In Praise of the Maoist Economic Planning: Living Standards and Economic Development in Sichuan since 1931

by Chris Bramall

How much of the economics from the Maoist era in China is clear to Westerners? This work contributes to a better understanding of this through an evaluation of the economic development in China's most populous province, from the mid-1920s to the liberalization program initiated in 1978. Few
works have dealt with this timespan, and Bramall deals with this complex and controversial subject effectively and objectively.

Genres: China

404 pages, Hardcover

First published August 26, 1993

Reviews

[Devourer Connecticut · Rating 5 out of 5]

The trend to dismiss central planning in China as a failure and that the current Chinese economy is a miracle not of socialism, but of capitalism and liberalism combined with a dictatorial state is a flawed assumption. While the notion that Deng did improve the economy and promote development is without a doubt correct, the dismissal of the previous model as entirely underwhelming or in fact catastrophic is entirely incorrect.
Bramall shows a picture of two Sichuan's, one where market forces dominated and one where economic planning was practiced alongside a socialist and egalitarian model. I think Bramall summons the experiment in that he says village life was not changed, but rather was transformed. Industrial growth was unprecedented- growing tens of folds and creating industries which were previously unheard of in Republican and warlord Sichuan. Life expectancy doubled and medical services matched middle income countries in their quality. China, with what little it could do with its starting position as an impoverished and imperialised state- accomplished a great amount for what resources were usable.
Bramall is correct in his assumption that economic planning, while only modestly improving actual incomes of the peasantry was successful in the aims of which it was attempting to achieve, meaning building a defensive industrial base in Sichuan and the massive use of industrial production for military purposes. While in hindsight, one may criticise the paranoia of China in the 50s-70s, however given that China by the 1960s was economically and militarily unable to defend against any American or Soviet onslaught, the development of the defence sector was in some sense rational. It is important to note how, once tensions eased with the USA, economic development began to rapidly grow, in part due to the policies of Deng Xiaoping regarding the agricultural sector- but also greatly due to the infrastructure built in the socialist period, which enabled market led development via providing a base for the growth of private industry. Without a doubt I agree with Bramall that China could never have seen the impressive growth rates post 1980 if it wasn't for the system of agriculture infrastructure and transport infrastructure alongside the progressive increase of mechanisation which was rapidly increasing right before the Dengist period, which signified that this sector would have grown despite any market reforms. This is also particularly important with regards to chemical fertilisers, because by the mid 1970s thanks to years of investment and promotion of growth by the Chinese government the use of chemical fertiliser was rapidly increasing. China by the mid 197os was beginning to take off economically, and it is likely that the Chinese economy would have grown faster by the 1980s than it did in the 1960s and 70s even without reforms (though it in doubtful it would be at the rates of the Dengist period).
Bramall is not an ideologue. He does not uncritically support the regime of Mao and points out the huge horrors in Maoist China, for example he takes 2 chapters to cover the Great Leap Forward, which saw tens of millions die, however it is important to note Bramalls conclusion that the periods which saw the largest disasters of the Great Leap Forward were precisely the years where planning ceased due to chaos and the decentralisation of information collection and data collection by state authorities, and this can also in part explain the economic performance during 1968-1969.
I would like to end my review by repeating what Bramall has said regarding national economic development with regards to the international political scene. When China post 1949 was making tremendous strides, this was in the period of alliance with the USSR, and thus where national defence was not prioritised. Post Sino Soviet Split, Chinese economic development for consumer goods was hampered (though it continued to grow at a good pace) by political demands for a prioritisation of the military. The second period where growth rates were beginning to reach the highs of the 1949-1958 period and where agricultural production exploded saw military industry being reused for civilian purposes, with factories being used to produce civilian goods rather than military goods- which would naturally see a greater amount of consumer goods for consumption, alongside a greater peasant income. The flaws of China from 1949-1978 are many, however as a whole economic planning placed China at a level far above most lower income nations and enabled the unprecedented growth of the Chinese economy once political goals were changed and international relations were at a friendly level.
I would definitely suggest everyone read this book, or at the very least the conclusion. I expect some data is out of date, and I have seem more positive evaluations (e.g Dongping Han- the unknown cultural revolution) and numbers online for living standards in pre-Deng China, and this may paint a more pessimistic picture than some may have previously had or currently have due to greater access to historical date, or it may be that modern data might actually show that this account is overly-optimistic.