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Out of Error: Further Essays on Critical Rationalism
If there has been some modest advance, since Karl Popper's death in 1994, in the general understanding of his critical rationalist theory of knowledge and philosophy of science, there is still widespread resistance both to it and to the recognition of the magnitude of his contribution. Popper long ago diagnosed the logical problems of traditional enlightenment rationalism (as did some irrationalists), but instead of pretending that they are readily solved or embracing irrational defeatism (as do postmodernists), he provided a cogent and liberating rationalist alternative. This book promotes, defends, criticizes, and refines this alternative. David Miller is the foremost exponent of the purist critical rationalist doctrine and here presents his mature views, discussing the role that logic and argument play in the growth of knowledge, criticizing the common understanding of argument as an instrument of justification, persuasion or discovery and instead advocating the critical rationalist view that only criticism matters. Miller patiently and thoroughly undoes the damage done by those writers who attack critical rationalism by invoking the sterile mythology of induction and justification that it seeks to sweep away. In addition his new material on the debate on verisimilitude is essential reading for all working in this field.
- GenresPhilosophy
314 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2006
About the author
David Miller
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Mi...
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Displaying 1 of 1 review
December 2, 2014
I have been wanting to write a review of David Miller's Out Of Error since I finished the book months ago. This is not an easy book to tackle, and it is not an easy review to write. Critical Rationalists are the most discerning and critical thinkers out there, and I'm sure I will hear, as I should, of any errors below.
First, I have to say that I am a lay falsificationist and a weak falsificationist at that. For me, falsificationism helps remove error and bias from my own thinking, falsification is more of a applicable tool to other areas of thought than it is a system to defend.
That said, it is easy to see why Miller and his book are pivotal to those who interested in the refined nuances of the debate against the murkier justificationist detractors. Even for the lay falsificationist, at some point in their growth, this book should be on their reading list. Although, give yourself some time to get through it.
Miller starts off with history of Popper and then quickly moves into the fundamentals of falsification. He maps out the three stages, including the methodological and epistemological stages of critical rationalism. For falsificationist, or at least me, this is the most compelling aspect of critical rationalism. It was a pleasure reading these refined methodological and epistemological concerns.
Miller then goes on to decimate the arguments of other detractors. Recently, I read an argument that Bayes was an extension of Popper. This has troubled me for this time. I was surprised to see Miller address this. He distinguishes between Bayesianism and subjective Bayesians. In one of my favorite lines he states, "it must be stressed that the mere use of...Bayes's theorem does not characterize Bayesianism any more than the use of Pythagoras' theorem characterizes Pythagorism." To horribly paraphrase, Miller considers subjective Bayesians to be nihilists not interested in the epistemological truth values. It removes the important 'human' critical element. This has been extremely helpful to me for analyzing Bayesianism and other evolutionary systems.
The book begins to turn when Miller replies to D. G. Mayo. Mayo holds that certain statistical methods have some utility and everydayness. That they need to be warranted, grounded, or substantiated. This has always been an aspect of falsificationism that has troubled me. I don't need falsificationism to weigh a preference or bet money. Again, Miller is on his toes.
Here Miller distinguishes between the absolute sceptic and the traditional sceptic. He points out that conclusive justificationism is unavailable. He considers Mayo's use of these statistical methods to be a non sequitur. And, this is a really good point. We know that the traditional sceptic has later found out to be in error when utilizing justificationist' arguments.
There is an irresponsibility to Mayo's arguments. That justification is what is at-hand doesn't make it error free. And, I wouldn't hold this position if I didn't see the abuses in the lay world. For example, in social media, opponents to an issue will throw out intuitive arguments to prove their bias like they are playing the kids' card game speed, throwing out intuitive arguments as if they need to get the justifications out of their hand.
From this point in the book, Miller goes on to very nuanced arguments utilizing symbolic logic. It's been more than twenty years since I studied philosophy and logic so I had to dust off those synapses to get through some of these arguments. But, I would advise any one reading this book to work through these chapters. It was very helpful for me to follow other critical rationalist discussions.
Even being beyond me--as stated, I am more interested in the applicability of falsification than defending it--I found this book to be really helpful. There are some great nuggets in it. I see why some more intelligent defenders consider it a bible, but it should also be required reading for the lay falsificationist at some point in their process as well.
First, I have to say that I am a lay falsificationist and a weak falsificationist at that. For me, falsificationism helps remove error and bias from my own thinking, falsification is more of a applicable tool to other areas of thought than it is a system to defend.
That said, it is easy to see why Miller and his book are pivotal to those who interested in the refined nuances of the debate against the murkier justificationist detractors. Even for the lay falsificationist, at some point in their growth, this book should be on their reading list. Although, give yourself some time to get through it.
Miller starts off with history of Popper and then quickly moves into the fundamentals of falsification. He maps out the three stages, including the methodological and epistemological stages of critical rationalism. For falsificationist, or at least me, this is the most compelling aspect of critical rationalism. It was a pleasure reading these refined methodological and epistemological concerns.
Miller then goes on to decimate the arguments of other detractors. Recently, I read an argument that Bayes was an extension of Popper. This has troubled me for this time. I was surprised to see Miller address this. He distinguishes between Bayesianism and subjective Bayesians. In one of my favorite lines he states, "it must be stressed that the mere use of...Bayes's theorem does not characterize Bayesianism any more than the use of Pythagoras' theorem characterizes Pythagorism." To horribly paraphrase, Miller considers subjective Bayesians to be nihilists not interested in the epistemological truth values. It removes the important 'human' critical element. This has been extremely helpful to me for analyzing Bayesianism and other evolutionary systems.
The book begins to turn when Miller replies to D. G. Mayo. Mayo holds that certain statistical methods have some utility and everydayness. That they need to be warranted, grounded, or substantiated. This has always been an aspect of falsificationism that has troubled me. I don't need falsificationism to weigh a preference or bet money. Again, Miller is on his toes.
Here Miller distinguishes between the absolute sceptic and the traditional sceptic. He points out that conclusive justificationism is unavailable. He considers Mayo's use of these statistical methods to be a non sequitur. And, this is a really good point. We know that the traditional sceptic has later found out to be in error when utilizing justificationist' arguments.
There is an irresponsibility to Mayo's arguments. That justification is what is at-hand doesn't make it error free. And, I wouldn't hold this position if I didn't see the abuses in the lay world. For example, in social media, opponents to an issue will throw out intuitive arguments to prove their bias like they are playing the kids' card game speed, throwing out intuitive arguments as if they need to get the justifications out of their hand.
From this point in the book, Miller goes on to very nuanced arguments utilizing symbolic logic. It's been more than twenty years since I studied philosophy and logic so I had to dust off those synapses to get through some of these arguments. But, I would advise any one reading this book to work through these chapters. It was very helpful for me to follow other critical rationalist discussions.
Even being beyond me--as stated, I am more interested in the applicability of falsification than defending it--I found this book to be really helpful. There are some great nuggets in it. I see why some more intelligent defenders consider it a bible, but it should also be required reading for the lay falsificationist at some point in their process as well.
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