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Husserl's Legacy: Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Transcendental Philosophy
Dan Zahavi offers an in-depth and up-to-date analysis of central and contested aspects of the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenology.What is ultimately at stake in Husserl's phenomenological analyses? Are they primarily to be understood as investigations of consciousness or are they equally about the world? What is distinctive about phenomenological transcendental philosophy, and what kind of metaphysical import, if any, might it have? Husserl's Legacy offers an interpretation of the more overarching aims and ambitions of Husserlian phenomenology and engages with some of the most contested and debated questions inphenomenology. Central to its interpretative efforts is the attempt to understand Husserl's transcendental idealism. Husserl's Legacy argues that Husserl was not an internalist, nor a quietist when it comes to metaphysical issues; that he assigned a fundamental importance to facticity and intersubjectivity;and that he was not opposed to all forms of naturalism.
- GenresPhilosophy
246 pages, Kindle Edition
Published November 24, 2017
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96 people want to read
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
April 23, 2020
This book grapples with 2 primary questions. First, what is metaphysical position of Husserl's transcendental idealism and phenomenology (e.g., does its insistence in the fact that all possible experience is constituted by our subjectivity imply that the external world does not exist)? Second, what is the most mature and effective way to go about understanding the mind (e.g., what is the role that Husserlian phenomenology can play in the sciences of mind)? Zahavi deals with these questions very clearly and with the perfect amount of detail. It is detailed, but not redundant, and thoroughly interesting. Moreover, the ideas are accessible to readers who haven't read much Husserl before (though I'd say that a background familiarity with Kantian transcendental idealism would be very helpful).
Zahavi argues that Husserl's transcendental idealism is very similar to Kant's and yet crucially different on one regard. Both Husserl and Kant affirm that all possible experiences and knowledge that we can have are constrained by or constituted by a transcendental subjectivity. They both affirm that this realm of experience makes up what we take to be the actual, real world, and that the world as it stands independently of our experience is in principle inaccessible. Husserl crucially differs from Kant, however, in his insistence that the very idea of a noumenal, in-principle-inaccessible world is still an idea that is conditional upon our transcendental subjectivity. Ultimately, it is our phenomenal world that is the real world for Husserl, and it is inappropriate to dismiss it as merely phenomenal, in contrast to a more fundamentally real, noumenal world.
Moreover, Husserl, according to Zahavi, does not dismiss the the ontological status of empirical claims (i.e., natural science) as merely posterior to a priori, transcendental knowledge of the conditions that are constitutive of those claims. Rather, Husserl acknowledges the possible knowledge we have of the a priori and transcendental, on the one hand, and the empirical and scientific, on the other hand, as both equal in ontological status. Both bodies of knowledge are conditional on transcendental subjectivity, phenomenal, and real. Both bodies of knowledge are suspect to further questioning and refinement, since they are conditional as such.
So Husserl is more of a commonsense, empirical realist compared to Kant. But Husserl is definitely not a straightforwardly empirical realist, as those who believe that scientific facts are infallibly and unconditionally true. Husserl is a transcendental idealist who will acknowledge the categorical difference between transcendental/a priori and empirical/phenomenal facts, but insist that this difference is mostly semantic or conceptual in nature. This semantic difference, for Husserl, nonetheless carries metaphysical implications. We can always know that, metaphysically, there is a transcendental subjectivity constituting whatever bit of knowledge or experience that we encounter.
Zahavi also argues that Husserlian phenomenology has a critical role to play in our understanding the nature of our cognition. The primary issue with natural sciences of mind is that they take for granted many assumptions about the mind, such as that certain mental faculties distinguishably exist, or that experience is realm of representations that mediate between us, on the inside, and the external world, on the outside. The point of Husserlian phenomenology is to attend to our first personal experience while suspending belief in the ordinary identities of and facts about objects that show up to us. It is an exercise in questioning our most deeply taken for granted assumptions.
Zahavi argues that this is a distinctive role that contemporary philosophy can have in our human pursuit of knowledge. Some people believe there is a crisis for philosophy in our modern day, since it has been pushed our of its role of making discoveries and refining knowledge by empirical sciences. Some philosophers have insisted that philosophy still has a role in clarifying and refining categories and explanations already drawn by science, or making sure that scientific knowledge is internally consistent. Zahavi argues against this. Philosophy has a greater role, in being uniquely capable of making new discoveries about how our experience works, and thus not only about our subjectivity, but also about the objects disclosed by experience. These discoveries can challenge and revise the ontologies of explanatory entities of cognition that natural sciences presuppose.
Zahavi has an agenda in writing this. He wants to refute a traditional stereotype philosophers have of Husserl. On this stereotypical understanding, Husserl is thoroughly Cartesian and internalist in his philosophy. Husserl wants to look away from the world and discover absolute facts about subjectivity. Zahavi's discussions on the metaphysical positions implied by Husserlian phenomenology and its relation to the natural sciences is largely motivated by his project to present a new understanding of Husserl. On this understanding, Husserl is consistent with embodied cognitive science; he is an externalist and transcendental idealist in a special way that allows this view to be consistent with naturalism.
I have previously been biased against Zahavi's understanding of Husserl, and biased in favor of this traditional stereotype. This is largely due to my previous mentor's holding such a position, and to my exposure to a bit of Husserl's work. Lacking Huserlian scholarship, I still do not know whether Zahavi's position is correct. Regardless of that, this book contains many interesting discussions and ideas, and Zahavi's version of Husserl amounts to the most sincere and correct metaphysical position to my knowledge. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the relationship between philosophy and science regarding understanding cognition; in transcendental idealism, or the relationship between Kant, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty; and in continental phenomenology more generally.
Here are a few concerns I'm left with. There seems to be an internal tension to Zahavi's version of Husserlian transcendental idealism. Zahavi claims that Husserl holds that scientific knowledge and knowledge of transcendental conditions of experience gained through the Husserlian phenomenological method are both just different aspects of the world -- a world that cannot be known in itself but is disclosed in multifarious ways. Zahavi also claims, however, that Husserl holds that scientific knowledge is ontologically posterior to transcendental knowledge. The latter amounts to the insight that we, as transcendental subjects, constitute the phenomenal world. Scientific knowledge is knowledge had about this phenomenal world. My question is, how can transcendental knowledge be both phenomenal and transcendental of the phenomenal realm? Zahavi does not go into this.
Also, Zahavi insists that Husserl affirms that the only real world is our phenomenal world. But this is compatible with the claim that there also exists a noumenal world, which we can say and know nothing about; it is only that this noumenal world is not "real" in the sense by which our phenomenal world is. Zahavi does not touch upon this claim whatsoever. It seems that according to Zahavi's account, Husserl simply refuses to treat the question of the noumenal. But this is a critical element to his system, if he is to avoid being a total subjectivist-idealist, and to be able to be an interlocutor with the natural sciences, as Zahavi affirms he can.
Zahavi argues that Husserl's transcendental idealism is very similar to Kant's and yet crucially different on one regard. Both Husserl and Kant affirm that all possible experiences and knowledge that we can have are constrained by or constituted by a transcendental subjectivity. They both affirm that this realm of experience makes up what we take to be the actual, real world, and that the world as it stands independently of our experience is in principle inaccessible. Husserl crucially differs from Kant, however, in his insistence that the very idea of a noumenal, in-principle-inaccessible world is still an idea that is conditional upon our transcendental subjectivity. Ultimately, it is our phenomenal world that is the real world for Husserl, and it is inappropriate to dismiss it as merely phenomenal, in contrast to a more fundamentally real, noumenal world.
Moreover, Husserl, according to Zahavi, does not dismiss the the ontological status of empirical claims (i.e., natural science) as merely posterior to a priori, transcendental knowledge of the conditions that are constitutive of those claims. Rather, Husserl acknowledges the possible knowledge we have of the a priori and transcendental, on the one hand, and the empirical and scientific, on the other hand, as both equal in ontological status. Both bodies of knowledge are conditional on transcendental subjectivity, phenomenal, and real. Both bodies of knowledge are suspect to further questioning and refinement, since they are conditional as such.
So Husserl is more of a commonsense, empirical realist compared to Kant. But Husserl is definitely not a straightforwardly empirical realist, as those who believe that scientific facts are infallibly and unconditionally true. Husserl is a transcendental idealist who will acknowledge the categorical difference between transcendental/a priori and empirical/phenomenal facts, but insist that this difference is mostly semantic or conceptual in nature. This semantic difference, for Husserl, nonetheless carries metaphysical implications. We can always know that, metaphysically, there is a transcendental subjectivity constituting whatever bit of knowledge or experience that we encounter.
Zahavi also argues that Husserlian phenomenology has a critical role to play in our understanding the nature of our cognition. The primary issue with natural sciences of mind is that they take for granted many assumptions about the mind, such as that certain mental faculties distinguishably exist, or that experience is realm of representations that mediate between us, on the inside, and the external world, on the outside. The point of Husserlian phenomenology is to attend to our first personal experience while suspending belief in the ordinary identities of and facts about objects that show up to us. It is an exercise in questioning our most deeply taken for granted assumptions.
