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Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth
Excerpt from An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth in Opposition to Sophistry and Scepticism:
I have been blamed for borrowing some hints, without acknowledgment, from Dr. Price, Dr. Oswald, and Buffier. I beg leave to say, that I am to this hour totally unacquainted with that work of Dr. Price which is alluded to; and that, when I published the first Edition of the Essay on Truth, I was totally unacquainted with the writings of Buffier and Dr. Oswald. I had heard indeed, that the French philosopher used the term Common Sense in a way similar to that in which I use it; but this was only hearsay; and I have since found, that though between his fundamental opinions and mine there is a striking resemblance, his application of that term is not entirely the same I should not have mentioned this, if I did not think, that it supplies an argument in favour of our common principles.
About the Publisher: Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
I have been blamed for borrowing some hints, without acknowledgment, from Dr. Price, Dr. Oswald, and Buffier. I beg leave to say, that I am to this hour totally unacquainted with that work of Dr. Price which is alluded to; and that, when I published the first Edition of the Essay on Truth, I was totally unacquainted with the writings of Buffier and Dr. Oswald. I had heard indeed, that the French philosopher used the term Common Sense in a way similar to that in which I use it; but this was only hearsay; and I have since found, that though between his fundamental opinions and mine there is a striking resemblance, his application of that term is not entirely the same I should not have mentioned this, if I did not think, that it supplies an argument in favour of our common principles.
About the Publisher: Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com. This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.
- GenresPhilosophy
503 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1770
About the author
James Beattie
175 books1 followerJames Beattie was a Scottish poet, moralist and philosopher. He was professor of Moral Philosophy and Logic at Marischal College, Aberdeen.
He became schoolmaster of the parish of Fordoun in 1753. He took the position of usher at the grammar-school of Aberdeen in 1758.
In 1760, he was, to his surprise, appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy at Marischal College (later part of Aberdeen University) as a result of the influence exerted by his close friend, Robert Arbuthnot of Haddo. In the following year he published a volume of poems, The Judgment of Paris (1765), which attracted attention. The two works, however, which brought him most fame were An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, and his poem of The Minstrel. The Essay, intended as an answer to David Hume, had great immediate success, and led to an introduction to the King, a pension of £200, and the degree of LL.D. from Oxford. The first book of The Minstrel was published in 1771 and the second in 1774.
Beattie was prominent in arguing against the institution of slavery, notably in his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770), and in Elements of Moral Science (1790 - 1793).
He became schoolmaster of the parish of Fordoun in 1753. He took the position of usher at the grammar-school of Aberdeen in 1758.
In 1760, he was, to his surprise, appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy at Marischal College (later part of Aberdeen University) as a result of the influence exerted by his close friend, Robert Arbuthnot of Haddo. In the following year he published a volume of poems, The Judgment of Paris (1765), which attracted attention. The two works, however, which brought him most fame were An Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, and his poem of The Minstrel. The Essay, intended as an answer to David Hume, had great immediate success, and led to an introduction to the King, a pension of £200, and the degree of LL.D. from Oxford. The first book of The Minstrel was published in 1771 and the second in 1774.
Beattie was prominent in arguing against the institution of slavery, notably in his Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth (1770), and in Elements of Moral Science (1790 - 1793).
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July 8, 2024
A CRITIQUE OF HUME AND BERKELEY FROM A “COMMON SENSE” PHILOSOPHER
James Beattie (1735–1803) was a Scottish poet, moralist and philosopher. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 371-page Kessinger Hardcover edition.]
