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Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study
Military Withdrawal From A Comparative Study by Maniruzzaman, Talukder. 8vo.
- GenresPolitics
250 pages, Hardcover
First published March 1, 1987
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August 5, 2009
This work was written in the mid-1980s. It is a comparative study of Military Withdrawal from Politics after they have staged a coup and run the government for some time. The author notes there is a difference between professional and non-professional militaries. He provides a definition of professionalism which includes “only politically neutral characteristics : specialized skill in warfare; career service; a system of internal administration; a behavioral code and standards of performance; strong group identity, and esprit de corps.” Maniruzzaman uses several ‘Third World’ countries for his examples, though his examples are concentrated in Latin America and the Middle East/South Asia.
In the first section of the book Syria is given as an example and the author notes the “Syrian army was so divided, so fratricidal and so destructive of any government –civilian or military because to its nonprofessional and praetorian nature.” Part of this was a result of the drawing of maps after the First World War which forced different sectarian and ethnic groups together. In the Syrian Army these divisions were “compounded by the penetration of ideological forces into the army from the Syrian political system. Ideological persuasion began even in the official training academies established after independence. The instructors there preached more politics than the science of war.” He argues “abrupt military withdrawal from politics is the pattern of a nonprofessional army.”
He continues with further examples of military intervention in the political process and states “the professional armies of these five countries [Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Peru and Turkey:] not only intervened in the political process but also, on occasions, returned to the barracks as well. It is withdrawal from the government which is the subject of the majority of this book. Maniruzzaman provides his ideas of what causes the exit of a professional army from political power. Much of it depends on the army leader’s attitude toward politicians and politics. The other reason falls in with professional military training, i.e. the scope of their aims at the time of intervention.
The author divides the type of professional armies with their scope of intervention into four categories. The arbiter/’moderator type intervenes only to remove obstacles to proper functioning of the civilian political system and withdraws to the barracks soon after the limited goal is accomplished for example, Brazilian army from 1945-1964. The partial moderator type is negative in character intervening only in response to national emergencies and consensus in both the military and civilian sectors of society in favor of intervention; intervenes in politics to prevent the rise to power of a political party that they perceive as their institutional enemy, Peru 1930-68 is his example. Guardian/corrective type develops a self image as the guardian of the founding principles of the state and intervenes only when it finds that the ruling civilian government is committing flagrant violations of sacred state principles, Turkey is his example. None of the above three desire to deepen their intervention in national politics, intervention could be removal of one particular ruler or taking action against a particular leader and ins party perceived by the military as inimical to their interests. Unfortunately, “the armed forces’ simple solutions to complex political problems initiate a chain of events that compel them to intervene again and again to defend their initial actions of commission or omission.” The ruler type intervenes to rule, not to withdraw, such as Argentina in the 1980s.
When discussing Turkey the author notes the Kemal model (Ataturk) – must choose between being professional military or professional politician, not both. Before World War I Ataturk resigned from the party and followed his military career. When he initiated his coup, he resigned from the military and concentrated on politics. Cardenas [Mexico} could well perceive that a professional army need not necessarily be political neutral, but an apolitical army must necessarily be professional. He thus introduced a series of reforms to build up a professional army.
The difference between Third World militaries and European militaries arises from their histories. During the development of modern warfare and politics professional armies in Europe had wars to keep them busy so there was not a situation of ‘military structural unemployment.’ In the third world today little exists for the military to do. Thus Maniruzzaman argues “the basic cause for the alienation of third world armies form society is that these organization have a monopoly on the instruments of violence but do not find a meaningful role in society because of the absence or infrequency of war and lack of facilities for proper training.” In other words, there is little to keep them busy practicing their profession and therefore get involved in politics.
Maniruzzaman argues for the abolition of the standing army and adoption of a defense strategy based on the concept of ‘nation-in-arms.’ In other words, the formation of militias for protecting the country will go a long way toward eliminating the possibility of frequent coup d’états. He states this is also a strong defensive ploy because invaders would recognize they would have to destroy the country to conquer it and thus would be left with nothing for their efforts.
The author goes through the various types of withdrawal: Middle-class revolution and military withdrawal-- the communist model, the non-communist model, Costa Rica; hegemonic coalition and military withdrawal—Mexico; lower class revolution and demilitarization—Mao Tse-Tung and Ho Chi Minh; upper class revolution and military withdrawal—Cuba and Nicaragua.
While the international economy seems to be a factor in change of governments, it seems that economic fluctuations affect equally the civilian and military government of the third world. If secular decline of prices of wool and meet in the world marked eroded the basis of civilian rule in Uruguay by 1973, the same factor forced the Uruguayan military to withdraw n 1984.
In his conclusion, Maniruzzaman provides 12 hypotheses and two sub-hypotheses. Thinking back on the history of the past two decades since this work was written, several of those hypotheses remain valid.
In the first section of the book Syria is given as an example and the author notes the “Syrian army was so divided, so fratricidal and so destructive of any government –civilian or military because to its nonprofessional and praetorian nature.” Part of this was a result of the drawing of maps after the First World War which forced different sectarian and ethnic groups together. In the Syrian Army these divisions were “compounded by the penetration of ideological forces into the army from the Syrian political system. Ideological persuasion began even in the official training academies established after independence. The instructors there preached more politics than the science of war.” He argues “abrupt military withdrawal from politics is the pattern of a nonprofessional army.”
He continues with further examples of military intervention in the political process and states “the professional armies of these five countries [Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, Peru and Turkey:] not only intervened in the political process but also, on occasions, returned to the barracks as well. It is withdrawal from the government which is the subject of the majority of this book. Maniruzzaman provides his ideas of what causes the exit of a professional army from political power. Much of it depends on the army leader’s attitude toward politicians and politics. The other reason falls in with professional military training, i.e. the scope of their aims at the time of intervention.
The author divides the type of professional armies with their scope of intervention into four categories. The arbiter/’moderator type intervenes only to remove obstacles to proper functioning of the civilian political system and withdraws to the barracks soon after the limited goal is accomplished for example, Brazilian army from 1945-1964. The partial moderator type is negative in character intervening only in response to national emergencies and consensus in both the military and civilian sectors of society in favor of intervention; intervenes in politics to prevent the rise to power of a political party that they perceive as their institutional enemy, Peru 1930-68 is his example. Guardian/corrective type develops a self image as the guardian of the founding principles of the state and intervenes only when it finds that the ruling civilian government is committing flagrant violations of sacred state principles, Turkey is his example. None of the above three desire to deepen their intervention in national politics, intervention could be removal of one particular ruler or taking action against a particular leader and ins party perceived by the military as inimical to their interests. Unfortunately, “the armed forces’ simple solutions to complex political problems initiate a chain of events that compel them to intervene again and again to defend their initial actions of commission or omission.” The ruler type intervenes to rule, not to withdraw, such as Argentina in the 1980s.
When discussing Turkey the author notes the Kemal model (Ataturk) – must choose between being professional military or professional politician, not both. Before World War I Ataturk resigned from the party and followed his military career. When he initiated his coup, he resigned from the military and concentrated on politics. Cardenas [Mexico} could well perceive that a professional army need not necessarily be political neutral, but an apolitical army must necessarily be professional. He thus introduced a series of reforms to build up a professional army.
The difference between Third World militaries and European militaries arises from their histories. During the development of modern warfare and politics professional armies in Europe had wars to keep them busy so there was not a situation of ‘military structural unemployment.’ In the third world today little exists for the military to do. Thus Maniruzzaman argues “the basic cause for the alienation of third world armies form society is that these organization have a monopoly on the instruments of violence but do not find a meaningful role in society because of the absence or infrequency of war and lack of facilities for proper training.” In other words, there is little to keep them busy practicing their profession and therefore get involved in politics.
Maniruzzaman argues for the abolition of the standing army and adoption of a defense strategy based on the concept of ‘nation-in-arms.’ In other words, the formation of militias for protecting the country will go a long way toward eliminating the possibility of frequent coup d’états. He states this is also a strong defensive ploy because invaders would recognize they would have to destroy the country to conquer it and thus would be left with nothing for their efforts.
The author goes through the various types of withdrawal: Middle-class revolution and military withdrawal-- the communist model, the non-communist model, Costa Rica; hegemonic coalition and military withdrawal—Mexico; lower class revolution and demilitarization—Mao Tse-Tung and Ho Chi Minh; upper class revolution and military withdrawal—Cuba and Nicaragua.
While the international economy seems to be a factor in change of governments, it seems that economic fluctuations affect equally the civilian and military government of the third world. If secular decline of prices of wool and meet in the world marked eroded the basis of civilian rule in Uruguay by 1973, the same factor forced the Uruguayan military to withdraw n 1984.
In his conclusion, Maniruzzaman provides 12 hypotheses and two sub-hypotheses. Thinking back on the history of the past two decades since this work was written, several of those hypotheses remain valid.
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