In Paradigms and Barriers Howard Margolis offers an innovative interpretation of Thomas S. Kuhn's landmark idea of "paradigm shifts," applying insights from cognitive psychology to the history and philosophy of science. Building upon the arguments in his acclaimed Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition , Margolis suggests that the breaking down of particular habits of mind—of critical "barriers"—is key to understanding the processes through which one model or concept is supplanted by another.
Margolis focuses on those revolutionary paradigm shifts— such as the switch from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican worldview—where challenges to entrenched habits of mind are marked by incomprehension or indifference to a new paradigm. Margolis argues that the critical problem for a revolutionary shift in thinking lies in the robustness of the habits of mind that reject the new ideas, relative to the habits of mind that accept the new ideas.
Margolis applies his theory to famous cases in the history of science, offering detailed explanations for the transition from Ptolemaic to cosmological astronomy, the emergence of probability, the overthrow of phlogiston, and the emergence of the central role of experiment in the seventeenth century. He in turn uses these historical examples to address larger issues, especially the nature of belief formation and contemporary debates about the nature of science and the evolution of scientific ideas.
Howard Margolis is a professor in the Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies and in the College at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality and Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition , both published by the University of Chicago Press.
Excessively technical in some chapters, but the idea of a cognitivist interpretation of Kuhn's paradigm shift proved to be successful. The structure of the reasoning is interesting but theoretically a bit shallow.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
To steal from a book review written by Philip Mirowski:
Why don't we know everything that there is to know already? ... In science studies, proposals to answer this question range from intractable problems of induction, to the prerequisite of novel technologies, the underdetermination of theories by evidence, hindrances of superstition and conservatism, the social character of cognition, to a postulation of fundamental epistemic weaknesses in our makeup. ... Margolis wants to interject what he believes is a novel answer to this question. Briefly, he believes that old mental habits prevent us from seeing what is plainly in front of our noses. ... He attacks the purported relativism of the sociological camp. ... But it is hard to imagine who, in the vast field of science studies, would find this an admirable or compelling precis of how scientists learn or how cultures revise their world views. ... Finally, his repeated praise of the simple virtues of observation tends to grate upon the reader, for it is the unacknowledged hard empirical spadework of the constructivist historians which generally provides the raw materials for so many of his own derivative readings of events in the history of science.
In my words, it was a bit painful to get through, and I don't agree at all with his overarching argument, but he has some interesting ideas. Also, I have realized that I am at least 10x dumber than real scientists.
The central thesis of this book is that "habits of mind" underlie the "paradigm shift" that Thomas Kuhn proposed in his book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" although the exact relationship between the two is left nebulous. Paradigm shifts that change a world view during scientific revolutions would seem to be the extreme case of mind habits. In the same way our brains built up a visual scene through an optimization scheme filling it with objects so we fill out our world view with various interlocking habits of mind. Affecting one affects the others so changing a world view is orders of magnitude more difficult than changing a single habit of mind even though both can affect how we perceive the evidence. Mental barriers exist because will stick with the old mental habit until that habit is actively challenged by some new viewpoint. Uncertainties and contradictions in the viewpoint may be acknowledge but not wanting to change a habit we will tend to assume some future finding will resolve those issues.
My only complaint is that this book could be half its size if the historical examples were better written and organized.