Analytic Philosophy: The History of an Illusion

by Aaron Preston

One would expect that so successful and controversial a philosophical school as analytic philosophy would have a clear platform of substantive philosophical views. However, this is not so. For at least 30 years, analytic philosophy has consisted in an increasingly loose and variable amalgam of philosophical topics, views and methods. This state of affairs has led some to claim that, despite its professional entrenchment, analytic philosophy is in a state of crisis. Analytic The History of an Illusion argues that this is so, and that the crisis is deeper and more longstanding than is usually recognized. Synthesizing data from early and recent studies on the historical and philosophical foundations of analytic philosophy as well as from canonical primary texts, it argues (1) that analytic philosophy has never involved significant agreement on substantive philosophical views, and thus that it has always been in this state of crisis, (2) that this fact was long hidden by the illusion that analytic philosophy was originally united in the metaphilosophical thesis that philosophy is linguistic analysis, and (3) that both the rise of analytic philosophy under this illusion and the preservation of its privileged status since the illusion's demise have been facilitated by a scientistic 'stance' that minimizes the traditional philosophical duty to examine one's most fundamental assumptions.


One would expect that so successful and controversial a philosophical school as analytic philosophy would have a clear platform of substantive philosophical views. However, this is not so. For at least 30 years, analytic philosophy has consisted in an increasingly loose and variable amalgam of philosophical topics, views and methods. This state of affairs has led some to claim that, despite its professional entrenchment, analytic philosophy is in a state of crisis. Analytic The History of an Illusion argues that this is so, and that the crisis is deeper and more longstanding than is usually recognized. Synthesizing data from early and recent studies on the historical and philosophical foundations of analytic philosophy as well as from canonical primary texts, it argues (1) that analytic philosophy has never involved significant agreement on substantive philosophical views, and thus that it has always been in this state of crisis, (2) that this fact was long hidden by the illusion that analytic philosophy was originally united in the metaphilosophical thesis that philosophy is linguistic analysis, and (3) that both the rise of analytic philosophy under this illusion and the preservation of its privileged status since the illusion's demise have been facilitated by a scientistic 'stance' that minimizes the traditional philosophical duty to examine one's most fundamental assumptions.

Genres: Philosophy, Logic

208 pages, Hardcover

First published March 28, 2007

Reviews

[Kamakana · Rating 5 out of 5]

if you like this review, i now have website: www.michaelkamakana.com

100818: i do not know if this is a five- let alone on a sort of philosophy i do not much read (analytic) but this book was an easy, convincing read, from an author who has obviously read and thought a lot about analytic philosophy. i have done neither. i have never thought to offer any argument, any disagreement, with what seems(ed) to be a massively successful philosophical edifice, so i find his book particularly enlightening. i am just glad somebody has braved such dangerous heights...

my father as scientist once suggested i read outside of my comfort zone, challenge all sorts of philosophy, to this end i started to note places the work was done, the year published, the type elaborated, the authors, the works, then even tried to approach what too often impressed as reading math... this and the four russell and four on wittgenstein has suggested to me that such perception of arid logicism is mistaken perception, that on this and on that occasion there are interesting thoughts in analytic philosophy, even past all the if and only if, and as much of the wide range of philosophy i have read have review shelves- from america, asia, china, england, france, germany, india, italy, japan, spain, i have to admit i have room for a dedicated review bookshelf (philosophy-analytic)... though then i have to read some. after all, i have a shelf of feminist philosophy and such only on occasion is updated, and are thoughts of (mostly male) analytics maybe less foreign to me than of all the various women thinkers...?

as far in ‘continental’ and ‘analytic’ this book goes far enough back in history to find origins for both 'schools' or 'movements' or 'traditions' though the important 'founding texts' are from around 1880 to 1920. the argument of this work is that there is no logical core to analytic thought, that it is apparent that the great early work of analytics are something invented, something even certain thinkers closely allied with will in time refuse identity, that in development analytic thought follows the usual progress of any philosophy in creation and struggle for legitimacy: 1) first phase, proclaiming revolutionary aspirations, promising logical ‘dissolving’ rather than trying uselessly to answer incoherent questions, then 2nd) the second phase as a self-conscious movement is brought ‘tradition’, certainty that analytic is promoted, vigorous protection and denigrating all other ways of thought, no longer ‘revolutionary’ but now ‘traditions’ much time is multiplied by time and space, english and american professional philosophy happy to fall in illusions, then in 3rd) the third phase, cracks showing in the pillars, simple errors that should have been seen before but the illusions of analytic are revealed illusions and everyone runs away from the tower before inevitable earthquake... and this entire career of thought has been resolved in about half a century...

so is it right to wrangle in outliers of thought (or so continental seems to be for many analytics) of privileged philosophy students, to decide for them, to teach them, this is the only way to 'do' philosophy, losing all of us who think there are more ways to do philosophy, analytics closing places in the united states/england/canada where such interest is ignored, where the simple ‘truths’ of this tradition are not recognized- and you really are just not good enough at math... this is my case. i do not know math, i have never known math, i probably never will know math, but i have come to believe math is not the only or to me most interesting way to know and be aware of the world... and it is particularly this book that alleviates any envy/ignorance/unread status i have felt in such prejudicial lack of math, this book offers a way past the historical and maybe geographical and language if not also conceptual schism of continental/analytic philosophy... this book frees me to read the sort of philosophy i want to read rather than nurturing through math questions that will never be answered, from titles to introductions, chapter headings, from the first sentence... but also i remember that language is not the final proof and last and most recent 'turn'... there is perhaps something referred to before reference...

i read on. this is a five not simply that it inspires reading another book, this five that makes cogent arguments that maybe i should just go with what i know i like... this five saves me from reading so many more books... and instead maybe read the books i am interested in...

[Gavin · Rating 3 out of 5]

As a student I was much vexed by analytic philosophy. This was partially sour grapes (because I didn't know enough maths to keep up with some of it), but also partially fair: it isn't what it says it is. Roughly: modern, modest, science-friendly clarification.)

Preston's polemic is that analytic philosophy isn't real and never was, in the sense that it isn't actually a school, a set of views, or even a methodology. (Instead it's a Anglophone social clique.) The nominally distinctive part of it was, according to Preston, the linguistic thesis: that "philosophy is wholly or largely a matter of linguistic analysis." While some analytics in the canon did think this, most don't and never did. This is dodgy.

John Wisdom is quoted saying that what analytics have in common is their seeking "new insight into old truths". Amazingly, that seems about right, and in the plainest possible terms.

Exciting but excessive.

[Manuel · Rating 4 out of 5]

I'm giving this book 4 stars for the powerful insight that Analytic Philosophy (AP) may not be a school, movement, or tradition in philosophy. The author brings powerful arguments for this thesis, particularly when quoting the early analysts and the misrepresentations of these analysts by later ordinary-language philosophers. Having formally studied AP myself, I knew it could only be loosely defined, but still held to the view that it somehow constituted a clearly-recognized tradition. So I was initially quite resistant to Preston's first statement of his thesis. Having come to the end of the book, though, I am left with a lot of uncertainties and questions!

One negative is that the book is too short, and leaves out a few chapters of AP that needed to be taken into account---e.g. there is no in-depth discussion of the Vienna Circle (which contradict's the traditional conception of AP as being particularly an anglo phenomenon) nor of the resurrection of metaphysics in AP in the 70's. Granted that AP had no "ideational" cohesion at its inception, what about during its middle and late stages? What about simply characterizing AP negatively, i.e. not Continental philosophy? Without answers to these questions, I'm still not 100% convinced that AP is just a name, a remnant of an illusion, held onto for the sake of academic hegemony.

Still, the author did manage to thoroughly shake my assumptions!

[Tosin Olufeyimi · Rating 2 out of 5]

Chapter one contain some hard truth. The other chapters is an historical gossiping.

[Michael White]

I disagree with some of the authors points, but still, a pretty persuasive argument against Analytic Philosophy as traditionally conceived.