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Two Theories of Morality: Thank-Offering to Britain Fund Lectures, 1976
In this expanded version of his "Thank-Offering to Britain Fund Lectures", delivered at the British Academy in February 1976, Stuart Hampshire compares two radically different conceptions of morality, those of Aristotle and Spinoza, authors, he claims, of the most plausible of all moral philosophies. He discusses the relation between moral intuitions and moral theory, and the contrasting ideas of moral normality and moral conversion. Spinoza's theory of the relation between mind and body is expounded and its relevance to recent theories is explained.
- GenresPhilosophy
104 pages, Hardcover
First published April 1, 1985
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
December 24, 2024
3.75 // 81b24
July 28, 2009
Stuart Hampshire claims that Aristotle’s and Spinoza’s moral philosophies are the most credible of all moral theories in the light of modern knowledge. However, since these theories cannot be reconciled or be seen as complementary, one must necessarily choose between them. Aristotle claims that an acceptable moral theory will give a firm foundation to the pre-existing principles that guide the decisions of the people we normally admire. By contrast, Spinoza questions existing morality, seeking a path to a necessary moral conversion.
Moral philosophy for Aristotle, allows moral intuitions to be modified by reflection on the general principles that explain them. It also permits the general principles themselves to be qualified by examining particular cases. Developing this approach, Hampshire argues that our intuitive sense that certain actions are “wrong, morally repugnant, shocking, indefensible, inhuman, vicious, disgraceful” cannot be regarded as instances of one, or even a very few, much more general prohibitions or injunctions. The same is true of the virtues and vices. They are all “irreducibly plural.” This is because the ways of life towards which people aspire are normally a balance between disparate elements and because people are so constructed as not to have any single overriding concern. Condemning utilitarianism in particular, Hampshire says that a conflict of claims between virtues and between moral injunctions is not to be settled once for all by a single principle.
He notes, however, that there is a remarkable convergence between idealisations of the virtues admired in different societies. These virtues may be given a different priority in these different societies; the courage of an aristocratic warrior may be different from the courage of an ascetic monk; and social circumstances may often render it difficult or impossible to pursue some of the virtues. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian virtues – courage, honesty, justice etc - do crop up everywhere, and people frequently try to find a balance between them.
Having thus defended Aristotle, Hampshire confronts the “barrier of modernity” that separates us from Aristotle. Specifically, he considers the notion of human freedom. Aristotle, he says, had no objection to slavery. Nor did he understanding of the psychological slavery that comes from ignorance or thoughtless emotion. Aristotle also lacks the modern understanding that human actions might be determined by natural laws and that this might cast doubt on ideas of personal responsibility. Hampshire therefore turns to Spinoza whose writings stand at the gateway to these modern concerns.
The focus for Spinoza’s philosophy is the possibility that human beings may evaluate and change their understanding of the moral (and indeed the natural) world. The human activity of thinking entails a process of stepping back, of gaining a greater objectivity by making corrections for point of view. Active conscious thought therefore turns into self-consciousness, into thought about thought. One can therefore see the world – but also one’s own emotions - not only from one’s own historically rooted and individual point of view but also from the perspective of the entire system. One may come to see the world from the perspective of God, sub specie aeternitatis.
Spinoza's morality begins from an understanding of this comparative human autonomy. It is possible for someone to liberate themselves from their own narrow viewpoint and thus free themselves from confusion, obsession, and inner conflict. Correspondingly, one can liberate one’s actions from hatred and construct peaceful and friendly relations with other people. Such a liberated person will respect those prohibitions and injunctions will protect this harmonious way of life from both social conflict and tyranny. Spinoza's doctrine therefore makes morality a by-product of, liberation.
Hampshire says that Aristotle’s Ethics leads the reader to see his own life from the standpoint of his eventual obituarist, as somebody who has performed well or badly. For Spinoza, in contrast, it is not the total performance within an individual's life that counts, but the rather those moments of transcendence, when a person is able to understand things, including himself, sub specie aeternitatis.
My only query about this excellent book is to ask whether Hampshire is correct to find these two theories to be just as incompatible as he suggest.
Moral philosophy for Aristotle, allows moral intuitions to be modified by reflection on the general principles that explain them. It also permits the general principles themselves to be qualified by examining particular cases. Developing this approach, Hampshire argues that our intuitive sense that certain actions are “wrong, morally repugnant, shocking, indefensible, inhuman, vicious, disgraceful” cannot be regarded as instances of one, or even a very few, much more general prohibitions or injunctions. The same is true of the virtues and vices. They are all “irreducibly plural.” This is because the ways of life towards which people aspire are normally a balance between disparate elements and because people are so constructed as not to have any single overriding concern. Condemning utilitarianism in particular, Hampshire says that a conflict of claims between virtues and between moral injunctions is not to be settled once for all by a single principle.
He notes, however, that there is a remarkable convergence between idealisations of the virtues admired in different societies. These virtues may be given a different priority in these different societies; the courage of an aristocratic warrior may be different from the courage of an ascetic monk; and social circumstances may often render it difficult or impossible to pursue some of the virtues. Nevertheless, the Aristotelian virtues – courage, honesty, justice etc - do crop up everywhere, and people frequently try to find a balance between them.
Having thus defended Aristotle, Hampshire confronts the “barrier of modernity” that separates us from Aristotle. Specifically, he considers the notion of human freedom. Aristotle, he says, had no objection to slavery. Nor did he understanding of the psychological slavery that comes from ignorance or thoughtless emotion. Aristotle also lacks the modern understanding that human actions might be determined by natural laws and that this might cast doubt on ideas of personal responsibility. Hampshire therefore turns to Spinoza whose writings stand at the gateway to these modern concerns.
The focus for Spinoza’s philosophy is the possibility that human beings may evaluate and change their understanding of the moral (and indeed the natural) world. The human activity of thinking entails a process of stepping back, of gaining a greater objectivity by making corrections for point of view. Active conscious thought therefore turns into self-consciousness, into thought about thought. One can therefore see the world – but also one’s own emotions - not only from one’s own historically rooted and individual point of view but also from the perspective of the entire system. One may come to see the world from the perspective of God, sub specie aeternitatis.
Spinoza's morality begins from an understanding of this comparative human autonomy. It is possible for someone to liberate themselves from their own narrow viewpoint and thus free themselves from confusion, obsession, and inner conflict. Correspondingly, one can liberate one’s actions from hatred and construct peaceful and friendly relations with other people. Such a liberated person will respect those prohibitions and injunctions will protect this harmonious way of life from both social conflict and tyranny. Spinoza's doctrine therefore makes morality a by-product of, liberation.
Hampshire says that Aristotle’s Ethics leads the reader to see his own life from the standpoint of his eventual obituarist, as somebody who has performed well or badly. For Spinoza, in contrast, it is not the total performance within an individual's life that counts, but the rather those moments of transcendence, when a person is able to understand things, including himself, sub specie aeternitatis.
My only query about this excellent book is to ask whether Hampshire is correct to find these two theories to be just as incompatible as he suggest.
February 15, 2023
Mi error fue no haber leído ninguna de las teorías mencionadas por separado antes, ahí ando cotejando información y buscando en wikipedia para seguirle lanpista a lo que el hombre habla. Aún así siento que no entendí mucho; el cerebro ya no me da para mucho.
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews