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The War in the Air, 1914-1994
2001 Air University Press oversize jumbo trade paperback, Alan Stephens (Making Sense of Strategy for the 21st Century). This book contains the proceedings of a conference held by the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) in Canberra in 1994. Since its publication by the RAAF's Air Power Studies Centre in that year, the book has become a widely used reference at universities, military academies, and other educational institutions around the world. This American edition is a somewhat shortened version with minor editorial changes. The contributors discuss the evolution of airpower from World War I to the near future. Essay subjects include World War I; doctrinal development in the interwar period; strategic bombing and support of surface forces in World War II; and airpower in the Korean War, Vietnam War, Arab-Israeli Wars, Falklands War, and Persian Gulf War; plus coverage of airpower in such peripheral conflicts as Operation El Dorado Canyon, the Malayan Emergency, and the Israeli raid on the Osirak nuclear reactor. - Amazon
- GenresMilitary History
418 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2001
6 people want to read
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March 11, 2013
It’s nice to know that professional military officers don’t take their jobs for granted. It has been my experience that good military officers are constantly learning just like professionals in any category. It was my privilege to attend a conference at our own Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base a few years back (it was a conference on games and the military). I was extremely impressed at the level of scholarship with which our officers studied the science of war—especially since it’s a brutal human reality where laypersons such as me think more of barbarism than scholarship. Yet, the truth is that it could be much more barbaric without studying the lessons of past conflicts.
The War in the Air: 1914-1994 covers 80 years of conflict in which air power has found a role. Edited by the Air University’s Alan Stephens, this features 14 papers delivered at a joint conference in Australia complete with questions and comments at the conclusion of those papers. It’s the next best thing to having attended the conference.
Amazingly, even in the discussions of air campaigns as disparate as WWI’s early use of winged aircraft and modern missile and smart technology in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and first Gulf War, there are several recurring themes: 1) the need for air superiority (control of the airspace to ensure unhindered operations on land/sea below—pp. 8, 34, 85, 149-50, 174, 210, 227n, and 339), 2) effectiveness of close air support (assuming air superiority--pp. 88, 148, 238, and 264 (expressing impossibility in Malayan Emergency), 266 (another perspective of Malayan Emergency), and 3) necessity of centralized command structures (pp. 146-7, 241, 294, and 339, (though there is also a case for decentralization on pp. 368-9).
Of course, along with notes on air successes, The War in the Air: 1914-1994 isn’t afraid to evaluate the failures, as well. The losses could be horrifying. The 8th Air Force’s loss of 11.5% of its B-17s (133 planes) during less than a month of 1943 is chilling to read (p. 75). That the R.A.F. lost over 1,000 planes in the Battle of Berlin just makes you shake your head at the waste in lives, machines, and munitions (p. 75). Early on in the Arab-Israeli Wars, the losses for the Israeli Air Force were more acceptable (1 IAF loss versus 40 enemy planes), but when their enemies switched to SAM defense, that loss ratio went to 2:4 (p. 203). And, just as I was traumatized to discover about the dud rate in WWII submarine torpedoes, I was quite aghast to read about the problem with bouncing bombs in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict (p. 235). I was also surprised to read about the horrible pilot:aircraft ratio of 3:1 in the ‘90s era Russian air force (p. 314).
My copy of this compendium of analysis is marked through and through with scribbles. My favorite references in the book were a quotation from General Eisenhower and one from the late economist John Kenneth Galbraith. The former was an incident in late June of 1944 where Lt. John Eisenhower was sitting in a jeep stuck in a major traffic jam in Normandy with his father, the late general and eventual President. The son commented to the more famous father, “You’d never get away with this if you didn’t have air superiority.” The general answered, “If I didn’t have air superiority, I wouldn’t be here.” (p. 100)
The latter involved that very economist who was so optimistic about bombing after World War II as saying that Americans “…should react with a healthy skepticism to the notion that air power will decide the outcome of a war in Kuwait and Iraq.” (p. 379) He likely changed his mind because of the lack of bang for the buck in Vietnam where much of the infrastructure being targeted was too easy to replace and the combat situations they needed to support were to be found in unfavorable terrain. But in the desert and with clear air superiority, both the Gulf War and the “liberation” of Iraq were largely won by air power. So, as smart as Galbraith was, he was wrong on this count.
Since it is a set of papers delivered at a conference, The War in the Air: 1914-1994 is not a typical history book, but it is full of some of the best historical research possible from the military perspective and offers rare insights into the process of conducting war. I gathered a certain amount of assurance in reading these papers and their responses. I suspect that many people would do so, as well.
The War in the Air: 1914-1994 covers 80 years of conflict in which air power has found a role. Edited by the Air University’s Alan Stephens, this features 14 papers delivered at a joint conference in Australia complete with questions and comments at the conclusion of those papers. It’s the next best thing to having attended the conference.
Amazingly, even in the discussions of air campaigns as disparate as WWI’s early use of winged aircraft and modern missile and smart technology in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict and first Gulf War, there are several recurring themes: 1) the need for air superiority (control of the airspace to ensure unhindered operations on land/sea below—pp. 8, 34, 85, 149-50, 174, 210, 227n, and 339), 2) effectiveness of close air support (assuming air superiority--pp. 88, 148, 238, and 264 (expressing impossibility in Malayan Emergency), 266 (another perspective of Malayan Emergency), and 3) necessity of centralized command structures (pp. 146-7, 241, 294, and 339, (though there is also a case for decentralization on pp. 368-9).
Of course, along with notes on air successes, The War in the Air: 1914-1994 isn’t afraid to evaluate the failures, as well. The losses could be horrifying. The 8th Air Force’s loss of 11.5% of its B-17s (133 planes) during less than a month of 1943 is chilling to read (p. 75). That the R.A.F. lost over 1,000 planes in the Battle of Berlin just makes you shake your head at the waste in lives, machines, and munitions (p. 75). Early on in the Arab-Israeli Wars, the losses for the Israeli Air Force were more acceptable (1 IAF loss versus 40 enemy planes), but when their enemies switched to SAM defense, that loss ratio went to 2:4 (p. 203). And, just as I was traumatized to discover about the dud rate in WWII submarine torpedoes, I was quite aghast to read about the problem with bouncing bombs in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict (p. 235). I was also surprised to read about the horrible pilot:aircraft ratio of 3:1 in the ‘90s era Russian air force (p. 314).
My copy of this compendium of analysis is marked through and through with scribbles. My favorite references in the book were a quotation from General Eisenhower and one from the late economist John Kenneth Galbraith. The former was an incident in late June of 1944 where Lt. John Eisenhower was sitting in a jeep stuck in a major traffic jam in Normandy with his father, the late general and eventual President. The son commented to the more famous father, “You’d never get away with this if you didn’t have air superiority.” The general answered, “If I didn’t have air superiority, I wouldn’t be here.” (p. 100)
The latter involved that very economist who was so optimistic about bombing after World War II as saying that Americans “…should react with a healthy skepticism to the notion that air power will decide the outcome of a war in Kuwait and Iraq.” (p. 379) He likely changed his mind because of the lack of bang for the buck in Vietnam where much of the infrastructure being targeted was too easy to replace and the combat situations they needed to support were to be found in unfavorable terrain. But in the desert and with clear air superiority, both the Gulf War and the “liberation” of Iraq were largely won by air power. So, as smart as Galbraith was, he was wrong on this count.
Since it is a set of papers delivered at a conference, The War in the Air: 1914-1994 is not a typical history book, but it is full of some of the best historical research possible from the military perspective and offers rare insights into the process of conducting war. I gathered a certain amount of assurance in reading these papers and their responses. I suspect that many people would do so, as well.
Displaying 1 of 1 review