"Comparative advantage" is an elegant economic theory that advocates free trade. However, the real world is far more complicated than the generalized version in the theory, as to adopt free trade as a policy is not just a economic issue but mostly a political issue. Thus, despite near unanimity findings
in the empirical study that free trade has broadly benefited the world economically as the "comparative advantage" theory predicted , we are still struggling to deal with conflicts and push-backs.
The book chronicles the evolve of American trade policy and inner working of the political decision-making. What makes it more than a history book is its comprehensive analysis on the fundamental cause of political impediment to free trade: political imbalance between free trade losers and winners. The losses from the free trade are more concentrated and losers are motivated to exert their political powers. Winners, on the other hand, tend to be politically quite as the benefit of the free trade is dispersed and takes time to materialize.
In author's view, America's 1934 trade policy system is a political mechanism to counter such political imbalance and align trade policy with what free trade economic theory would suggest. First half of the book highlights how congress delegates the trade policy to executive branch to protect itself from the protectionist pressures, how different bureaucracies in the executive branches, especially Trade Representatives (USTR), bridge business interests, congress and white house to promote trade, and how semi-judicial process of trade remedies works as pressure relief mechanism.
Another theme of the book is the new challenges America's free trade policy faced in 70s and 80s, and how 1934 system dealt with them. The last part of the book also brings the new development in 90s and early 2000s into the picture, touches on topics such as political polarization and the rise of China and the increasing trade imbalance between US and China.
To draw lessons from the history are absolutely important for today's purpose, as we are a facing a tough trade environment: the doha round is basically dead; TPP and TTIP are buried in the wave of anti-trade populism; Donald Trump became the first American president winning the election with an extreme anti-trade policy platform. Liberal trade order, aka 1934 system that Washington establishment/elites have believed and endorsed since great depression might come to an end soon. Or is the system resilient enough to survive another round of trade protectionism? After all, it survived 80s.
As the author correctly pointing out, the 80s protectionists are mostly business/corporate, who lost out in the competition with foreign imports, while 21st century protectionists are mostly labors, who suffer from lower wage and less job opportunity due to what they perceive, rightly or wrongly, as the consequences of the free trade. The 1934 system was built to deal with 80s' protectionism but not 21st century's. The trade authority delegated to executive branch gives president enough power to implement his/her own anti-trade agenda without much counter-balancing power in congress. Therefore, I fear there will be serious blow-back to free-trade for an extended period of time.