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Plan and Purpose in Nature
Plan and Purpose in Nature is a brilliant survey of Darwinian evolution in the natural world.It tells the story not only of the wonderful adaptations which the process of the natural selection produces throughout nature,but also the limitations of evolution for the 20th century human beings,which environment and diet have changed drastically while their biology and psychology have not.
176 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1996
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
June 17, 2019
This felt like a stream of consciousness account of the authors thoughts on evolution. There are lot of concepts introduced and fewer that are elaborated on. Sometimes it is difficult to follow the thought process and structure of the book.
December 22, 2021
Largely a popularisation of his work (and other giants in the 50s/60s) which is better found in Dawkins.
November 4, 2013
The book is a memoir-like reflection on the author's career as an evolutionary biologist. Most of what he says has been covered elsewhere. In a few places, such as his criticism (?) of E.O. Wilson, I didn't understand the point he was making.
Williams discusses sexual selection in a new way. Rather than being separate from natural selection, Williams brings them together. Increased status and power leads to greater control over "resources," including reproductive privileges. That insight might help explain the prevalence of rank-related behavior in humans, which does not seem to have been covered much by evolutionary theorists.
When Williams writes of the uniqueness of the genotype ("...your genotype never existed before you were conceived and will never be produced again"; and "I will never be duplicated, and when I am gone it will be forever"), it's difficult not to envision a biologically given individual character that has a substantial say in now we, each, engage the world. As a side note, when Williams writes on the moment of conception issue, he seems to contradict himself. Williams writes that "the joining of human egg and sperm define a new and unique human genotype," but then goes on to add that this does not provide "anything else of moral importance implied by the term 'human.'" If the genotype is unique, presumably it is more than an empty vessel, waiting to be filled and "humanized" by the environment, and void of a content that has a bearing on how it engages the world. Animals are bred for specific temperaments and traits; how are humans different in their unique innateness?
Williams repeats the standard view about kin selection and inclusive fitness, but does not explain why, biologically, genes from one offspring should give a hoot, akin to "action at a distance," about a cousin's genes. Even among siblings there's rivalry. With reciprocal altruism explaining the benefits of cooperation, with proximal kin likely to be the primary beneficiaries of such mutuality, and if not all "altruistic acts" end in death prior to reproduction, is kin selection/inclusive fitness necessary as an explanation for how a biological being moves from self-interest to the interest of the other?
Williams reflects on the "lubricious" slide of "is" to "ought," the issue that Hume raised. While logically correct, if we, as biological beings live and strive to live, is Williams saying we ought not to live?
Williams discusses sexual selection in a new way. Rather than being separate from natural selection, Williams brings them together. Increased status and power leads to greater control over "resources," including reproductive privileges. That insight might help explain the prevalence of rank-related behavior in humans, which does not seem to have been covered much by evolutionary theorists.
When Williams writes of the uniqueness of the genotype ("...your genotype never existed before you were conceived and will never be produced again"; and "I will never be duplicated, and when I am gone it will be forever"), it's difficult not to envision a biologically given individual character that has a substantial say in now we, each, engage the world. As a side note, when Williams writes on the moment of conception issue, he seems to contradict himself. Williams writes that "the joining of human egg and sperm define a new and unique human genotype," but then goes on to add that this does not provide "anything else of moral importance implied by the term 'human.'" If the genotype is unique, presumably it is more than an empty vessel, waiting to be filled and "humanized" by the environment, and void of a content that has a bearing on how it engages the world. Animals are bred for specific temperaments and traits; how are humans different in their unique innateness?
Williams repeats the standard view about kin selection and inclusive fitness, but does not explain why, biologically, genes from one offspring should give a hoot, akin to "action at a distance," about a cousin's genes. Even among siblings there's rivalry. With reciprocal altruism explaining the benefits of cooperation, with proximal kin likely to be the primary beneficiaries of such mutuality, and if not all "altruistic acts" end in death prior to reproduction, is kin selection/inclusive fitness necessary as an explanation for how a biological being moves from self-interest to the interest of the other?
Williams reflects on the "lubricious" slide of "is" to "ought," the issue that Hume raised. While logically correct, if we, as biological beings live and strive to live, is Williams saying we ought not to live?
Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews