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Prolegomena to Ethics
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- GenresPhilosophy
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First published January 1, 1883
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About the author
Thomas Hill Green
109 books8 followersThomas Hill Green was an English philosopher, political radical and temperance reformer, and a member of the British idealism movement. Like all the British idealists, Green was influenced by the metaphysical historicism of G.W.F. Hegel. He was one of the thinkers behind the philosophy of social liberalism.
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June 4, 2024
THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHER LOOKS AT ETHICS
Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) was an English Idealist philosopher, political radical (“social liberalism”) and temperance reformer. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 162-page edition.]
He wrote in this 1882 book, “The elimination of ethics, then, as a system of precepts, involves no intrinsic difficulties other than those involved in the admission of a natural science that can account for the moralization of man. The discovery, however, that our assertions of moral obligation are merely the expression of an ineffectual wish to be better off than we are, or are due to the survival of habits originally enforced by physical fear, but of which the origin is forgotten, is of a kind to give us pause. It logically carries with it the conclusion… that, in inciting ourselves or others to do anything because it ought to be done, we are at best making use of a serviceable illusion. And when this consequence is found to follow logically from the conception of man as in his moral attributes a subject of natural science, it may lead to a reconsideration of a doctrine which would otherwise have been taken for granted as the most important outcome of modern enlightenment.” (Pg. 5)
He states, “the question which lies at the root of ethical inquiry [is] In what relation do we ourselves stand to the one self distinguishing subject, other than nature, which we find to be implied in nature?” (Pg. 22)
He summarizes, “We have been considering the action of the self-conditioning and self-distinguishing mind, which the existence of a connected world implies, in determining a particular product of that world, viz., the animal system of man, with the receptive feelings to which that system is organic---in so determining it as to reproduce itself, under limitations, in the capacity for knowledge which man possesses. The characteristic of this particular mode of its reproduction in the human self is the apprehension of a world which IS, as distinct from one which SHOULD BE. It constitutes a knowledge of the conditions of the feelings that occur to us, and uniform relations between changes in those conditions.” (Pg. 34)
He observes, “But though feeling… constitutes individuality, it does not in that sense amount to the full individuality of man. It does not make the human … what it is. Each of us is one or individual… It is thus only as self-conscious that we are capable of knowledge, because [it is] only as self-conscious that we are aware of being in the presence of facts. Only in virtue of self-consciousness is there for us a world to be known.” (Pg. 46)
He states, “The motive or character is morally good, if likely on the whole to issue in intentional actions which are good in the sense of producing on the whole, one person taken with another and one time with another, an excess of pleasure over pain. Clearly, upon this view, our statement that Ethics is founded on the distinction between the good and the bad will could only be accepted under the proviso that by good and bad will is understood good and bad intentional action, and further that intentional action is understood to be good of bad according to its relation to an ultimate good and evil, which are constituted not by any kind of action, intention, or character, but by pleasure and pain.” (Pg. 60)
He summarizes, “Thus is the conscientious citizen of modern Christendom reason without and reason within, reason as objective and reason as subjective, reason as the better spirit of the social order in which he lives, and reason as his loyal recognition and interpretation of that spirit—these being but different aspects of one and the same reality, which is the operation of the divine mind in man---combine to yield both the judgment, and obedience to the judgment, which we variously express by saying that every human person has an absolute value; that humanity in the person of every one is always to be treated as an end, never merely as a means; that in the estimate of that well-being which forms the true good every one is to count for one and no one for more than one; that everyone has a ‘suum’ which everyone else is bound to render him.” (Pg. 85)
He notes, “Our conclusion, then is that the state of mine which is now most naturally expressed by the unspoken questions. Have I been what I should be, shall I be what I should be, in doing so and so? is that in which all moral progress originates. It must have preceded the formation of definite ideals of character, as well as any articulation of the distinction between outward action and its motives. It is no other than the sense of personal responsibility for making the best of themselves in the family, the tribe, or the state, which must have actuated certain persons, many or few, in order that the establishment and recognition of any moral standards whatever, Given such standards, it is the spirit which at once demands from the individual a loyal conformity to them, and disposes him, upon their suggestion, to construct for himself an ideal of virtue, of personal goodness, higher than they explicitly contain. The action of such an ideal, in those stages of moral development with which we are now familiar, is the essential condition of all further bettering of human life. Its action is of course partial in various degrees of partiality.” (Pg. 124-125)
He argues, “Whatever the errors arising from [Utilitarianism’s] Hedonistic psychology, no other theory has been available for the social or political reformer, combining so much truth with such ready applicability. No other has offered so commanding a point of view from which to criticize the precepts and institutions presented as authoritative. When laws of the Church, or of the State, or of ‘opinion,’ have become antagonistic to each other; when any of them, again, has been found to conflict with one of those convictions of tender consciences, or of enthusiasts for humanity, which are a ‘law of opinion’ in the making.” (Pg. 133)
This book will be of interest to students of the history of philosophy, and particularly ethical philosophy.
Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) was an English Idealist philosopher, political radical (“social liberalism”) and temperance reformer. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 162-page edition.]
He wrote in this 1882 book, “The elimination of ethics, then, as a system of precepts, involves no intrinsic difficulties other than those involved in the admission of a natural science that can account for the moralization of man. The discovery, however, that our assertions of moral obligation are merely the expression of an ineffectual wish to be better off than we are, or are due to the survival of habits originally enforced by physical fear, but of which the origin is forgotten, is of a kind to give us pause. It logically carries with it the conclusion… that, in inciting ourselves or others to do anything because it ought to be done, we are at best making use of a serviceable illusion. And when this consequence is found to follow logically from the conception of man as in his moral attributes a subject of natural science, it may lead to a reconsideration of a doctrine which would otherwise have been taken for granted as the most important outcome of modern enlightenment.” (Pg. 5)
He states, “the question which lies at the root of ethical inquiry [is] In what relation do we ourselves stand to the one self distinguishing subject, other than nature, which we find to be implied in nature?” (Pg. 22)
He summarizes, “We have been considering the action of the self-conditioning and self-distinguishing mind, which the existence of a connected world implies, in determining a particular product of that world, viz., the animal system of man, with the receptive feelings to which that system is organic---in so determining it as to reproduce itself, under limitations, in the capacity for knowledge which man possesses. The characteristic of this particular mode of its reproduction in the human self is the apprehension of a world which IS, as distinct from one which SHOULD BE. It constitutes a knowledge of the conditions of the feelings that occur to us, and uniform relations between changes in those conditions.” (Pg. 34)
He observes, “But though feeling… constitutes individuality, it does not in that sense amount to the full individuality of man. It does not make the human … what it is. Each of us is one or individual… It is thus only as self-conscious that we are capable of knowledge, because [it is] only as self-conscious that we are aware of being in the presence of facts. Only in virtue of self-consciousness is there for us a world to be known.” (Pg. 46)
He states, “The motive or character is morally good, if likely on the whole to issue in intentional actions which are good in the sense of producing on the whole, one person taken with another and one time with another, an excess of pleasure over pain. Clearly, upon this view, our statement that Ethics is founded on the distinction between the good and the bad will could only be accepted under the proviso that by good and bad will is understood good and bad intentional action, and further that intentional action is understood to be good of bad according to its relation to an ultimate good and evil, which are constituted not by any kind of action, intention, or character, but by pleasure and pain.” (Pg. 60)
He summarizes, “Thus is the conscientious citizen of modern Christendom reason without and reason within, reason as objective and reason as subjective, reason as the better spirit of the social order in which he lives, and reason as his loyal recognition and interpretation of that spirit—these being but different aspects of one and the same reality, which is the operation of the divine mind in man---combine to yield both the judgment, and obedience to the judgment, which we variously express by saying that every human person has an absolute value; that humanity in the person of every one is always to be treated as an end, never merely as a means; that in the estimate of that well-being which forms the true good every one is to count for one and no one for more than one; that everyone has a ‘suum’ which everyone else is bound to render him.” (Pg. 85)
He notes, “Our conclusion, then is that the state of mine which is now most naturally expressed by the unspoken questions. Have I been what I should be, shall I be what I should be, in doing so and so? is that in which all moral progress originates. It must have preceded the formation of definite ideals of character, as well as any articulation of the distinction between outward action and its motives. It is no other than the sense of personal responsibility for making the best of themselves in the family, the tribe, or the state, which must have actuated certain persons, many or few, in order that the establishment and recognition of any moral standards whatever, Given such standards, it is the spirit which at once demands from the individual a loyal conformity to them, and disposes him, upon their suggestion, to construct for himself an ideal of virtue, of personal goodness, higher than they explicitly contain. The action of such an ideal, in those stages of moral development with which we are now familiar, is the essential condition of all further bettering of human life. Its action is of course partial in various degrees of partiality.” (Pg. 124-125)
He argues, “Whatever the errors arising from [Utilitarianism’s] Hedonistic psychology, no other theory has been available for the social or political reformer, combining so much truth with such ready applicability. No other has offered so commanding a point of view from which to criticize the precepts and institutions presented as authoritative. When laws of the Church, or of the State, or of ‘opinion,’ have become antagonistic to each other; when any of them, again, has been found to conflict with one of those convictions of tender consciences, or of enthusiasts for humanity, which are a ‘law of opinion’ in the making.” (Pg. 133)
This book will be of interest to students of the history of philosophy, and particularly ethical philosophy.
Displaying 1 of 1 review