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Mao vs. Chiang;: The battle for China, 1925-1949
Traces the events of the twenty-four year struggle for power between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung and their influence on the destiny of China.
151 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1972
About the author
Robert S. Elegant
40 books14 followersRobert Sampson Elegant (born March 7, 1928) is a British-American author and journalist born in New York City. He spent many years in Asia as a journalist. The Asian settings of all but one of his novels reflect that experience. He covered both the Korean and the Vietnam Wars, as well as four or five lesser conflicts.
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
December 12, 2024
This is a very short introduction to the complex events surrounding the Chinese Civil War and the Chinese Revolution.
It starts with Sun Yat-Sen and moves on quickly to the lives of Mao and Chiang, their formative experiences, their political beliefs and so on.
It gives a solid, if brief, description of how Mao started off at a clear disadvantage and through sheer will was able to bounce back from the failures of his initial uprisings during the Autumn Harvest and Nanchang.
It shows that Chiang was initially much the superior, and how the complicated international scheme added additional factors to their rivalry. The author is at pains to show that the Soviet Union did not consistently back Mao, and seemed to have believed that Chiang would win the power struggle so it was more concerned with creating relations with the likely China than in backing a loser.
An interesting aspect here is that Chiang and the KMT were seduced by the proponents of airpower, especially Chennault. In the work on military deception Harlan Jencks touched upon this curiosity by stating the Nationalists were convinced that isolated forces could be resupplied from the air.
This was postwar, so it's very hard to understand why Chiang and his generals were not disabused of these phantasies given that they were definitively disproven during the Second World War. The German attempts to resupply their forces by air in the Soviet Union was a major failure, nor were the bombers able to destroy the enemy industry or permanently disrupt his transportation.
In prospect it is easier to forgive the proponents of airpower because they had not yet tried it. But in 1946 it had been tried, and failed, and yet Chiang clung to it.
Both the Americans and the Soviets had substantial forces in China after the defeat of Japan, which is something frequently overlooked. Many works have discussed the failure of the Marshall Mission and it is given good coverage here.
The final chapter incorporates a short history of Mao as supreme ruler of China, and how his planned utopia never materialised. How his dreams of making China a great economic and military power went unrealised.
One might have hoped that Chiang's new regime in Taiwan would have been given a short description but it is not covered.
It poignantly ends with both Chiang and Mao exitting the scene while China moves forward under new direction.
With so few pages none of the campaigns or personalities are covered in great depth, and as the book is somewhat dated newer scholarship might take issue with some of its conclusions. The author is careful to avoid falling for the propaganda of either side, however, treating the Long March critically, for example.
This is a fair and balanced work that shows that both Chiang and Mao were, in their own ways, great men, and that both had failings and shortcomings as any human does. But they left a deep imprint on China.
It starts with Sun Yat-Sen and moves on quickly to the lives of Mao and Chiang, their formative experiences, their political beliefs and so on.
It gives a solid, if brief, description of how Mao started off at a clear disadvantage and through sheer will was able to bounce back from the failures of his initial uprisings during the Autumn Harvest and Nanchang.
It shows that Chiang was initially much the superior, and how the complicated international scheme added additional factors to their rivalry. The author is at pains to show that the Soviet Union did not consistently back Mao, and seemed to have believed that Chiang would win the power struggle so it was more concerned with creating relations with the likely China than in backing a loser.
An interesting aspect here is that Chiang and the KMT were seduced by the proponents of airpower, especially Chennault. In the work on military deception Harlan Jencks touched upon this curiosity by stating the Nationalists were convinced that isolated forces could be resupplied from the air.
This was postwar, so it's very hard to understand why Chiang and his generals were not disabused of these phantasies given that they were definitively disproven during the Second World War. The German attempts to resupply their forces by air in the Soviet Union was a major failure, nor were the bombers able to destroy the enemy industry or permanently disrupt his transportation.
In prospect it is easier to forgive the proponents of airpower because they had not yet tried it. But in 1946 it had been tried, and failed, and yet Chiang clung to it.
Both the Americans and the Soviets had substantial forces in China after the defeat of Japan, which is something frequently overlooked. Many works have discussed the failure of the Marshall Mission and it is given good coverage here.
The final chapter incorporates a short history of Mao as supreme ruler of China, and how his planned utopia never materialised. How his dreams of making China a great economic and military power went unrealised.
One might have hoped that Chiang's new regime in Taiwan would have been given a short description but it is not covered.
It poignantly ends with both Chiang and Mao exitting the scene while China moves forward under new direction.
With so few pages none of the campaigns or personalities are covered in great depth, and as the book is somewhat dated newer scholarship might take issue with some of its conclusions. The author is careful to avoid falling for the propaganda of either side, however, treating the Long March critically, for example.
This is a fair and balanced work that shows that both Chiang and Mao were, in their own ways, great men, and that both had failings and shortcomings as any human does. But they left a deep imprint on China.
Displaying 1 of 1 review