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Forging A Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University And The Vietnam War
Forging A Fateful Alliance is an important study of the Vietnam War and American higher education-- revealing how secret and semi-secret institutional involvement in that conflict led to public disclosures that undermined the integrity of academe. After Indochina's de facto division in 1954, Michigan State University offered South Vietnam an array of technical support as part of the "nation-building" program. This support included developing a viable national public administrative structure and, at the same time, training South Vietnam's notorious military police. In return for these services, the U.S. government provided the university with generous clandestine and open financial remuneration -- money that the university would use to expand academic programs, construct new facilities, and fuel its dramatic growth.
In the end, however, the arrangement proved to be a Faustian bargain. Like many universities, MSU was accused of being a tool of Cold War foreign policy, of sending professors abroad to staff grandiose "outreach" programs that were based more on ideology than on scholarship or research. Ultimately, flaws inherent in the nation- building scheme, including its failure to address cultural differences or recognize the massive corruption in South Vietnam's government, foreshadowed the enormity of the tragedy that occurred in Southeast Asia after 1965.
In the end, however, the arrangement proved to be a Faustian bargain. Like many universities, MSU was accused of being a tool of Cold War foreign policy, of sending professors abroad to staff grandiose "outreach" programs that were based more on ideology than on scholarship or research. Ultimately, flaws inherent in the nation- building scheme, including its failure to address cultural differences or recognize the massive corruption in South Vietnam's government, foreshadowed the enormity of the tragedy that occurred in Southeast Asia after 1965.
165 pages, Paperback
First published May 1, 1998
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March 4, 2022
With the departure of the last French troops and advisers from South Vietnam in April 1956, the Americans took over complete responsibility for training the Vietnamese army, as Ngo Dinh Diem had desired. The Americans gave great attention to the 50,000-man Civil Guard, the militia responsible for patrolling districts of villages as part of the Strategic Hamlet Program. Responsibility for training the Civil Guard went to a team from Michigan State University, which tried to pattern the Civil Guard after an American state police force, civilian in character, and caused the Saigon government many headaches.
During his exile in the 1950s, Diem paid a brief visit to Japan, where he befriended Wesley Fishel, a young American political scientist. An expert in East Asian comparative politics, Fishel was immediately interested in Diem, whom he deemed an “extremely keen person.” Fishel’s interest may not have been purely academic; in addition to conducting research in Japan, he was also working for the military intelligence section of the U.S. Far East Command and may have sought Diem out on the orders of his superiors. Diem readily agreed to stay in contact with Fishel, apparently because he correctly surmised that the professor might be able to help him gain en- try into U.S. government and academic circles. Fishel subsequently became one of Diem’s most enthusiastic American supporters.
In 1951, Fishel joined the faculty of Michigan State College, which was soon renamed Michigan State University. Michigan State was one of several American universities that became involved in American government-sponsored foreign aid programs during the 1950s. Over the course of the decade, school officials set up programs to provide technical assistance to several countries in Latin America and Asia. Intrigued by the possibility of such a program for Vietnam, Fishel arranged for Diem to work at Michigan State as a consultant. In 1952, Fishel sent a letter to the US Mutual Security Administration in which he outlined what he and Diem had in mind. The letter indicated that Vietnam needed technical assistance in areas as diverse as “police science,” “foreign trade problems,” and even “studies for the adoption of democratic institutions. Although this proposal did not generate much interest in Washington when it was drafted, it took on new significance after Diem’s return to Vietnam in 1954.
By the time of Diem’s appointment as Prime Minister, Fishel had become one of his closest and most trusted American friends. In late July 1954, Diem submitted an “urgent request” for Fishel to come to Saigon to provide advice on “governmental reconstruction.” Fishel arrived in mid-August and immediately began working in Diem’s palace. In addition to acting as an unofficial liaison between the palace and the American embassy, Fishel was also busy laying the groundwork for the Michigan State–sponsored technical assistance project that he and Diem had first proposed more than two years earlier.
Two weeks later, Fishel wrote an enthusiastic letter to a Michigan State College faculty colleague: "Believe me, our work will be cut out for us here. . . . The Government is shaky as all hell. . . . Nothing can help it so much as administrative, economic and social reforms (and these I am attempting to effectuate on the Presidential level). But it’s a tough haul. . . . [Diem] has just about two months to make good. If he doesn’t, the country will go to the Communists by default. If he does, there’s just a chance it can be saved. And this is the challenge [Michigan State] has been handed!"
Fishel was not alone in his belief. His colleagues at Michigan State had already enthusiastically endorsed the idea of creating what one of them described as “a total program of technical assistance in public administration” that would address “all the problems confronting government” in South Vietnam, so in the spring of 1955, the first members of the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) arrived in Saigon. Over the next seven years, the MSUG brought more than one hundred academic and professional experts to Vietnam to advise the Diem government on a wide range of reform projects: refugee resettlement, tax and fiscal policy, civil service training, and the reorganization of the police.
This remarkably ambitious undertaking was part of a larger American-sponsored effort to build a South Vietnam modelled on America. When Fishel returned to Saigon in 1956 to take the post of chief advisor of the MSUG, he was more confident than ever that the group would achieve its reform goals. In addition to enjoying the support of senior American officials in Washington, the MSUG expected to benefit from Fishel’s personal friendship with Diem. During his two-year tenure as chief advisor, Fishel had breakfast with Diem at Independence Palace several times per week — an arrangement that gave Fishel better access to the Prime Minister than all but several American and Vietnamese officials could enjoy.
Nevertheless, the MSUG mostly failed to bring about the sweeping changes that Fishel and other Michigan State officials imagined. As MSUG members soon discovered, their excellent access to Diem and other senior GVN officials did not mean influence over the regime’s policies and practices. The Michigan Staters would often be forced to abandon the ambitious reform plans they had designed. As a result, the MSUG’s once warm relations with Diem began to cool even before Fishel’s term as chief adviser ended in 1958, and the scope and scale of the MSUG’s responsibilities steadily diminished after that date. In 1959, Michigan State’s ties to the government were further strained by a series of critical articles published in the United States by former MSUG members who had become disillusioned with the regime. These tensions would lead eventually to the termination of Michigan State’s contract with Diem's government. They would also contribute to Fishel’s growing estrangement from Diem. In 1962, around the same time that the last MSUG members were departing from Vietnam, Fishel broke with Diem and began advocating his removal from office.
Why had the MSUG failed so miserably? Former MSUG members mostly attributed the group’s failings to the Diem regime's resistance to reform. However, this explanation is too narrow, for it overlooks the fundamental differences over how to think about politics, governance, and democracy that provoked the disagreements between the Americans and the South Vietnamese. For Fishel and many of his colleagues, South Vietnam’s political and administrative reform needs during the 1950s were best understood by reference to certain recent innovations adopted in America. One of the most important of these was a new theory of democracy known as pluralism, which held, according to political scientist Robert Dahl, that the essence of liberal democracy lay in the practice of power-sharing among political parties, interest groups, and other organizations. In the United States and other liberal societies, Dahl explained, competitive elections and other democratic practices ensured that political leaders would compromise with their rivals. For Diem, though, the very idea that good governance outcomes could be derived from bargaining among leaders was foreign. For him, democracy and good governance depended on the leadership of wise and incorruptible officials who could be counted on to uphold mutual social responsibility. Therefore, while Diem and the MSUG often agreed on the specific goals of particular reform projects, such agreement often hid deeper differences in ideology, which became increasingly problematic.
For instance, in response to the MSUG’s proposal to reduce or eliminate the budgetary autonomy of the provinces, Diem offered argued that it was essential that provincial and local governments be required to balance their own budgets because that would compel officials to exercise restraint and to enlist the support and participation of the people whom they were governing. Diem believed that this way the government would encourage mutual responsibility among citizens — what he considered the very essence of democracy. But this requirement led local officials to force citizens to contribute labor or money to public works projects — a practice most Americans considered both undemocratic and repressive.
Many other MSUG suggestions met with similar resistance, so, as the group's final report in 1962 demonstrated, its accomplishments fell short of what the MSUG had planned to do. Fishel's personal relationship with Diem had become tense. Although Fishel continued to support his friend in public, he and many other American officials were displeased with him for what they saw as authoritarian policies. Alas, the story of Diem's government's collaboration with Michigan State College is one of a failed alliance.
FORGING A FATEFUL ALLIANCE is an informative, well-written, and detailed study. John Ernst has done an outstanding job, shedding light on the reasons behind the MSUG's rise and fall. This book will contribute another important piece of analysis to complete the explanation for the failure of the American-South Vietnamese alliance. I highly recommend it.
During his exile in the 1950s, Diem paid a brief visit to Japan, where he befriended Wesley Fishel, a young American political scientist. An expert in East Asian comparative politics, Fishel was immediately interested in Diem, whom he deemed an “extremely keen person.” Fishel’s interest may not have been purely academic; in addition to conducting research in Japan, he was also working for the military intelligence section of the U.S. Far East Command and may have sought Diem out on the orders of his superiors. Diem readily agreed to stay in contact with Fishel, apparently because he correctly surmised that the professor might be able to help him gain en- try into U.S. government and academic circles. Fishel subsequently became one of Diem’s most enthusiastic American supporters.
In 1951, Fishel joined the faculty of Michigan State College, which was soon renamed Michigan State University. Michigan State was one of several American universities that became involved in American government-sponsored foreign aid programs during the 1950s. Over the course of the decade, school officials set up programs to provide technical assistance to several countries in Latin America and Asia. Intrigued by the possibility of such a program for Vietnam, Fishel arranged for Diem to work at Michigan State as a consultant. In 1952, Fishel sent a letter to the US Mutual Security Administration in which he outlined what he and Diem had in mind. The letter indicated that Vietnam needed technical assistance in areas as diverse as “police science,” “foreign trade problems,” and even “studies for the adoption of democratic institutions. Although this proposal did not generate much interest in Washington when it was drafted, it took on new significance after Diem’s return to Vietnam in 1954.
By the time of Diem’s appointment as Prime Minister, Fishel had become one of his closest and most trusted American friends. In late July 1954, Diem submitted an “urgent request” for Fishel to come to Saigon to provide advice on “governmental reconstruction.” Fishel arrived in mid-August and immediately began working in Diem’s palace. In addition to acting as an unofficial liaison between the palace and the American embassy, Fishel was also busy laying the groundwork for the Michigan State–sponsored technical assistance project that he and Diem had first proposed more than two years earlier.
Two weeks later, Fishel wrote an enthusiastic letter to a Michigan State College faculty colleague: "Believe me, our work will be cut out for us here. . . . The Government is shaky as all hell. . . . Nothing can help it so much as administrative, economic and social reforms (and these I am attempting to effectuate on the Presidential level). But it’s a tough haul. . . . [Diem] has just about two months to make good. If he doesn’t, the country will go to the Communists by default. If he does, there’s just a chance it can be saved. And this is the challenge [Michigan State] has been handed!"
Fishel was not alone in his belief. His colleagues at Michigan State had already enthusiastically endorsed the idea of creating what one of them described as “a total program of technical assistance in public administration” that would address “all the problems confronting government” in South Vietnam, so in the spring of 1955, the first members of the Michigan State University Group (MSUG) arrived in Saigon. Over the next seven years, the MSUG brought more than one hundred academic and professional experts to Vietnam to advise the Diem government on a wide range of reform projects: refugee resettlement, tax and fiscal policy, civil service training, and the reorganization of the police.
This remarkably ambitious undertaking was part of a larger American-sponsored effort to build a South Vietnam modelled on America. When Fishel returned to Saigon in 1956 to take the post of chief advisor of the MSUG, he was more confident than ever that the group would achieve its reform goals. In addition to enjoying the support of senior American officials in Washington, the MSUG expected to benefit from Fishel’s personal friendship with Diem. During his two-year tenure as chief advisor, Fishel had breakfast with Diem at Independence Palace several times per week — an arrangement that gave Fishel better access to the Prime Minister than all but several American and Vietnamese officials could enjoy.
Nevertheless, the MSUG mostly failed to bring about the sweeping changes that Fishel and other Michigan State officials imagined. As MSUG members soon discovered, their excellent access to Diem and other senior GVN officials did not mean influence over the regime’s policies and practices. The Michigan Staters would often be forced to abandon the ambitious reform plans they had designed. As a result, the MSUG’s once warm relations with Diem began to cool even before Fishel’s term as chief adviser ended in 1958, and the scope and scale of the MSUG’s responsibilities steadily diminished after that date. In 1959, Michigan State’s ties to the government were further strained by a series of critical articles published in the United States by former MSUG members who had become disillusioned with the regime. These tensions would lead eventually to the termination of Michigan State’s contract with Diem's government. They would also contribute to Fishel’s growing estrangement from Diem. In 1962, around the same time that the last MSUG members were departing from Vietnam, Fishel broke with Diem and began advocating his removal from office.
Why had the MSUG failed so miserably? Former MSUG members mostly attributed the group’s failings to the Diem regime's resistance to reform. However, this explanation is too narrow, for it overlooks the fundamental differences over how to think about politics, governance, and democracy that provoked the disagreements between the Americans and the South Vietnamese. For Fishel and many of his colleagues, South Vietnam’s political and administrative reform needs during the 1950s were best understood by reference to certain recent innovations adopted in America. One of the most important of these was a new theory of democracy known as pluralism, which held, according to political scientist Robert Dahl, that the essence of liberal democracy lay in the practice of power-sharing among political parties, interest groups, and other organizations. In the United States and other liberal societies, Dahl explained, competitive elections and other democratic practices ensured that political leaders would compromise with their rivals. For Diem, though, the very idea that good governance outcomes could be derived from bargaining among leaders was foreign. For him, democracy and good governance depended on the leadership of wise and incorruptible officials who could be counted on to uphold mutual social responsibility. Therefore, while Diem and the MSUG often agreed on the specific goals of particular reform projects, such agreement often hid deeper differences in ideology, which became increasingly problematic.
For instance, in response to the MSUG’s proposal to reduce or eliminate the budgetary autonomy of the provinces, Diem offered argued that it was essential that provincial and local governments be required to balance their own budgets because that would compel officials to exercise restraint and to enlist the support and participation of the people whom they were governing. Diem believed that this way the government would encourage mutual responsibility among citizens — what he considered the very essence of democracy. But this requirement led local officials to force citizens to contribute labor or money to public works projects — a practice most Americans considered both undemocratic and repressive.
Many other MSUG suggestions met with similar resistance, so, as the group's final report in 1962 demonstrated, its accomplishments fell short of what the MSUG had planned to do. Fishel's personal relationship with Diem had become tense. Although Fishel continued to support his friend in public, he and many other American officials were displeased with him for what they saw as authoritarian policies. Alas, the story of Diem's government's collaboration with Michigan State College is one of a failed alliance.
FORGING A FATEFUL ALLIANCE is an informative, well-written, and detailed study. John Ernst has done an outstanding job, shedding light on the reasons behind the MSUG's rise and fall. This book will contribute another important piece of analysis to complete the explanation for the failure of the American-South Vietnamese alliance. I highly recommend it.
August 20, 2017
The infamous Ramparts magazine with Madame Nhu on the cover has been framed and hanging in our office forever. Doug was at MSU when all this was going on - so I've always been interested in the "real" story. MSU was also deeply involved with the Green Zone in Iraq (Brennan had close ties with MSU, if I've got my stories straight). So, this little book has been on my shelf for years and years. It must have been the author's thesis paper for some degree or another. It read like a sixth grade year end project. BORING. I like history, I wanted to know more about this topic, and I had to force (FORCE!) myself to read this thing. Acronyms. There was far far too much repetitive acronym use. Even with the endless repetition, I couldn't tell you what most stood for. MSUG, AOM, CIA (ok, I knew that one), etc etc. Made the thing practically unreadable. My take away? MSU had good intentions. Mistakes were made. President of South Vietnam was an asshole. It seems things would have gone better for MSU and its plans if only the Vietnamese spoke better English. Did MSU staff really not expect them to speak Vietnamese? Why did the MSU staff not learn Vietnamese before going? Language problems repeatedly cropped up, and are blamed for many of the aid failures. It seems like such a simple obvious issue. Certainly can't blame MSU for the war, and I think most of the MSU staff were well intentioned - but just woefully unprepared about what they were going to find when arrived. No amount of education and culture sharing was going to head off that war.
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