Zahavi argues that this is a distinctive role that contemporary philosophy can have in our human pursuit of knowledge. Some people believe there is a crisis for philosophy in our modern day, since it has been pushed our of its role of making discoveries and refining knowledge by empirical sciences. Some philosophers have insisted that philosophy still has a role in clarifying and refining categories and explanations already drawn by science, or making sure that scientific knowledge is internally consistent. Zahavi argues against this. Philosophy has a greater role, in being uniquely capable of making new discoveries about how our experience works, and thus not only about our subjectivity, but also about the objects disclosed by experience. These discoveries can challenge and revise the ontologies of explanatory entities of cognition that natural sciences presuppose.
Zahavi has an agenda in writing this. He wants to refute a traditional stereotype philosophers have of Husserl. On this stereotypical understanding, Husserl is thoroughly Cartesian and internalist in his philosophy. Husserl wants to look away from the world and discover absolute facts about subjectivity. Zahavi's discussions on the metaphysical positions implied by Husserlian phenomenology and its relation to the natural sciences is largely motivated by his project to present a new understanding of Husserl. On this understanding, Husserl is consistent with embodied cognitive science; he is an externalist and transcendental idealist in a special way that allows this view to be consistent with naturalism.
I have previously been biased against Zahavi's understanding of Husserl, and biased in favor of this traditional stereotype. This is largely due to my previous mentor's holding such a position, and to my exposure to a bit of Husserl's work. Lacking Huserlian scholarship, I still do not know whether Zahavi's position is correct. Regardless of that, this book contains many interesting discussions and ideas, and Zahavi's version of Husserl amounts to the most sincere and correct metaphysical position to my knowledge. I recommend this book to anyone interested in the relationship between philosophy and science regarding understanding cognition; in transcendental idealism, or the relationship between Kant, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty; and in continental phenomenology more generally.
Here are a few concerns I'm left with. There seems to be an internal tension to Zahavi's version of Husserlian transcendental idealism. Zahavi claims that Husserl holds that scientific knowledge and knowledge of transcendental conditions of experience gained through the Husserlian phenomenological method are both just different aspects of the world -- a world that cannot be known in itself but is disclosed in multifarious ways. Zahavi also claims, however, that Husserl holds that scientific knowledge is ontologically posterior to transcendental knowledge. The latter amounts to the insight that we, as transcendental subjects, constitute the phenomenal world. Scientific knowledge is knowledge had about this phenomenal world. My question is, how can transcendental knowledge be both phenomenal and transcendental of the phenomenal realm? Zahavi does not go into this.
Also, Zahavi insists that Husserl affirms that the only real world is our phenomenal world. But this is compatible with the claim that there also exists a noumenal world, which we can say and know nothing about; it is only that this noumenal world is not "real" in the sense by which our phenomenal world is. Zahavi does not touch upon this claim whatsoever. It seems that according to Zahavi's account, Husserl simply refuses to treat the question of the noumenal. But this is a critical element to his system, if he is to avoid being a total subjectivist-idealist, and to be able to be an interlocutor with the natural sciences, as Zahavi affirms he can.
January 15, 2018
Excellent plumbing from Zahavi. Fav chapt: 4, because its extensive, comprehensive, illuminating treatment of internalism and the likes. Least fav: 6, because of a completely unproductive engagement with a philosophical program that obviously hasn’t quite found its lane yet, judging from Zahavi’s treatment. Also, can we please give less attention to Sparrow?!? What the hell did he ever do to deserve this amount? Runner up for least fav: 5, because Zahavi just tends to leave open the questions of how to assess phenomenological methodology (despite clarifying its relevance), of how to make sense of a specifically phenomenological or otherwise postmodern interpretation of transcendental theory, and of how to conceptualize nature. Clearly, Zahavi still is cherry-picking Husserlian topics to buttress his scientism, and that is getting kind of booriiiing.
May 1, 2025
Zahavi defends Husserl against misunderstandings and objections. While the overall tone is defensive, tediously so in the last third, the author is always reasonable and gives the other side fair consideration. Other writers might have given in to straw-man presentations, authoritarian pronouncements, and terminological ju-jitsu, but Zahavi’s willingness to take objections seriously and fairly gives the reader very high confidence in his answers.
The main objections to and dismissals of Husserl’s philosophy come from traditional realism. Broadly, there are two kinds. One is scientific realism, which claims the world is objectively “out there,” self-existent and mind-independent. The other main variety is Kantian. Though Kant was an idealist, he did allow that there was a world out there beyond the mind, the ultimate source of our sensations and perceptions, but we can’t know anything about it. If it’s beyond the mind, it’s beyond the mind, utterly inaccessible, so forget about it.
According to Zahavi, Husserl said the objective reality of the world is not some sort of ghostly noumenon. Rather, objectivity is the complement of transcendental subjectivity. We commonly understand objectivity to be located beyond the mind because we have a narrow idea of what “the mind” is. With a detailed understanding of transcendental subjectivity, it becomes clear that objectivity can be understood in a different way. That doesn’t make it any less real or less objective. It’s the same world, and it presents itself to us in the same way, but now we know its secret.
Zahavi is a good explainer and sticks close to Husserl’s published work, not making up stuff. There’s no question about the depth of his Husserl knowledge. Nevertheless, Husserl wrote an enormous amount over his lifetime. My own reading is limited to a few books, but even so, I know Husserl said so many things, so many times, so many ways, it is possible to extract quotations and definitions to support just about any argument. Zahavi doesn’t always acknowledge that, presenting textual evidence as if it were definitive. Nothing’s definitive about what Husserl “really meant.”
In the last part of the book, Zahavi spends way too much time knocking down objections from philosophers who do not have a good grasp of what Husserl’s project was about. That seemed incompatible with the fairly sophisticated argumentation in the front of the book, so I wondered what audience Zahavi had in mind when he wrote.
Despite my disagreements with Zahavi’s interpretation of some key Husserl points such as the reduction, the concept of “givenness,” intersubjectivity, and Husserl’s concept of internal time, I enjoyed the book overall. And anyway, who am I to disagree with Dan Zahavi? I think this book succeeds in making the point that after nearly a hundred years since Husserl’s last book, his ideas are still very much alive and worthy of serious consideration.
For non-philosophers like myself the book is a very good way to get quick, focused insight into some key points of Husserl’s thinking. For someone brand-new to phenomenology, I’d recommend instead Zahavi’s “Phenomenology: the Basics” (Routledge, 2019).
The main objections to and dismissals of Husserl’s philosophy come from traditional realism. Broadly, there are two kinds. One is scientific realism, which claims the world is objectively “out there,” self-existent and mind-independent. The other main variety is Kantian. Though Kant was an idealist, he did allow that there was a world out there beyond the mind, the ultimate source of our sensations and perceptions, but we can’t know anything about it. If it’s beyond the mind, it’s beyond the mind, utterly inaccessible, so forget about it.
According to Zahavi, Husserl said the objective reality of the world is not some sort of ghostly noumenon. Rather, objectivity is the complement of transcendental subjectivity. We commonly understand objectivity to be located beyond the mind because we have a narrow idea of what “the mind” is. With a detailed understanding of transcendental subjectivity, it becomes clear that objectivity can be understood in a different way. That doesn’t make it any less real or less objective. It’s the same world, and it presents itself to us in the same way, but now we know its secret.
Zahavi is a good explainer and sticks close to Husserl’s published work, not making up stuff. There’s no question about the depth of his Husserl knowledge. Nevertheless, Husserl wrote an enormous amount over his lifetime. My own reading is limited to a few books, but even so, I know Husserl said so many things, so many times, so many ways, it is possible to extract quotations and definitions to support just about any argument. Zahavi doesn’t always acknowledge that, presenting textual evidence as if it were definitive. Nothing’s definitive about what Husserl “really meant.”
In the last part of the book, Zahavi spends way too much time knocking down objections from philosophers who do not have a good grasp of what Husserl’s project was about. That seemed incompatible with the fairly sophisticated argumentation in the front of the book, so I wondered what audience Zahavi had in mind when he wrote.
Despite my disagreements with Zahavi’s interpretation of some key Husserl points such as the reduction, the concept of “givenness,” intersubjectivity, and Husserl’s concept of internal time, I enjoyed the book overall. And anyway, who am I to disagree with Dan Zahavi? I think this book succeeds in making the point that after nearly a hundred years since Husserl’s last book, his ideas are still very much alive and worthy of serious consideration.
For non-philosophers like myself the book is a very good way to get quick, focused insight into some key points of Husserl’s thinking. For someone brand-new to phenomenology, I’d recommend instead Zahavi’s “Phenomenology: the Basics” (Routledge, 2019).
February 27, 2021
La verdad es que me ha sorprendido la sistematicidad y el orden en el que se discuten aspectos centrales de la filosofía de Husserl. Sin embargo, el contenido es totalmente académico: muchas citas y contraste de interpretaciones. No lo recomendaría para aprender sobre la filosofía de Husserl en general. Ahora bien, si lo que se busca es profundizar en los debates y los problemas de sus ideas, no podría pensar en un libro mejor.
October 3, 2021
Too much talk about the different opinions about Husserl, rather than discussion of Husserl's ideas.
September 6, 2024
This book prompted me to read Husserl and introduced me to Transcendental Philosophy which is relatable
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews