily in Greece, the country having been historically considered a British sphere of influence. Right from the start, the British were strongly suspicious of the anti-Nazi resistance. The EAM were in fact perfectly happy to participate in a parliamentary political system. There was also no doubt that they constituted an indigenous movement -- Stalin was very careful not to intervene in Greece, a fact greatly appreciated by Churchill (Tito provided little more than empty bluster in support of the Greek left during the initial stage of conflict). Despite this, after German withdrawal, the British insisted on restoration of the exiled monarchy, which Greeks viewed as little more than a holdover from the country's fascist past. A coalition government with EAM participation existed for a period under British guns. The EAM's refusal to unilaterally disarm led it to resign from the cabinet. Pro-EAM protests erupted, which the government responded to by firing on civilians. An armed conflict broke out between the EAM and the British-led forces. Throughout this period, there were some American clucking of tongues about Britain's conduct, but contrary to the naive beliefs of some on the Greek left, America's fundamental goals in Greece differed little from those of Britain. Thus, the British were prepared to violently intervene to prevent Greek democracy, which it found unacceptable if the anti-Nazi resistance movement, nominally but not actually Communist, and lacking foreign backing, was allowed to participate on even terms.
Eventually, parliamentary elections were held amidst an atmosphere of right-wing terror. The left boycotted the elections, which brought to power a corrupt and repressive government. The left was split on the question of whether or not to take up armed resistance. Wittner reviews how U.S. postwar policy towards Greece (as with Iran and Turkey) was strongly shaped by the desire to maintain U.S. control over the immense energy resources of the Middle East, upon which the American economy had grown increasingly dependent. Throughout, the Russian threat was invoked. As was the case during the war, the allegation by and large continued to lack merit throughout the postwar period. As Wittner perceptively observes, "Ironically, the grim specter of Soviet expansionism that haunted American policymakers was contradicted by the reality of Soviet policy toward Greece. At international conferences, of course, the Russians frequently raised the Greek issue, but it remained a riposte to Western attacks on Russian policies elsewhere rather than a serious effort to put the Greek left in power." (56-57). By 1947, devastated Britain had a hard time maintaining its support for the Greek government. Pressures mounted on the United States to take over responsibility for the Greek situation.
This came to pass through the large-scale aid program known as the Truman Doctrine. The book features an intricate discussion of how this administration initiative was pushed through in the face of considerable opposition from various elements of the U.S. Congress and public, notably New Deal-liberals. One such liberal critique (and a perceptive one) is noted as follows: "Once the United States took on the responsibility for funding the Greek and Turkish governments, [New Republic editor Henry Wallace] told an overflow crowd at Madison Square Garden, 'every fascist dictator will know that he has credit in our bank.' The real crisis was not one 'of the Greek economy, but of the American spirit.'" (82). The initiative did, however, enjoy solid business support (in the business press, the objective of securing oil resources was discussed with perfect candor). Apparent obstacles in the Truman administration's way, like the Doctrine's apparent incompatibility with the principle of non-interference in the affairs of sovereign nations enshrined in the UN Charter, as well as the need for cosmetic arrangements aimed at concealing the impression of infringement of Greek sovereignty, were skillfully maneuvered around. An American mission aimed at shoring up the Greek government in the face of indigenous armed opposition (by now tepidly backed by neighboring countries, but not by the Soviets), was thus established.
The intricate maneuverings of the U.S. aid mission and the U.S. Embassy (sometimes in cooperation, sometimes each others' rivals) to control the Greek political system while the civil war raged, are documented thoroughly in the book. The idea that the left would get to participate in politics on minimally even-handed terms was categorically rejected. Instead, the Americans supported a "coalition government" consisting primarily of the right-wing Populist party with a token Liberal providing a fig leaf of pluralism. Anyone not 100% committed to the American anti-Communist crusade were hysterically denounced by U.S. officials as "fellow-travelers" or "appeasers", including the avowedly non-Communist Socialist Party. As Wittner observes: "the uncompromising hostility of the Americans toward the only party of substance on Greece's non-Communist left owed less to the politics of the latter than to the political orientation of the former." (132) Even Liberals deemed insufficiently militant were rejected. By contrast, the "political orientation" of the American mission remained friendly indeed towards right-wing extremists and former Nazi collaborators. The Americans at one point even apparently flirted with the idea of instituting a full-blown military dictatorship. Understood all along was the fact that the real rulers of the country was a corrupt and venal oligarchy. Preserving this status quo at the expense of the Greek people's right to self-determination is what the American intervention was about in a nutshell, concealed with tales about "Communist aggression" for public relations reasons (which, irrelevantly, may have been believed by planners).