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1770 book, “All sciences, and especially Moral Philosophy ought to regulate human practice: practice is regulated by principles, and all principles suppose conviction: yet the aim of our most celebrated moral systems is, to divest the mind of every principle, and of all conviction; and consequently, to disqualify man for action, and to render him as useless, and as wretched as possible. In a word, SCEPTICISM is now the profession of every fashionable inquirer into human nature; a skepticism which is not confined to points of mere speculation, but has been extended to practical truths of the highest importance, even to the principles of morality and religion.” (Pg. 4)
He says that John Locke is “one of the most amiable, and most illustrious men, that ever our nation produced… [Bishop George] Berkeley was equally amiable in his life, and equally a friend to truth and virtue… but some of his reasonings on the subject of human nature I cannot admit, without renouncing my claim to rationality. There is a writer now alive [David Hume]… [who] has published a book called, A Treatise of Human Nature… His philosophy has done great harm. Its admirers, I know, are very numerous; but I have not met with one person, who both admired and understood it.” (Pg. 6, 8)
He outlines the book: “First, I shall endeavor to trace the several kinds of Evidence and Reasoning up to their first principles; with a view to ascertain the Standard of Truth, and explain its immutability. Secondly, I shall shew that my sentiments on this issue… are yet perfectly consistent with the genius of true philosophy… Thirdly, I shall answer some objections; and make some remarks, by way of ‘Estimate of Scepticism and Sceptical Writers.’” (Pg. 15)
He admits, “If I be asked, what I mean by ‘the nature of things,’ I cannot otherwise explain myself, than by saying, that there is in my mind something which induces me to think, that everything existing in nature, is determined to exist, and to exist after a certain manner in consequence of established laws… because by those laws the nature of all things is determined. Of those laws I do not pretend to know anything, except so far as they seem to be intimated to me by my own feelings, and by the suggestions of my own understanding. But these feelings and suggestions are such… that I cannot help … believing that their intimations are not fallacious...” (Pg. 18)
He asserts, “Some philosophers have given the name of ‘Common Sense’ to that faculty by which we perceive self-evident truth; and, as the term seems proper enough, we shall adopt it… We mean to draw some important inferences from this distinction between Reason and Common Sense.” (Pg. 20) Later, he adds, “The term Common Sense… [has] been used… to signify that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse.” (Pg. 26)
He argues, “except we believe many things without proof, we can never believe anything at all; for that all sound reasoning must ultimately rest on the principles of common sense… on principles intuitively certain, or intuitively probable; and consequently, that common sense is the ultimate judge of truth, to which reason must continually act in subordination.” (Pg. 33)
He contends, “our constitution is so framed, that we must believe it is true… that which is intimated to us, as such, by the original suggestions of our own understanding. If these are fallacious, it is the Deity who makes them so… for in this supposition it is implied that we suppose the Deity a deceiver.” (Pg. 38) Still, he grants that, “although we acknowledge some of our senses, in some instances, deceitful, our detection of the deceit, whether by the evidence of our other senses, or by a retrospect to our past experience, or by trusting to the testimony of other men, does still imply, that we do and must believe our senses previously to all reasoning.” (Pg. 43)
He points out, “It has been asked, whether this continued consciousness of our being always the same, does not constitute our sameness or identity. No more, I should answer, than our perception of truth, light, or cold, is the efficient cause of truth, light, or cold; but consciousness is as different from identity, as the understanding is different from truth, as past events are different from memory, as colours from the power of seeing. Consciousness of identity is so far from constituting identity, that it presupposes it.” (Pg. 53-54)
He summarizes, “That our soul exists, and continues through life the same individual being, is a dictate of common sense; a truth which the law of our nature renders it impossible for us to disbelieve; and in regard to which, we cannot suppose ourselves in an error, without supposing our faculties fallacious, and consequently disclaiming all conviction, and all certainty, and disavowing the distinction between truth and falsehood.” (Pg. 59)
Of Hume’s arguments about religion, he counters, “It seems, then, that though it be rational to assign a cause to every thing in the universe, yet to assign a cause to the universe is not rational!... this argument of Mr. Hume’s… is no argument at all… If the universe had a beginning, it must have had a cause This is a self-evident axiom, or at least an undeniable consequence of one. We necessarily assent to it; such is the law of our nature. If we deny it, we cannot, without absurdity, believe anything else whatsoever; because we at the same time deny the authenticity of those instinctive suggestions which are the foundation of all truth. The Atheist will never be able to elude the force of this argument, till he can prove, that everything in nature exists necessarily, independently, and from eternity.” (Pg. 78)
He states, “the dictates of common sense are, in respect to human knowledge in general, what the axioms of geometry are in respect to mathematics; on the supposition that those axioms are false or dubious, all mathematical reasoning falls to the ground; and on the supposition that the dictates of common sense are erroneous or deceitful, all science, truth, and virtue are vain.” (Pg. 95)
After suggesting some criteria in support of common sense, he summarizes, “let it not be supposed, that I mean to insinuate, that a man never trusts his faculties till he first examine them after this manner: we believe our senses previously to all reflection or examination; and we never disbelieve them, but upon the authority of our senses, placed in circumstances more favorable to accurate observation. If the reader is not satisfied with these criteria, it is no great matter… I offer these remarks rather as hints to be attended to by other adventurers in this part of science, than as a complete solution of the difficulty… for on them does not depend the doctrine I mean to establish.” (Pg. 140-141)
