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Blacks and Social Justice
Delineate the principal arguments for and against the major racial issues of our time.
200 pages, Hardcover
First published March 1, 1984
About the author
Bernard R. Boxill
5 books4 followersBernard R. Boxill is Professor of Philosophy (Emeritus) at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He is the author of Blacks and Social Justice (1984, 1992) and the editor of Race and Racism (2001), and he is currently completing A History of African American Political Thought: From Martin Delany to the Present.
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April 21, 2026
A REFUTATION OF THE SO-CALLED ‘COLOR BLIND’ POLICIES OF CONSERVATIVES
Bernard Boxill (b. 1937) is an American philosopher and Professor Emeritus since his 2017 retirement from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; he previously taught at UC Dominguez Hills, UC Santa Barbara, UCLA, and the University of South Florida.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1984 book (revised edition, 1992), “In recent years, black people have marked with deepening apprehension the development of a certain trend in the nation’s racial policies… The first alarms were set off by … Marco DeFunis and Allan Bakke, when their suits against preferential admissions reached to the Supreme Court. But it was left for the Reagan administration, which had consistently backed off the issues of busing, affirmative action, and housing discrimination, to show clearly the direction in which the nation’s policies on race are heading… The conceit of institutions like Bob Jones University, in propounding that God commands the separation of the races, was apparently deemed genuine religious belief to be protected by the First Amendment…
“There are blacks, too, who welcome the changes and too, perhaps because of their color, feel entitled to speak with a forthrightness few whites have dared to emulate. According to these black critics, affirmative action, busing, and the other color-conscious policies instituted to speed black progress suggest that blacks cannot succeed without special help, and so are belittling and insulting, as well as unjust. The assumption behind color-conscious policies, according to these critics, is that black are poor because of racism. They maintain that this ‘race theory’ is false and pernicious. Blacks are poor, they argue, because their class determines that they lack the skills and attitudes to work that the market will pay for. And this ‘class theory’ of black inequality, they conclude, demonstrate that color-conscious policies are both unjust and counter-productive. The first aim of this book is to rebut or defuse these and other charges being leveled against the color-conscious policies that have been threatened by Ronald Reagan’s administration.” (Pg. 1-2)
In Chapter 1, he explains, “My object in this chapter is to demonstrate that the color-blind principle, which considers all color-conscious policies to be invalid, is mistaken. I do not deny that many color-conscious policies are wrong. Jim Crow was certainly wrong, and, for different reasons, proposals for black control of inner cities and inner city schools are probably wrong. But this is not because they are color-conscious, but for reasons which indicate that color-conscious policies like busing and affirmative action could be correct.” (Pg. 11)
He observes, “perhaps the most provocative of the claims [Thomas] Sowell and [Walter] Williams make in support of their theory that the free market system is the only sure path to black advancement is that racial discrimination is not a decisive cause of black subordination. But although this is their official view, the one trumpeted to the press, it is not their real view. Their real view, at least the view for which they provide arguments, is that in a FREE MARKET, racial discrimination is not a decisive cause of black subordination. And this shows how careless---and misleading---their official view is. For since, as they frequently insist and lament, markets have rarely been free, their real view provides absolutely no support for their official view. On the contrary, it suggests that the official view is false. Sowell and Williams imply that it is the absence of free markets that permits racial discrimination to have its effects, and, consequently, that it is the absence of a free market that is the real cause of black subordination in this country. But, even if it is true that a free market tends to eliminate the effects of discrimination, as they say, it does not follow that the absence of a free market is the cause of black subordination since rigidly enforced equal opportunity laws might, equally, tend to eliminate the effects of discrimination. Ideology, not logic, seems to determine Sowell’s and Williams’s choice of the main cause of black subordination.” (Pg. 26-27)
He continues, “Sowell and Williams focus their gaze, unaccountably, on the tendency of the employer to discriminate. But what of the tendency of the public to discriminate? The idea that employers may be racially prejudiced but that the public is color-blind is perfectly ludicrous. As anyone knows… the public is as prone to pure or perceptual discrimination as the employers. Because of this the employer may have to engage in a type of discrimination which has not, so far, been defined. An employer may decide that he had better not hire blacks, even if he neither dislikes them nor believes them to be incompetent, because he perceives that the public would rather not be served by blacks, either because it dislikes them (pure discrimination) or thinks them incompetent (perceptual discrimination). What is worse, precisely the same argument that Sowell and Williams use to show that the free market compels employers not to discriminate can be used to show instead that the free market compels employers to discriminate. For, just as there are situations in which the free market makes it costly to discriminate, in the situation cited the free market makes it costly not to discriminate.” (Pg. 29)
He notes, “The argument I am proposing in support of preferential treatment should be distinguished from another argument which, I admit, has a certain superficial attractiveness. My argument is that qualified blacks deserve compensation for discrimination because even they have been wronged and probably harmed by it, and that preferential treatment is appropriate compensation for them because it suits their objectives and abilities. The other, superficially attractive, argument is that qualified blacks deserve compensation because they are probably the very blacks who would, in the absence of discrimination, have qualified without preferential treatment. But only a moment’s reflection is needed to see that this argument is flawed… this eminently sound observation does not imply that the ‘best prepared’ are not wronged or harmed by discrimination. That is an altogether distinct claim. The best prepared … may nevertheless be disadvantaged by discrimination." (Pg. 150-151)
He states, “In this [preferable] definition of black pride, a person is simply proud of the fact that there are black people who have made great achievements. This kind of black pride is distinct from cultural or physical pride. If a black person is proud of the achievements of outstanding black people, his culture need not be their culture, and their achievements need not be exemplifications of a peculiar black culture. I am proud that St. Augustine was a black man, but I am sure that my culture is not his, and I am not less proud---for I do not really care---that his ‘The Holy City’ shows no traces of Negritude. Of course, it goes without saying that pride in the achievements of black people can mean pride in black culture.” (Pg. 177)
He reports that Glenn Loury “maintains that the black middle class uses the black poor as a ‘constant reminder to many Americans of a historical debt owed to the black community.’ In this way, he says, the black middle class is able to sustain public support for race-specific programs like preferential treatment for blacks and minority business set asides though these programs benefit the black middle class and not the black poor. On the basis of this claim Loury concludes that the black middle class owes a special obligation to the black underclass. Several obvious objections can be raised against Loury’s argument. For example, much of the black middle class does not owe its success to race-specific programs. After all, it did not suddenly materialize only after these programs were implemented. But I will give Loury his claim that the black middle class used the misery of the black underclass to persuade government to implement programs that are to its benefit rather than to benefit of the black underclass. I will show, however, that his claim does not justify the conclusions he draws.
“Suppose, first, that the black underclass does not deserve the benefit of the programs in question. In that case, given Loury’s strong implication that the black middle class dupes white society into bearing their cost, what his claim implies is that the black middle class owes a special obligation to white society to compensate it for the cost of the reforms. It does not imply that the black middle class has any special obligation to the black underclass except perhaps to apologize to it for using its misery to dupe white society. But suppose that the black underclass deserves the benefit of the programs in question… What does he want the black middle class to say to the black underclass? ‘I made it with special help, but you must make it on your own’?” (Pg. 257-258)
This book will be of great interest to anyone seeking counter-arguments to black conservatives such as Sowell and Williams.
Bernard Boxill (b. 1937) is an American philosopher and Professor Emeritus since his 2017 retirement from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; he previously taught at UC Dominguez Hills, UC Santa Barbara, UCLA, and the University of South Florida.
He wrote in the Introduction to this 1984 book (revised edition, 1992), “In recent years, black people have marked with deepening apprehension the development of a certain trend in the nation’s racial policies… The first alarms were set off by … Marco DeFunis and Allan Bakke, when their suits against preferential admissions reached to the Supreme Court. But it was left for the Reagan administration, which had consistently backed off the issues of busing, affirmative action, and housing discrimination, to show clearly the direction in which the nation’s policies on race are heading… The conceit of institutions like Bob Jones University, in propounding that God commands the separation of the races, was apparently deemed genuine religious belief to be protected by the First Amendment…
“There are blacks, too, who welcome the changes and too, perhaps because of their color, feel entitled to speak with a forthrightness few whites have dared to emulate. According to these black critics, affirmative action, busing, and the other color-conscious policies instituted to speed black progress suggest that blacks cannot succeed without special help, and so are belittling and insulting, as well as unjust. The assumption behind color-conscious policies, according to these critics, is that black are poor because of racism. They maintain that this ‘race theory’ is false and pernicious. Blacks are poor, they argue, because their class determines that they lack the skills and attitudes to work that the market will pay for. And this ‘class theory’ of black inequality, they conclude, demonstrate that color-conscious policies are both unjust and counter-productive. The first aim of this book is to rebut or defuse these and other charges being leveled against the color-conscious policies that have been threatened by Ronald Reagan’s administration.” (Pg. 1-2)
In Chapter 1, he explains, “My object in this chapter is to demonstrate that the color-blind principle, which considers all color-conscious policies to be invalid, is mistaken. I do not deny that many color-conscious policies are wrong. Jim Crow was certainly wrong, and, for different reasons, proposals for black control of inner cities and inner city schools are probably wrong. But this is not because they are color-conscious, but for reasons which indicate that color-conscious policies like busing and affirmative action could be correct.” (Pg. 11)
He observes, “perhaps the most provocative of the claims [Thomas] Sowell and [Walter] Williams make in support of their theory that the free market system is the only sure path to black advancement is that racial discrimination is not a decisive cause of black subordination. But although this is their official view, the one trumpeted to the press, it is not their real view. Their real view, at least the view for which they provide arguments, is that in a FREE MARKET, racial discrimination is not a decisive cause of black subordination. And this shows how careless---and misleading---their official view is. For since, as they frequently insist and lament, markets have rarely been free, their real view provides absolutely no support for their official view. On the contrary, it suggests that the official view is false. Sowell and Williams imply that it is the absence of free markets that permits racial discrimination to have its effects, and, consequently, that it is the absence of a free market that is the real cause of black subordination in this country. But, even if it is true that a free market tends to eliminate the effects of discrimination, as they say, it does not follow that the absence of a free market is the cause of black subordination since rigidly enforced equal opportunity laws might, equally, tend to eliminate the effects of discrimination. Ideology, not logic, seems to determine Sowell’s and Williams’s choice of the main cause of black subordination.” (Pg. 26-27)
He continues, “Sowell and Williams focus their gaze, unaccountably, on the tendency of the employer to discriminate. But what of the tendency of the public to discriminate? The idea that employers may be racially prejudiced but that the public is color-blind is perfectly ludicrous. As anyone knows… the public is as prone to pure or perceptual discrimination as the employers. Because of this the employer may have to engage in a type of discrimination which has not, so far, been defined. An employer may decide that he had better not hire blacks, even if he neither dislikes them nor believes them to be incompetent, because he perceives that the public would rather not be served by blacks, either because it dislikes them (pure discrimination) or thinks them incompetent (perceptual discrimination). What is worse, precisely the same argument that Sowell and Williams use to show that the free market compels employers not to discriminate can be used to show instead that the free market compels employers to discriminate. For, just as there are situations in which the free market makes it costly to discriminate, in the situation cited the free market makes it costly not to discriminate.” (Pg. 29)
He notes, “The argument I am proposing in support of preferential treatment should be distinguished from another argument which, I admit, has a certain superficial attractiveness. My argument is that qualified blacks deserve compensation for discrimination because even they have been wronged and probably harmed by it, and that preferential treatment is appropriate compensation for them because it suits their objectives and abilities. The other, superficially attractive, argument is that qualified blacks deserve compensation because they are probably the very blacks who would, in the absence of discrimination, have qualified without preferential treatment. But only a moment’s reflection is needed to see that this argument is flawed… this eminently sound observation does not imply that the ‘best prepared’ are not wronged or harmed by discrimination. That is an altogether distinct claim. The best prepared … may nevertheless be disadvantaged by discrimination." (Pg. 150-151)
He states, “In this [preferable] definition of black pride, a person is simply proud of the fact that there are black people who have made great achievements. This kind of black pride is distinct from cultural or physical pride. If a black person is proud of the achievements of outstanding black people, his culture need not be their culture, and their achievements need not be exemplifications of a peculiar black culture. I am proud that St. Augustine was a black man, but I am sure that my culture is not his, and I am not less proud---for I do not really care---that his ‘The Holy City’ shows no traces of Negritude. Of course, it goes without saying that pride in the achievements of black people can mean pride in black culture.” (Pg. 177)
He reports that Glenn Loury “maintains that the black middle class uses the black poor as a ‘constant reminder to many Americans of a historical debt owed to the black community.’ In this way, he says, the black middle class is able to sustain public support for race-specific programs like preferential treatment for blacks and minority business set asides though these programs benefit the black middle class and not the black poor. On the basis of this claim Loury concludes that the black middle class owes a special obligation to the black underclass. Several obvious objections can be raised against Loury’s argument. For example, much of the black middle class does not owe its success to race-specific programs. After all, it did not suddenly materialize only after these programs were implemented. But I will give Loury his claim that the black middle class used the misery of the black underclass to persuade government to implement programs that are to its benefit rather than to benefit of the black underclass. I will show, however, that his claim does not justify the conclusions he draws.
“Suppose, first, that the black underclass does not deserve the benefit of the programs in question. In that case, given Loury’s strong implication that the black middle class dupes white society into bearing their cost, what his claim implies is that the black middle class owes a special obligation to white society to compensate it for the cost of the reforms. It does not imply that the black middle class has any special obligation to the black underclass except perhaps to apologize to it for using its misery to dupe white society. But suppose that the black underclass deserves the benefit of the programs in question… What does he want the black middle class to say to the black underclass? ‘I made it with special help, but you must make it on your own’?” (Pg. 257-258)
This book will be of great interest to anyone seeking counter-arguments to black conservatives such as Sowell and Williams.
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