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Regime Change: U.S. Strategy through the Prism of 9/11
The 9/11 terrorist attacks starkly recast the U.S. debate on "rogue states." In this new era of vulnerability, should the United States counter the dangers of weapons proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism by toppling regimes or by promoting change in the threatening behavior of their leaders? Regime Change examines the contrasting precedents set with Iraq and Libya and provides incisive analysis of the pressing crises with North Korea and Iran. A successor to the author's influential Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy (2000), this compelling book clarifies and critiques the terms in which today's vital foreign policy and security debate is being conducted.
424 pages, Paperback
First published January 30, 2007
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May 1, 2016
This is a very conditional 4 star review: If you haven't read anything else by Litwak, it's 4 starts. If you have read "Rogue States" or something else, then it's three stars. I say this because while the arguments in this book are strong and well-informed, but Litwak has a tendency to repeat himself within and between his books.
This book looks at US foreign policy towards rogue states after 9/11. Litwak argues that the central tension of post 9/11 foreign policy has been regime change v. behavior change. In choosing between these strategies, the US has has to develop a concept of societal change in the long term to inform how we should deal with the threat in the short term. For example, the US that Iranian civil society is moving against the regime in the long run has motivated a desire to avoid doing something to empower the regime, pushing the US towards a behavioral change strategy. In contrast, the belief that Iraqi society could never meaningfully change with SH in power, nor remove him alone, was a big factor in pushing the US towards regime change.
The most interesting argument in the book (in favor of behavioral change) is that the guarantee of regime survival is one of the best ways to incentivize states to cooperate on WMD matters. He points mainly to the Libya example to back this up. The US negotiated with Libya over its WMD program throughout the 1990's and into the 2000's while hitting it with tough sanctions. However, we didn't ratchet up the regime change talk, and we gave him an out that he finally took in 2003. Most of the reasons Qadaffi took the deal to give up his WMD program in exchange for normalization were internal: economic downturns, political instability, etc. This is a strong theme in Litwak's work: we need to remember that most states' main goal is survival, and most states' actions are derived from internal priorities, even though we tend to think that their relations to us/what we do to them matter the most. IN contrast, Litwak argues that Saddam Hussein cultivated strategic ambiguity on his WMD program because he needed the threat of WMD to keep internal power. He also had no incentive to cooperate with the US because the US was essentially fixated on regime change. After all, if you have such an implacable foe, why not try to get the ultimate trump card in order to stop them from destroying you? It's this kind of empathetic thinking that makes Litwak a sound foreign policy analyst.
I'm a bit skeptical of this rationalist view of SH. In fact, the rationalist bias of political science infuses this entire book, which is one of its weaknesses. The idea that Saddam, Kim Jong-Il, or any of these guys might do something non-strategic for religious, political, or personal reasons doesn't occur in the book, yet we know that these guys didn't exactly have great information gathering and decision making systems. Moreover, the idea that you should seek WMD or at least WMD ambiguity only makes sense if there's no other way of achieving your goals (because states like the US pay much less attention to conventional arms build-ups) and if your opponent's regime change policy is truly unconditional. Most regimes can stay in power with other means than the attention-grabbing WMD, and most regime change policies aren't truly unconditional. I therefore think that LItwak probably imputes too much rationality into these actors and looks at the WMD-security question a little too narrowly.
Let me add that the chapter on Iraq in this book is excellent. Not totally original, but a great summary of the beliefs and events that contributed to the war. Litwak is a very clear writer, and I'll definitely come back to him continually for designing lectures and such. The book is fairly dry, wonky policy stuff, but those interested in foreign policy should check it out. Just don't feel like you have to read Rogue States as well.
This book looks at US foreign policy towards rogue states after 9/11. Litwak argues that the central tension of post 9/11 foreign policy has been regime change v. behavior change. In choosing between these strategies, the US has has to develop a concept of societal change in the long term to inform how we should deal with the threat in the short term. For example, the US that Iranian civil society is moving against the regime in the long run has motivated a desire to avoid doing something to empower the regime, pushing the US towards a behavioral change strategy. In contrast, the belief that Iraqi society could never meaningfully change with SH in power, nor remove him alone, was a big factor in pushing the US towards regime change.
The most interesting argument in the book (in favor of behavioral change) is that the guarantee of regime survival is one of the best ways to incentivize states to cooperate on WMD matters. He points mainly to the Libya example to back this up. The US negotiated with Libya over its WMD program throughout the 1990's and into the 2000's while hitting it with tough sanctions. However, we didn't ratchet up the regime change talk, and we gave him an out that he finally took in 2003. Most of the reasons Qadaffi took the deal to give up his WMD program in exchange for normalization were internal: economic downturns, political instability, etc. This is a strong theme in Litwak's work: we need to remember that most states' main goal is survival, and most states' actions are derived from internal priorities, even though we tend to think that their relations to us/what we do to them matter the most. IN contrast, Litwak argues that Saddam Hussein cultivated strategic ambiguity on his WMD program because he needed the threat of WMD to keep internal power. He also had no incentive to cooperate with the US because the US was essentially fixated on regime change. After all, if you have such an implacable foe, why not try to get the ultimate trump card in order to stop them from destroying you? It's this kind of empathetic thinking that makes Litwak a sound foreign policy analyst.
I'm a bit skeptical of this rationalist view of SH. In fact, the rationalist bias of political science infuses this entire book, which is one of its weaknesses. The idea that Saddam, Kim Jong-Il, or any of these guys might do something non-strategic for religious, political, or personal reasons doesn't occur in the book, yet we know that these guys didn't exactly have great information gathering and decision making systems. Moreover, the idea that you should seek WMD or at least WMD ambiguity only makes sense if there's no other way of achieving your goals (because states like the US pay much less attention to conventional arms build-ups) and if your opponent's regime change policy is truly unconditional. Most regimes can stay in power with other means than the attention-grabbing WMD, and most regime change policies aren't truly unconditional. I therefore think that LItwak probably imputes too much rationality into these actors and looks at the WMD-security question a little too narrowly.
Let me add that the chapter on Iraq in this book is excellent. Not totally original, but a great summary of the beliefs and events that contributed to the war. Litwak is a very clear writer, and I'll definitely come back to him continually for designing lectures and such. The book is fairly dry, wonky policy stuff, but those interested in foreign policy should check it out. Just don't feel like you have to read Rogue States as well.
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