The particular methods by which the military campaign was carried out is reviewed in some detail. The enterprise was no joke -- in fact, it was remarkably brutal. The Greek government, with full U.S. support, deployed mass arbitrary arrests as well as torture against suspected rebel sympathizers. Many of them were sent to prison islands (where they were subject to "reindoctrination") or forcibly exiled. Political killings were utilized on a systematic basis, again with U.S. support. As Wittner writes, "behind the U.S. support for political executions lay the determination of American and Greek officials to destroy the Greek Communist Party" (148) -- that is, to destroy a leading element of the former anti-Nazi resistance. Civil liberties were sharply curtailed. Propaganda warfare was waged on a large scale, to counter the rather unfavorable press coverage that deeply infuriated American officials involved in the campaign -- not exactly an unfamiliar theme. Not once did the U.S. mission indicate the slightest intention of moving towards reconciliation and peace until the Red menace had been firmly stamped out once and for all. Reading this account leads one to assume that this campaign in many respects were to serve as a model for similar interventions carried out by the U.S. in later years, notably in Indochina (this is explicitly confirmed later in the book).
The economic policies pursued by the U.S. aid mission in Greece are also discussed. By the time the U.S. took over the country, it was marked with very high poverty and inequality. Little was done in the way of investment to alleviate this problem (excepting, of course, the massive expenditures required to keep the military effort on course). The American rulers' commitment to budgetary austerity and determination to fight inflation took priority (history repeated itself when the "Troika" conquered Greece six decades later). Many public employees were laid off. Subsidies on food ended. It was determined that the expressed need for increased government revenue, would have to be attained through increased taxation. U.S. government economic analysts had expressed the desirability of shifting the tax burden more onto the country's rich, who enjoyed virtual immunity from income taxation. This idea, however, was in the end deemed undesirable (for some odd reason). Instead, the exact opposite was done. Eugene Clay, chief economic adviser for the U.S. mission "estimated that the new tax structure confiscated one-third of the national income -- a tremendous burden in a country so close to the margin of existence, and one which fell disproportionately upon those least able to pay." (175) From these policy decisions, one can discern rather clearly why there was such a pressing need to annihilate the left. The plight of the great majority remained miserable at the end of the U.S. mission (adding the massive devastation wrought by the military campaign).
There were also widespread American efforts to subvert and undermine the Greek trade union movement. This involved endeavoring to make sure that the labor leadership consisted virtually exclusively of rightists. For a brief period, strikes were punishable by death, a piece of legislation essentially tolerated by the Americans. Communist trade unionists were not only removed from any influence, but in many instances murdered, a practice which the AFL was happy to condone. Eventually, a solid right-wing labor leadership was attained. Even this element aroused fury when it got too uppity (for example, asking for a wage raise). As observed by Wittner, "American officials [having] destroyed Communist influence in the trade unions, ... adopted a policy of undeviating hostility to wage increases." (216) The idea of promoting working class interests in any way evidently is what offended the Americans, even when this was done by dedicated anti-Communists.
In reviewing the dynamics of the military conflict raging between the U.S.-supplied government and the rebels, it is noted that the latter were always vastly outnumbered. Nevertheless, the rebels persevered for quite a while, compelling the Americans to increase supplies of armaments to the Greek government and eventually take over the military leadership (contrary to their original intentions). An illustrative description of the spirit of the conflict was provided by the assistant director of the U.S. military advisory group in January 1949, cited in the book. Assailing the "dismal failure" of the Greek National Army (GNA), he then went on to say: "Practically all [GNA] commanders ... invariably plead unfavorable weather, forbidding terrain, inadequate strength, and serious dangers to other vital areas, as a defense for their inertia and failures. Yet the inferior bandits continue to operate in the same weather and over the same terrain as must the GNA, with high success, in complete defiance of and with bold indifference to a greatly superior, better fed, better organized and better equipped GNA." (248) Nevertheless, the government did finally succeed in crushing the "bandits" not very long after this assessment. The author's conclusion is that the rebel defeat owed less to American support for the government (even though this is recognized to have been an important factor) than to the final abandonment of support for the rebels by Tito.
The complex and fascinating international dynamics to the Greek conflict are insightfully discussed. As already noted, throughout the period when they ran the Greek government, the Americans constantly hammered on the refrain that they were engaged in defense against a plot from the Kremlin. The reality was radically different. As Wittner concludes: "unlike American aid to the Athens government -- which dwarfed external assistance to the rebels -- Soviet aid was nonexistent, a point not contested by U.S. officials." (255) Evidence as clear, explicit, and unambiguous as it gets is provided to show that Stalin indeed denied support for the Greek guerrillas. In early 1948, Stalin told Bulgarian and Yugoslav leaders: "The uprising in Greece must be stopped, and as quickly as possible." (262) In fact, a very serious rift developed between Stalin and Tito over the Greek issue, causing the expulsion of Tito from the Cominform. When Moscow's hostility towards the Greek cause became apparent, this influenced neighboring Bulgaria and Albania to largely cease supporting the rebels. Tito, however, maintained his support, until elements on the Greek left loyal to Stalin, wrestled control of the rebel movement and renounced Titoism. This proved a less than brilliant move, since the rebels' one and only remaining lifeline was thereby cut. Despite the untenability of the charge of Soviet proxy warfare, the Americans remained firm in their commitment, throughout the conflict, that any peaceful settlement (proposals to that effect were repeatedly advanced by the Communists) was out of the question until the rebels had been destroyed.
Finally, the war's aftermath is reviewed. As Wittner formulates the question to be pondered: "After its ordeal of war and destruction, the nation faced the long-postponed prospect of peaceful reconstruction under democratic auspices. The only question remaining was: Would Greece's rightist rulers and their American patron allow it?" (284) Sort of. Greece remained nominally a parliamentary democracy for a couple of decades afterwards. America remained highly influential in the country's political affairs. Despite the fact that the left had been virtually wiped out, the Americans remained deeply on guard against any political force, like the Liberal Party, that showed the slightest indication of being anything less than totally committed to militant anti-communism. The economic consequences were mixed. The country did enjoy substantial growth, though on something rather like a Third World-type model. Poverty remained a severe problem. The covert machinations of U.S. intelligence continued to permeate most facets of the Greek body politic. After a period of rule by the mildly reformist Papandreou government, there came a fascist military coup in 1967, supported (and probably directly participated in) by the Americans. The junta was overthrown and something like social democracy was restored in 1974, with a tone of hostility to the U.S. (for some odd reason).
In sum, America's intervention in Greece was quite ugly and destructive. The U.S.'s alignment was with corrupt, brutal, reactionary and quite anti-democratic forces. Greek self-determination was sacrificed at the expense of this U.S. policy commitment, which was motivated in large part by the American desire to maintain control over Middle East energy resources, as was stressed again and again in internal government planning documents. Can the American policy be justified? Perhaps one can argue that the alternative would have been even worse: Greece becoming a Soviet satellite. On the other hand, a more benign outcome is equally possible. As Wittner puts it, "if British and American policy of the 1940s had been more tolerant of the left [it] might have followed the pattern of its counterparts in France and Italy" rather than succumbing to the Kremlin's pull. (311) In my view, quite apart from any question of right or left, it was scandalous for the United States and Britain to side with the elements in Greece that had collaborated with the Nazis and to violently suppress the anti-Nazi resistance, particularly considering the fact that the resistance was known to be indigenous and not supported by Stalin. Whatever one's judgment, Wittner's book is a rich, detailed, fascinating, thoughtful, and superbly authored study of what actually did take place in Greece under U.S. auspices in the aftermath of World War II, which is indispensable reading for anyone who wants to evaluate what took place.
December 21, 2011
An all-too-familiar story. US backs a repressive government because it fears that the opposition would bring Communism to power.
Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews