Idea of Pure Critique

by Iain M. Mackenzie

What is required of the idea of critique if it is to overcome indifference? This question addresses core themes in modern, post-Kantian and European philosophy, challenging theory's resignation in the face of contemporary political and economic formations. If indifference is to be overcome, critique must be demarcated in its purity, as an idea of critique in and of itself. For the idea of critique to become pure we must view critique as the construction of difference-only pure critique, as the construction of difference, can overcome our current age of indifference.

The Idea of Pure Critique will appeal to students of Kant as well as to the many interested in Deleuze and Guattari's contribution to philosophies of difference. More fundamentally, the book presents a series of political and philosophical challenges to the apathy that pervades modern forms of life.

Genres: Philosophy

160 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2004

Reviews

[Jaxen · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a really incredible piece that outlines the nature of what is required of critical activity for it to become 'pure.' What necessitates this move? If you have spent any time engaging with others on topics of philosophy, politics, cultural theory, etc., then you will probably be familiar with the "Theist DESTROYS Atheist in this Debate" or "Atheist uses RATIONALITY to KILL Theist" type of content. You probably have some stance in regard to these debates, but it seems undeniable that this kind of content rarely changes anyone's mind or gives anyone useful resources for pursuing creative questions of theology or knowledge or whatever else. These types of debates or reaction videos are only capable of engaging in 'critcism', which MacKenzie defines as the "unreflective to-and-fro of claim and counter-claim" (6), because they engage each other on the same terrain of baseless assumptions and thus giving rise to indifference. This indifference is not silent, it is "the transformation of metaphysical complexities into what we might now call the Sunday supplement version of philosophy -- all style and labels and no real substance and subtlety" (3), which is true of (nearly) all YouTube pop-philosophy (or most of 'BreadTube').

The first step towards an idea of pure critique is a subtraction of criticism from the critical action. But this is not enough because if we insist on some higher justification or judgment for our critical nature (something that MacKenzie accuse Kant of doing, where he assumes moral and theological ends for reason), then we have placed something above and beyond the realm of critique, which therefore leads us to the same quagmire of the to-and-fro that criticism is characteristic of. At this point it might appear strange that we should even care about pure critique, if what is required of it is the removal of a judgment or justification for such critique; is pure critique a negative and empty idea, merely subtracting all that it is not? MacKenzie argues that pure critique is essentially a creative procedure and the construction of difference, which requires avoiding 1) an assumed given terrain that concepts all occupy, 2) an assumed given idea of what critical activity involves, and 3) an assumed given account of the nature of the critic (27). MacKenzie thinks that the constructivist approach to philosophy engendered by Deleuze and Guattari have all the elements in effecting an idea of pure critique as a way of philosophy, mirroring their account of the relationship between the 'concept,' the 'plane of immanence,' and the 'conceptual personae.'

It is at this point that I will justify my three star rating of a book which, in my opinion, is deserving of three stars: I have never read a full work of Deleuze and Guattari and as such find it nearly impossible to fully grasp the three ideas and the problems they arise within this work. While MacKenzie does a very good job in introducing D&G's jargon and way of thinking, he makes it very clear in a footnote that this work is not an introduction to D&G's thought and I think that much of my confusion with the rest of the work (which includes most portions of 'Philosophy as Pure Critique' and 'Four Problems of Pure Critique') will be aided by reading through D&G (especially 'What is Philosophy?') in conjunction with this book. In a sense, I've come to this book too early to fully appreciate its richness, although I have an intuition toward the importance of this project and will be keeping up with MacKenzie's publications, this book is the first part in a three part project on the nature of critical activity.

[Adrian Mendizabal · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is really a very demanding book. It has specific assertions that, for some practical reasons, I cannot apply to my writing. But I admire its commitment to constructivist approach in philosophy. Basically, it has three main assertions (and I quote from p. 89):

'First, pure critique must avoid taking that w/c is criticized as given. Second, pure critique must avoid simply assuming what is to be critical: that is, that the content of the critique itself can be taken as given. Third, pure critique must avoid reliance upon a predetermined idea of the critic. It is only by meeting there requirements that critique can avoid justificatory and judgmental regimes and thereby become pure.'