Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815

by Peter P. Hill

Shortly before the United States declared war on Great Britain in June 1812, Congress came within two votes of declaring war on Napoleon Bonaparte’s French empire. For six years, France and Britain had both seized American shipping. While common wisdom says that America was virtually an innocent in this matter, caught in the middle of the epic wars between France and Britain, Peter Hill has uncovered a far more complex and interesting history. French privateers and Napoleon’s navy were seizing American merchant ships in a concerted attempt to disrupt Britain’s commerce. American ships were the principal carriers of British goods to the continent, and Napoleon believed his best, and perhaps only, hope to defeat Britain was to cut off that market. While the French emperor sought an accommodation with America, the administrations of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison continually frustrated him. American diplomatic fumbling sent mixed messages, and American neutrality policies, Hill finds, were more punishing to France than to Britain. Always interested in lucrative ventures, American merchant ships also became the main suppliers of food to British forces fighting Napoleon in Spain and Portugal. By 1812, the United States was on a collision course with both Britain and France over clashes on the high seas, and war with two major powers at once might have proven disastrous for the young United States. Hill’s engaging narrative details the fascinating history of America’s troubled relationship with Napoleon and how this crisis with France was finally averted.

289 pages, Hardcover

First published April 14, 2005

Reviews

[Terry Tucker · Rating 3 out of 5]

I gave this book three stars for the dense writing style. However, it does get 4 starts for its extensive research and comprehensive content. - this book is rich in detail

Shortly before the U declared war on Great Britain in June of 1812, Congress came within two votes of declaring war on Napoleon. For 6 years, France and Britain had seized American Shipping. Contrary to common myth and High School history lessons, America was not an innocent caught in the middle between superpowers.

France seized American shipping to strangle Britain’s commerce. American carriers were primary shippers of British goods to the continent. Americans would fumble the diplomacy and send mixed messages to France and Britain. Americans used a strategy of hedging by attempting agreements and declaring strict neutrality of the seas. Congress hoped to coerce both belligerents in honoring the “Free Seas – make Free Goods” principle when they enacted a non-importation act, then an embargo aimed at France and Britain, a non-intercourse act, and then Macon’s Bill #2. Ironically, American neutrality policies were more damaging to France than to Britain.

In November 1807, Britain “orders-in council” required all neutral carriers bound for Europe to stop first at a British port and obtain customs and license certificates. A month later Napoleon retaliated by threatening seizure of vessels if Americans adhered to this control. Washingtons rub was on a vital distinction of what was permissible and impermissible venues of capture/seizure as the Superpowers continued to move the goal posts in the middle of game based on military failures or victories.

In similar fashion with contemporary history – Superpowers demanded “alignment” and strict alliances. Washington barely survived this Great Power competition as Britain and France demanded – in essence – an ideological and economic alliance in a zero-sum game of either or. The cost of which was high politically and economically as American businesses sought profits and did not care from whom, all the while the American public raged with anger against the Jefferson Administration to do something about the impressments, seizures and merchantmen in prison. Ironically, all these actors demanded adherence to a rules-based order, yet ignored those rules to their convenience in a “do as I say, not as I do” fashion.

In a foreign policy lesson for today (that America has long forgotten), passive resistance, proactive neutrality, diplomatic finesse, and hedging strategies through agreements – not alliances – are cautious strategies of weak states caught in the crossfire of Superpower wrath.

This is an excellent book that does a deep dive into the political and foreign policy exchanges of France, Britain, and the US.

[QOH · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book fills in a huge gap in most early Republic scholarship--how the US and France got on (or didn't) after the Quasi-War, then leading up to the War of 1812 and the end of Napoleon's reign in 1815. (Did you know we almost went to War with France again? Quasi-War II with France, perhaps. And it all starts with Florida...)

It's a good hook, but overall, it's hard to keep the interest level up because like most diplomacy, it's a lot of talk and no action.

If you are interested in the letter-by-letter (and consul-by-consul) account of the diplomacy covering these years, this is the book for you. If you are interested in kinda-sorta reading a summary, you'd be fine reading the introduction and the conclusion, because the history goes like this:

-France does something provoking (seizes ships on high seas, impounds ships in port, makes a decree that affects American shipping).
-Americans wring hands and protest through various diplomatic channels.
-France ignores/fobs off/pretends to agree to American demands.
-Nothing happens.
-France does something provoking (seizes ships on high seas, impounds ships in port, makes a decree that affects American shipping).
-Americans wring hands and protest through various diplomatic channels.
-France ignores/fobs off/pretends to agree to American demands.
-Nothing happens.
-France does something provoking (seizes ships on high seas, impounds ships in port, makes a decree that affects American shipping).
-Americans wring hands and protest through various diplomatic channels.
-France ignores/fobs off/pretends to agree to American demands.
-Nothing happens.

...and so on. There are nuances here, but if you are not really, really fascinated by them, you'll probably find this a dry read.

Really a 3.5, but I'm rounding up because it's thorough, is well-sourced (primary sources), and the author delves into some interesting historiography.