He argues, “That I am at present awake, and not asleep, I certainly know; but I cannot prove it: for there is no criterion for distinguishing dreaming fancies from waking perceptions more evident, than that I am now awake, which is the point in question; and, as we have often remarked, it is essential to every proof, to be more evident than that which is to be proved. That I am now awake, must therefore carry its own evidence along with it; if it be evident at all, it must be self-evident. And so it is: we may mistake dreams for realities, but no rational being every mistook a reality for a dream.” (Pg. 185)
He adds, “I have known many who could not answer Berkeley’s arguments; I never knew one who believed his doctrine.” (Pg. 197) He continues, “[Berkeley] was indeed a most excellent person; none can revere his memory more than I. But does it appear, that he ever acted according to his principles, or that he thoroughly understood them? Does it appear that, if he had put them in practice, no hurt would have ensued to himself, or to society?... Does it appear, that men may adopt his principles without danger of becoming sceptics? The contrary of all this appears with incontrovertible evidence… I pity Berkeley’s weakness in patronizing an absurd and dangerous theory…” (Pg. 201-202)
He observes, “some things are in our power, and others are not… I am sensible, that I deserve reward or punishment for those actions only which are in my own power. I am no more accountable for the evil which I can neither prevent nor remedy, than for the destruction of Troy… and for the good which happens … against my will, I no more deserve reward or praise, than if I were a piece of inanimate matter. This is the doctrine of common sense: and this doctrine has in all ages been supported by some of the most powerful principles of our nature.” (Pg. 216-217)
He concludes, “The measure of skepticism seems indeed to be full; it is time for truth to vindicate her rights, and we trust they shall be yet completely vindicated. Such are the hopes and the earnest wishes of one, who has seldom made controversy in his study, who never took pleasure in argumentation, and who disclaims all ambition of being reputed a subtle disputant, but who, as a friend to human nature, would account it his honor to be instrumental in promoting, though by means unpleasant to himself, the cause of virtue and true science, and in bringing to contempt that skeptical sophistry which is equally subversive of both.” (Pg. 345)
If you are interested in Common Sense philosophy, you might look into 'Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense,' Thomas Reid's 'Inquiry and Essays,' and 'Dugald Stewart: Selected Philosophical Writings.'
James Beattie (1735–1803) was a Scottish poet, moralist and philosopher. [NOTE: page numbers below refer to a 371-page Kessinger Hardcover edition.]
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1770 book, “All sciences, and especially Moral Philosophy ought to regulate human practice: practice is regulated by principles, and all principles suppose conviction: yet the aim of our most celebrated moral systems is, to divest the mind of every principle, and of all conviction; and consequently, to disqualify man for action, and to render him as useless, and as wretched as possible. In a word, SCEPTICISM is now the profession of every fashionable inquirer into human nature; a skepticism which is not confined to points of mere speculation, but has been extended to practical truths of the highest importance, even to the principles of morality and religion.” (Pg. 4)
He says that John Locke is “one of the most amiable, and most illustrious men, that ever our nation produced… [Bishop George] Berkeley was equally amiable in his life, and equally a friend to truth and virtue… but some of his reasonings on the subject of human nature I cannot admit, without renouncing my claim to rationality. There is a writer now alive [David Hume]… [who] has published a book called, A Treatise of Human Nature… His philosophy has done great harm. Its admirers, I know, are very numerous; but I have not met with one person, who both admired and understood it.” (Pg. 6, 8)
He outlines the book: “First, I shall endeavor to trace the several kinds of Evidence and Reasoning up to their first principles; with a view to ascertain the Standard of Truth, and explain its immutability. Secondly, I shall shew that my sentiments on this issue… are yet perfectly consistent with the genius of true philosophy… Thirdly, I shall answer some objections; and make some remarks, by way of ‘Estimate of Scepticism and Sceptical Writers.’” (Pg. 15)
He admits, “If I be asked, what I mean by ‘the nature of things,’ I cannot otherwise explain myself, than by saying, that there is in my mind something which induces me to think, that everything existing in nature, is determined to exist, and to exist after a certain manner in consequence of established laws… because by those laws the nature of all things is determined. Of those laws I do not pretend to know anything, except so far as they seem to be intimated to me by my own feelings, and by the suggestions of my own understanding. But these feelings and suggestions are such… that I cannot help … believing that their intimations are not fallacious...” (Pg. 18)
He asserts, “Some philosophers have given the name of ‘Common Sense’ to that faculty by which we perceive self-evident truth; and, as the term seems proper enough, we shall adopt it… We mean to draw some important inferences from this distinction between Reason and Common Sense.” (Pg. 20) Later, he adds, “The term Common Sense… [has] been used… to signify that power of the mind which perceives truth, or commands belief, not by progressive argumentation, but by an instantaneous, instinctive, and irresistible impulse.” (Pg. 26)
He argues, “except we believe many things without proof, we can never believe anything at all; for that all sound reasoning must ultimately rest on the principles of common sense… on principles intuitively certain, or intuitively probable; and consequently, that common sense is the ultimate judge of truth, to which reason must continually act in subordination.” (Pg. 33)
He contends, “our constitution is so framed, that we must believe it is true… that which is intimated to us, as such, by the original suggestions of our own understanding. If these are fallacious, it is the Deity who makes them so… for in this supposition it is implied that we suppose the Deity a deceiver.” (Pg. 38) Still, he grants that, “although we acknowledge some of our senses, in some instances, deceitful, our detection of the deceit, whether by the evidence of our other senses, or by a retrospect to our past experience, or by trusting to the testimony of other men, does still imply, that we do and must believe our senses previously to all reasoning.” (Pg. 43)
He points out, “It has been asked, whether this continued consciousness of our being always the same, does not constitute our sameness or identity. No more, I should answer, than our perception of truth, light, or cold, is the efficient cause of truth, light, or cold; but consciousness is as different from identity, as the understanding is different from truth, as past events are different from memory, as colours from the power of seeing. Consciousness of identity is so far from constituting identity, that it presupposes it.” (Pg. 53-54)
He summarizes, “That our soul exists, and continues through life the same individual being, is a dictate of common sense; a truth which the law of our nature renders it impossible for us to disbelieve; and in regard to which, we cannot suppose ourselves in an error, without supposing our faculties fallacious, and consequently disclaiming all conviction, and all certainty, and disavowing the distinction between truth and falsehood.” (Pg. 59)
Of Hume’s arguments about religion, he counters, “It seems, then, that though it be rational to assign a cause to every thing in the universe, yet to assign a cause to the universe is not rational!... this argument of Mr. Hume’s… is no argument at all… If the universe had a beginning, it must have had a cause This is a self-evident axiom, or at least an undeniable consequence of one. We necessarily assent to it; such is the law of our nature. If we deny it, we cannot, without absurdity, believe anything else whatsoever; because we at the same time deny the authenticity of those instinctive suggestions which are the foundation of all truth. The Atheist will never be able to elude the force of this argument, till he can prove, that everything in nature exists necessarily, independently, and from eternity.” (Pg. 78)
He states, “the dictates of common sense are, in respect to human knowledge in general, what the axioms of geometry are in respect to mathematics; on the supposition that those axioms are false or dubious, all mathematical reasoning falls to the ground; and on the supposition that the dictates of common sense are erroneous or deceitful, all science, truth, and virtue are vain.” (Pg. 95)
After suggesting some criteria in support of common sense, he summarizes, “let it not be supposed, that I mean to insinuate, that a man never trusts his faculties till he first examine them after this manner: we believe our senses previously to all reflection or examination; and we never disbelieve them, but upon the authority of our senses, placed in circumstances more favorable to accurate observation. If the reader is not satisfied with these criteria, it is no great matter… I offer these remarks rather as hints to be attended to by other adventurers in this part of science, than as a complete solution of the difficulty… for on them does not depend the doctrine I mean to establish.” (Pg. 140-141)
He argues, “That I am at present awake, and not asleep, I certainly know; but I cannot prove it: for there is no criterion for distinguishing dreaming fancies from waking perceptions more evident, than that I am now awake, which is the point in question; and, as we have often remarked, it is essential to every proof, to be more evident than that which is to be proved. That I am now awake, must therefore carry its own evidence along with it; if it be evident at all, it must be self-evident. And so it is: we may mistake dreams for realities, but no rational being every mistook a reality for a dream.” (Pg. 185)
He adds, “I have known many who could not answer Berkeley’s arguments; I never knew one who believed his doctrine.” (Pg. 197) He continues, “[Berkeley] was indeed a most excellent person; none can revere his memory more than I. But does it appear, that he ever acted according to his principles, or that he thoroughly understood them? Does it appear that, if he had put them in practice, no hurt would have ensued to himself, or to society?... Does it appear, that men may adopt his principles without danger of becoming sceptics? The contrary of all this appears with incontrovertible evidence… I pity Berkeley’s weakness in patronizing an absurd and dangerous theory…” (Pg. 201-202)
He observes, “some things are in our power, and others are not… I am sensible, that I deserve reward or punishment for those actions only which are in my own power. I am no more accountable for the evil which I can neither prevent nor remedy, than for the destruction of Troy… and for the good which happens … against my will, I no more deserve reward or praise, than if I were a piece of inanimate matter. This is the doctrine of common sense: and this doctrine has in all ages been supported by some of the most powerful principles of our nature.” (Pg. 216-217)
He concludes, “The measure of skepticism seems indeed to be full; it is time for truth to vindicate her rights, and we trust they shall be yet completely vindicated. Such are the hopes and the earnest wishes of one, who has seldom made controversy in his study, who never took pleasure in argumentation, and who disclaims all ambition of being reputed a subtle disputant, but who, as a friend to human nature, would account it his honor to be instrumental in promoting, though by means unpleasant to himself, the cause of virtue and true science, and in bringing to contempt that skeptical sophistry which is equally subversive of both.” (Pg. 345)
If you are interested in Common Sense philosophy, you might look into 'Selections from the Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense,' Thomas Reid's 'Inquiry and Essays,' and 'Dugald Stewart: Selected Philosophical Writings.'
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