Meade and Lee at Bristoe Station: The Problems of Command and Strategy after Gettysburg, from Brandy Station to the Buckland Races, August 1 to October 31, 1863

by Jeffrey Wm Hunt

The Civil War in the Eastern Theater during the late summer and fall of 1863 was anything but inconsequential. Generals Meade and Lee continued where they had left off, executing daring marches while boldly maneuvering the chess pieces of war in an effort to gain decisive strategic and tactical advantage. Cavalry actions crisscrossed the rolling landscape; bloody battle revealed to both sides the command deficiencies left in the wake of Gettysburg. It was the first and only time in the war Meade exercised control of the Army of the Potomac on his own terms. Jeffrey Wm Hunt brilliant dissects these and others issues in Meade and Lee at Bristoe Station: The Problems of Command and Strategy After Gettysburg, from Brandy Station to the Buckland Races, August 1 to October 31, 1863. The carnage of Gettysburg left both armies in varying states of command chaos as the focus of the war shifted west. Lee further depleted his ranks by dispatching James Longstreet (his best corps commander) and most of his First Corps via rail to reinforce Bragg's Army of Tennessee. The Union defeat that followed at Chickamauga, in turn, forced Meade to follow suit with the XI and XII Corps. Despite these reductions, the aggressive Lee assumed the strategic offensive against his more careful Northern opponent, who was also busy waging a rearguard action against the politicians in Washington. Meade and Lee at Bristoe Station is a fast-paced, dynamic account of how the Army of Northern Virginia carried the war above the Rappahannock once more in an effort to retrieve the laurels lost in Pennsylvania. When the opportunity beckoned Lee took it, knocking Meade back on his heels with a threat to his army as serious as the one Pope had endured a year earlier. As Lee quickly learned again, A. P. Hill was no Stonewall Jackson, and with Longstreet away Lee's cudgel was no longer as mighty as he wished. The high tide of the campaign ebbed at Bristoe Station with a signal Confederate defeat. The next move was now up to Meade. Hunt's follow-up volume to his well-received Meade and Lee After Gettysburg is grounded upon official reports, regimental histories, letters, newspapers, and other archival sources. Together, they provide a day-by-day account of the fascinating high-stakes affair during this three-month period. Coupled with original maps and outstanding photographs, this new study offers a significant contribution to Civil War literature.

Genres: Civil War, American Civil War

480 pages, Hardcover

Published December 19, 2018

Reviews

[Josh Liller · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the second in a trilogy covering the Army of the Potomac and Army of Northern Virginia from mid-July 1863 through the end of the year. The first book was Meade and Lee After Gettysburg: From Falling Waters to Culpeper Court House, July 1863, covering the second half of July 1863 and the story of how the two armies got from the Potomac to the Rappahannock. I read and enjoyed that book.

There are 450 pages of main text with footnotes, plus an extensive bibliography. The maps are simple but reasonably effective, and of the same style as the first book in this trilogy. There are some contemporary photos and sketches scattered throughout (typical Library of Congress fare), with the ones I found most interesting being the extent of the railroad destruction by Lee.

A little over a hundred pages covers August and most of September 1863. This includes the cavalry battles of Second Brandy Station, Culpepper Courthouse, and Jack's Shop. Hunt admits in the Preface that he didn't go into as much detail with the early cavalry battles as he could have. This part wraps up Longstreet west going west and Lee's withdrawal from the Rappahannock to the Rapidan, with Meade following. I was very surprised to learn that by the time Longstreet left both the AOTP and ANV were essentially back to their pre-Gettysburg strength, at least in terms of numbers.

We then move into the Bristoe Campaign proper. Howard and Slocum go west prompting Lee to go on the offensive. Battles at Morton's Ford and Third Brandy Station, and Meade withdraws back across the Rappahannock. Meade's counterattack across the Rappahannock while Lee crosses upstream.

The skirmish at Auburn gets three chapters and about a hundred pages, as Warren's II Corps finds itself in an unexpected jam. The Battle of Bristoe Station gets almost another hundred pages. The cavalry clash and chase at Buckland gets about 40 pages. The book ends with Lee back across the Rappahannock and Meade slowly moving that direction, repairing the wrecked railroad as he goes.

Hunt wraps things up an analysis of the command decisions during this three-month period. His most interesting conclusion is that sending Longstreet west was a mistake. Longstreet's prescience in the West achieved a Pyrrhic victory at Chickamauga and was otherwise a failure. If had he remained in Virginia then Lee's offensive would have been more effective, even if Meade had retained the XI and XII Corps. Longstreet at Chickamauga also resulted in Grant at Chattanooga, which helped bring Grant to Virginia in 1864.

I entered this trilogy as a fan of George Meade and I must say that at this point my opinion of him is badly shaken. I don't think Meade was a bad general, much less an incompetent one. But he was cautious and hesitant to a fault, needed strong direction from above, and lacked a certain assertiveness necessary for defeating Lee and winning the war (a quality which Grant possessed). Hunt makes it clear the Lincoln-Halleck-Meade command situation was not good and contrasts it to Lee-Davis. Meade seems to have been to sensitive to the possibility of being blamed should something go wrong. He also seems to have believed poor intelligence that overestimated Lee's manpower, especially after Longstreet left, and feared Lee might move into the Shenandoah and/or strike for the Potomac again. (I am reminded of the famous incident during the Battle of the Wilderness where Grant tells off an anonymoous panicked Union officer for being so worried about Lee.)

Meade made a number of mistakes during this period. He was too slow with his planning toward and across the Rapidan. He failed to properly guard the upper Rappahannock, and on the contrary made an overly aggressive push back across the Rappahannock. As a result, when he learned Lee was across he made a long and hasty withdrawal to Centerville, not making any effort to intercept Lee or strike his flank. His failure to pursue the ANV once it began to withdraw back toward the Rappahannock is understandable due to the weather.

Something repeatedly referenced, but (unless I missed it) never really addressed in detail was Meade's desire (prior to Lee's offensive) to make a move to Fredericksburg, a strategy which Lincoln opposed. Pages 145 and 447 have the most to say on the subject that I could find, and if I understand the citation this may be based entirely off Andrew Humphrey's essay in Battles & Leaders. Hunt also states that Meade believed the James River approach was best, which makes me wonder if that was another reason Grant retained him. I'm curious to see if this matter comes up again in the final volume about Mine Run since Meade successfully positioned himself during that offensive between Lee and Fredericksburg meaning he could have easily fallen back to where he wanted to be.

This period does not come across as the Union cavalry's finest hour, even excluding Kilpatrick's incompetence at Buckland. They seem to have mostly been outfought by Stuart's cavalry during the Bristoe Campaign, which impaired Meade's ability to react effectively to Lee's offensive. Other than being caught between the two wings of the AOTP at one point, Stuart seems to been at the top of his game during this period.

Like the first part of this trilogy, this is another solid work covering a badly neglected part of the Civil War. A must read for Civil War buffs. I look forward to the conclusion of the trilogy with Mine Run (no publication date or full title announced that I'm aware of).

[Matthew Bartlett · Rating 5 out of 5]

I’ve said this many times when it comes to the Battle of Gettysburg. The fight did not end with the failure of Longstreet’s Assault on the third day of battle or Pickett’s Charge as it’s more well known. There were still many fights to be had in the campaign, including the retreat back into Virginia. Thanks to Jeffrey Wm Hunt, he’s been taking care of that. In his previous work, Meade and Lee after Gettysburg, he began to chronicle the retreat and the fights that ensued on the road. Here in Meade and Lee at Bristoe Station, he continues that work.

Jeffrey Wm Hunt is the author of Meade and Lee After Gettysburg, and gained his Bachelors Degree in Government and his Masters Degree in History from the University of Texas. He is the Director of the Texas Military Forces Museum and an adjunct professor of History at Austin Community College. He’s been teaching there since 1988. He also served as the Director of the Living History Program at the Admiral Nimitz National Museum of the Pacific War in Fredericksburg.

As stated before, this book continues the narrative from Meade and Lee After Gettysburg. From there, we take a look at the continuing operations, and it doesn’t disappoint. While I know this is a history book, the action is fast-paced, and often times feels like we’re moving from exciting battle to exciting battle. Robert E. Lee continues to struggle with his corps commanders, mainly in the form of A.P. Hill, and the tug of war pushed through Pennsylvania until the Confederate forces could retreat across the Rappahannock River. However, this book also shows the struggle Meade had with trying to run the battles in his own way, eventually leading to interference from Washington. Meade’s actions during the campaign have always fascinated me, and the political nature of command is shown here in droves. It is possibly one of the things I enjoy most about this book. While Hunt could continually talk about the battles, and I wouldn’t mind if he did, it was the politicking that intrigued me. Success and failure are one thing, but blame is another, and that is prevalent in one of the concluding chapters concerning the retreat and pressure from Washington that Meade felt. Hunt’s narrative is wonderfully written, and overall, I think that this book perhaps takes care of one major flaw in how we see the battle today. We often see Lee and his army slowly trudging back to Virginia after Gettysburg, but this book proves different. It shows that the fight was still there, and I appreciate that.
I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in the Gettysburg Campaign. Not only is it well researched and well documented, but it is also told in a sweeping narrative that reads oftentimes like a novel. The amount of fighting during this period is well chronicled, and I can see his work being read for years by scholars and students alike. This proves, yet again, that we still have a lot to learn about the Gettysburg Campaign. Highly Recommended.

Matthew Bartlett

[Stephen Morrissey · Rating 4 out of 5]

Before Ulysses Grant arrives in the Virginia Theater, modern readers of Civil War history must feel a kindred spirit in dispirited, disappointed and downtrodden Abraham Lincoln: since McClellan's "slows" around Richmond, the Union president looked far and wide for a dashing general, one who, even if he did not take the same audacious risks as Robert E. Lee, would do the cold math that attrition and wearing down of the Confederacy, though at a high cost, would ultimately win the war. Readers are faced with that conundrum in Hunt's second volume of the post=Gettysburg campaigning, focusing on Meade's and Lee's dancing and prodding each other across the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers. Meade is ponderous, the very essence of prudence, but is handicapped by Lincoln's and Halleck's intrusion into strategy. Meade simply could not bring himself to fight an ill-omened offensive battle after seeing the success of defensive battle on the hills of Gettysburg.

Until October 1863, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia wins the moral war: the army is reconstituted, failing to crumble into the earth after the bloody defeat in Pennsylvania. However, Lee is unable to bag Meade, as he did with McClellan, Burnside, Pope, and Hooker. If Meade doesn't understand how to wage offensive war, he certainly embodies prudent defensive measures, retreating to a strong position from which Lee cannot grasp at him.

Like the first volume, Hunt's book is heavy on tactics, zooming into largely forgotten battles like Bristoe Station. However, the narrative is crisp, the maps plentiful, and the movements told in thorough detail to make the campaign come alive.

At the end of Hunt's second volume, we remain as tired as Lincoln of retreating. When will the Army of the Potomac attack and end the war? That question propels us further into 1863 and another winter of Union discontent.

[Mark Harden · Rating 5 out of 5]

If you thought that the second half of 1863 in the Eastern Theater was just both sides licking their wounds from Gettysburg, this outstanding campaign book will enlighten you. Hunt does an absolutely compelling job of recounting the tactics and maneuvers in the Bristoe Station campaign. It makes for exciting reading, as he effectively presents the options and decisions from the perspective of the commanders on the scene, with the information they had at the time. Includes excellent maps to allow you to follow the action.

Have you read campaign books where the generals are introduced as they appear with biographical background that reads like an intermission from an encyclopedia? Hunt introduces them, but with the perfect blend of anecdote and memorable characterization that shines a light on the story.

A minor thing, but I loved his chapter subheadings (e.g. "An Alarming Message - Great Danger - Meade Reacts - Retreat"); they not only enhanced the action with their summary but as a Cormac McCarthy fan, reminded me of "Blood Meridian"!

[Jason · Rating 4 out of 5]

Fantastic account of the too often glossed over summer and fall following Gettysburg. A great blend of strategic overview, big picture leadership decision making, and tactical movements. The epilogue’s discussion of leadership and the period’s impact on the rest of the war alone would make the whole book worth it.

[Mike · Rating 5 out of 5]

Fascinating review of a forgotten part of the civil war

[JeffParrotte · Rating 4 out of 5]

Meticulously researched and well-written, but the author sometimes leans into suspense a bit too much for the sake of narrative, especially when the drama doesn't pay off.